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ABSTRACT 
 
For years, prosecutors in Taiwan have been faced with criticism from scholars, 
lawyers, and judges over the abuse or errors of prosecutorial charging decision where 
there is insufficient evidence to indict a case or there is an ill or unjustified motivation or 
consideration behind the charge, whether those charges are intentionally or erroneously 
made. These criticisms strongly suggest that the current screening mechanism does not 
function effectively as a shield to protect the accused and to scrutinize prosecutorial 
charging decisions. As a result, not only does unwarranted charging inflict a 
discriminative effect upon defendants, but it also burdens our criminal justice system 
with inflated caseloads and fosters mistrust of the system by the citizens.  
 
The prosecutorial system in Taiwan mainly adopts mandatory prosecution, which 
means that prosecutors are obligated to charge once the requirement of mandatory 
prosecution is satisfied, i.e., sufficient evidence to entertain a suspicion that the defendant 
committed the crime is reached, in felony cases. But in practice, prosecutors retain a large 
measure of decisions that permit abusive or erroneous charges to be filed. Therefore, the 
effective screening of prosecutorial charging occupies a critical stage in criminal justice 
to prevent potential wrongful prosecution and conviction. However, one may infer that 
the system is seldom being employed to screen charging decisions, given that both the 
overall offense and the corruption offense dismissal rates are much lower than 1%.  
Although these statistics are not determinative, they still strongly imply the screening 
system in Taiwan is ineffective.  As such, the current screening mechanism does not 
iii 
 
function effectively as a shield to protect the accused and scrutinize unwarranted 
charging decisions.  
 
The current body of research does point out the problems of prosecutorial 
charging decision, yet it does not address any prospective solutions. Moreover, it does not 
propose any reforms to the current screening mechanism or has any evaluation of the 
current screening mechanism. It is, therefore, the goal of this dissertation to analyze 
current deficiencies of the mechanism and to institute potential alternatives for screening 
mechanisms in order to eradicate unfounded or erroneous prosecution.  
 
In achieving this goal, the methodology of “comparative analysis” is the major 
underpinning.  Legal theories from various bodies of research are referenced in order to 
identify the characteristics of the major systems of the United States and France, as well 
as address the advantages and disadvantages of those screening mechanisms, such as the 
grand jury and preliminary hearing mechanisms in the United States, and investigating 
judges (juge d’instruction) in France.  These features are then compared and contrasted to 
Taiwan’s current system to discover the defects in the design of its screening mechanism, 
including the screening procedure, screener neutrality, evidentiary rule, the right to 
counsel, the threshold to screening, and discovery. Furthermore, screening mechanisms 
from different countries originated from different historical backgrounds as well as 
different legal cultures, which are explored to determine if the resulting procedures 
provide a potential vehicle for Taiwan to reform its current screening system.  
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Eventually, the proposed reform of the screening mechanism would adopt 
adversarial-style procedures that emphasize an evenhanded process for both parties, more 
participation and input from the defense, and independent screening procedures that 
allow the screening judge to hold a hearing. Both structural reform to the screening 
procedure and adding an adversarial component to improve the screening would lead to a 
comprehensive and improved solution for Taiwan.  Through the external improvements, 
the system would scrutinize prior to charging, increasing the chances of weeding out 
unfounded prosecutions. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
I. Problems Presented 
 
 For years, prosecutors in Taiwan have faced criticisms from scholars, lawyers, and judges 
over the abuse and poor judgment of prosecutorial charging decisions where there is not 
sufficient evidence to indict a suspect or there is an unjustified motivation or consideration 
behind the charge, whether those charges are intentionally or erroneously made.1  Additionally, 
the current screening mechanism is criticized for not functioning effectively as a shield to protect 
the accused and to scrutinize prosecutorial charging decisions.  As a result, it is believed that 
unwarranted charging inflicts a discriminative effect upon defendants, burdens the criminal 
justice system with inflated caseloads, and fosters mistrust of the judicial system by our citizens.  
These beliefs have a detrimental effect on the image of the prosecutors’ professionalism, 
neutrality, and independence.  
 
The prosecution system in Taiwan mainly adopts mandatory prosecution, which means 
that prosecutors are obligated to charge when the requirement of mandatory prosecution is 
satisfied, i.e., in felony cases, as soon as there is sufficient evidence to entertain suspicion that 
                                                
1 Judicial Reform Foundation, Jian Zuo Ni Lei Le Ma? Zhui Qi E Jian Xi Lie Ji Zhe Hui Zhi Yi Zhi Zhi Si[The 
Prosecutor, Are You Tired? In the Pursuit of Evil Prosecutor Conference [The Prosecutor, Are You Tired? In the 
Pursuit of Evil Prosecutor Conference I to IV] (Taiwan), Nov. 29, 2011, Dec. 8, 2011, Mar. 29, 2012, Jun.11, 2012, 
available at http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/RTE/myform_detail.asp?offset=20&id=3629 (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).  
see also Jaw-Perng Wang, Yin yan ti yao yi Xing shi zhen cha ren quan zhi bao zhang, Si fa gai ge shi zhou nian di 
hui gu yu zhan wang hui yi shi lu [Synopsis of the Protection of human right in criminal investigation, Tenth 
Anniversary Conference on Retrospective and Perspective of Judicial Reform Minutes], 339, 359, Law Book Series 
II of Institutum Jurisprudentiae, Academia Sinica(2010) (proposals by professor Wang indicates that some charging 
cases demonstrate the deficiency of over-control, or under-control, a situation of abuse of prosecutorial charging 
power) (Taiwan). 
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the charged committed the crime, in felony cases.2  In theory, the underlying principle for the 
adoption of mandatory prosecution was to shield prosecutors from political or improper 
influence and abuse of power.  Moreover, legislators want to prevent administrative hierarchical 
intervention, demand for unitary application of law, and consistency of decisionmaking.3 
 
In practice, whether prosecutors’ decisions are really independent of external influence is 
still in question, especially when they retain charging decision power, can abuse it, and breach 
the requirements of mandatory prosecution.  Thus, under a mandatory prosecution system, abuse 
of mandatory prosecution or errors of judgment by prosecutors regarding the decision to 
prosecute still in exist.  After all, the laws in books sometimes differ from the laws in action.  
Therefore, the effective screening of prosecutorial charging remains a critical stage in criminal 
justice to prevent the potentially wrongful prosecution and conviction.      
 
The mechanism for supervision of charging decision was added to the Code of Criminal 
Procedure Article 161in 2002.  Since then, Taiwan has not had any additional regulatory efforts 
and institutional checks to reform or examine the mechanism.  It is uncertain that the new system 
functions as originally designed.  Moreover, there is no existing academic work that examines 
the effectiveness of the newly promulgated mechanism.  Whether the new screening mechanism 
is a sufficient mechanism for reviewing the prosecutors’ charging decision or error of judgment 
is unknown.  We might a better picture from empirical data.   
                                                
2Here, it refers to offenses that are not listed in the Taiwan Code of Criminal Procedure article 376.  Offenses 
enumerated in article 376 are applied by discretionary prosecution. 
3 YU-XIONG LIN, JIAN CHA GUAN ZAI SU SUNG FA SHANG ZHI REN WU YU YI WU[THE PROSECUTOR’S MISSION 
AND OBLIGATION IN THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE] in JIAN CHA GUAN LUN [THE PROSECUTOR], 26-28 (1999) 
(Taiwan).  
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First, the system may seldom be used to screen charging decisions, because both the 
overall offense and the corruption offense dismissal rates are much lower than 1%4 (See infra 
Appendix A, Table 1, and Table 2), especially when the corruption offense conviction rate is 
disproportionately low, about 63%5 (See table 3), when compared with the overall offense 
conviction rate (See table 4).  Comparatively, in New York State, the grand jury dismissal rate is 
5.9%, 6  which suggests that the screening mechanism is employed positively to remove 
unwarranted cases.  Even when the U.S. Federal grand jury dismissal rate is only 0.4% in 1984,7 
the rate is also much higher than that of Taiwan.   
 
Second, because the overall offense dismissal rate in Taiwan is so low, ranging from 
0.0025% to 0.03%, one might deem that either the prosecution is of extraordinary high quality or 
the screening mechanism is not used properly.  Perhaps prosecutions in Taiwan have a very low 
dismissal rate because they know their decisions are subject to the screening mechanism and, 
                                                
4Given the data and information from judicial authority gathered, the annual dismissal rate is far less than 1%.see Di 
fang fa yuan xing shi di yi shen an jian cai pan jie quo-an nian bie fen [Results of Judgments and Rulings of 
Criminal First Instance Cases by the District Courts – by Year], in JUDICIAL YUAN, JUDICIAL STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK tbl 62 (2011) (Taiwan), available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/index1.htm (last visited Sep.10, 
2012); Di fang fa yuan xing shi di yi shen an jian cai pan jie quo-an zui ming fen [Results of Judgments and Rulings 
of Criminal First Instance Cases by the District Courts – by Offenses], in JUDICIAL YUAN, JUDICIAL STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK tbl 64 (2011) (Taiwan), available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/index1.htm (last visited Oct.10, 
2012). 
5 From May, 2008 to May, 2012, the conviction rate of corruption offense is 63.1% while the overall offense 
conviction rate is 95.7%. see Ge di fang fa yuan jian cha shu tan du an jian 97 nian 5 yue qi jin ji quan ban xian an 
ding zui lu ge nian du tong ji biao[Corruption and overall criminal cases conviction rate of national prosecutors 
office from May, 2008 to 2012] in MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, Statistic of Justice,  
available at http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/273111445976.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2012). 
6See Ric Simmons, Re-Examination the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy In The Criminal Justice 
System?,82 B. U. L.Rev.1, 31-32 (2002), for a discussion that the federal grand jury dismissal rate is0.4 % in 1984 
and the state grand jury in N. Y. dismissal rate is5.9%; Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: Toward A 
Functional Makeover Of The Ancient Bulwark Of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 342 (2010).  
7Simmons, id. see also U. S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for United States Attorney, Statistical Report 
United States Attorney’s Office Fiscal Year 1984, (1984)(reporting the trial conviction rate that was convicted by 
trial is 80%). 
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therefore, only bring charges that are very strong.  In such a case, we would expect the final 
conviction rate for these charges to be quite high.  If we examine the overall conviction rate 
throughout these years, the conviction rate is in fact quite high8; however, the overall conviction 
rates are broken down into distinct felonies, like corruption, a different picture emerges.  For 
example, the conviction rates for corruption offenses, including facilitation of payment and 
favoritism averages only 59.48% and ranges from a low of 49% to a high of 68% from May 
2001 to 20129 (See Table 3).  Then, by comparing the conviction and dismissal rates within the 
same year for the corruption offense, the dismissal rates are mostly zero10 (See Table 2). 
 
Although all these statistics are descriptive and inconclusive, they nevertheless suggest 
that the new screening mechanism is underemployed.  This dissertation is convinced that some 
non-guilty cases should not enter trial in the first place, and that the screening mechanism is 
rarely effective in dismissing the cases.  Obviously, some cases shall not be brought to court, and 
shall be weeded out before the onset of trial.   
 
Furthermore, one empirical project was outsourced to a private institute, Decision-
Making Research, by the Ministry of Justice in Taiwan to examine the reason for low conviction 
                                                
8 From May 2008 to June 2012, the overall offenses conviction rates are 95.7%, 95.4%, 95.6%, 96.1%, and 96.1%. 
See Ministry of Justice, Statistic of Justice, available at 
http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/273111445976.pdf(last visited Aug. 30, 2012).  
9Ge di fang fa yuan jian cha shu tan du an jian 97 nian 5 yue qi jin ji quan ban xian an ding zui lu ge nian du tong ji 
biao[Corruption and overall criminal cases conviction rate of national prosecutors office from May,2008 to 2012] in 
Ministry of Justice, Statistic of Justice, available at http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/273111445976.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 21, 2012); From May, 2008 to May, 2012, the average conviction rate of corruption offense is 
63.1% while the overall offense conviction rate is 95.7%, see Ministry of Justice, Statistic of Justice, available at: 
http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9221455414.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
10 Di fang fa yuan xing shi di yi shen an jian cai pan jie quo-an zui ming fen [Results of Judgments and Rulings of 
Criminal First Instance Cases by the District Courts – by Year], in JUDICIAL YUAN, JUDICIAL STATISTICS 
YEARBOOK tbl 64 (2011) (Taiwan), available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/index1.htm (last visited Oct.10, 
2012). 
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rates in corruption offenses and to seek ways to improve the conviction rate.11  They collected 
opinions of judges, prosecutors, and attorneys, by sending questionnaires to the prosecutors’ 
offices, courthouses, law firms, and by collecting the feedback anonymously from these three 
groups.12  From the 295 judges who provided reasons for “not guilty” verdicts13 279 judges 
(94.6%) considered the main reason to be insufficient charging evidence, 29 judges (9.8%) found 
the probative value of all presented evidence not sufficient to prove the elements of the charged 
crimes, 17 judges (5.8%) found that major evidence was excluded, 20 judges (6.8%) provided 
other reasons, such as different interpretations of the law, the charged act constituted no offense, 
etc., and 2 judges (0.7%) refused to give an answer (See Table 5).  Considering the extremely 
high number of answers, it strongly suggests that corruption prosecutions often fail due to 
insufficient evidence. 
 
Judges were also asked whether prosecutors abuse the charging power.  Among 353 of 
judges who answered this question,14 6.5% of judges answered yes, very serious, 19.8% yes, 
quite serious, 52.4% of judges considered the abuses do exist but not serious, 14.7% answered 
not at all, 6.5% of judges had no comment (See Table 6).  To sum up, all the answers 
acknowledging some level of prosecutorial abuse of charging power is 78.7%, and about 26.3% 
of judges thought that abuse was “very” or “quite serious.” 
 
                                                
11FA WU BU, DIAO CHA JI GOU: JUE CE DIAO CHA GU FEN YOU XIAN GONG SI[Ministry of Justice, Research 
Institute: Decision Making Research], Taiwan DI QU GONG WU YUAN FAN TAN DU ZUI DING ZUI LU ZHI WEN 
JUAN DIAO CHA [Taiwan conviction rate of government officials corruption questionnaire and research], 1-2 
(2008)(Taiwan) (Among the judges group, they sent out 1562 questionnaires and recalled 506 copies, excluding 
invalid samples, there are 498 valid samples). 
12Id. at 3-6. 
13Id. at 49 (noting this is multiple choices question). 
14Id. at 56. 
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With regard to low conviction rates 498 judges responded, and the following summarizes 
their answer 15  (See Table 7).  Three hundred thirty-two(66.7%) judges deemed that the 
prosecutor did not conduct detailed investigation and prosecuted the case recklessly; 296 (59.4%) 
judges stated that judges adopt very high standard of proof in corruption cases due to the 
seriousness of the penalty; 209 (42%) judges thought that the prosecutors or investigators did not 
conduct proper investigation; 166 (33.3%) considered that both prosecutors and investigators are 
incapable of investigating these cases; 88 (17.7%) judges considered that some of the judges lack 
relevant social experience and expertise to handle these cases; 84 (16.9%) judges considered 
litigating prosecutors’ poor performance at trial; 32 (6.4%) judges stated other reasons, such as 
the corruption crime nature makes it hard to collect evidence, the prosecutor charged on the basis 
of merit of promotion, or performance, etc.; and 10 (2%) judges refused to give an answer.  Once 
again, judges considered that prosecutors are not committed to their job and close cases in 
reckless ways.  These figures demonstrate the severity of the abuse of prosecution in corruption 
cases and suggest how urgently Taiwan needs reform.  They echo the society’s call for the 
restraint of this power.   
 
Moreover, in a case, recently revealed and condemned, a defendant was charged with 
rape and burglary of a victim at knifepoint. The prosecutor charged the defendant without a DNA 
test report, but merely on the basis of his confession and victim’s identification.  The defendant 
was in custody until trial. During the trial, the DNA (extracted from the victim) examination 
came out and proved that the offense was committed by another.  The court eventually cleared 
                                                
15Id. at 68, 75 (noting this is multiple choices question). 
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the defendant.16  As a matter of law, a mere confession could not prove a defendant’s guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt without corroborating evidence.17  The community and the accused’s 
family condemned the prosecution for abuse of prosecutorial power.18  In another case, the 
prosecutor charged a theft offense on the basis of a confession where nothing had been stolen.  It 
was revealed by the judicial reform foundation to caution the Ministry of Justice for rock solid 
prosecution and establishment of concrete measures to prevent such abuses of power.19 
 
Finally, in a panel discussion held by the Judicial Reform Foundation, then a High Court 
Prosecutors’ Office prosecutor, Eric Chen, and a famous criminal field attorney, Wellington L. 
Koo, both pointed out that the new screening mechanism adopted in 2002 would not function to 
weed out the cases because of the threshold issue.20  Koo predicted that as long as the prosecutor 
proceeds with the charge, chances that a judge would exercise her screening authority are not 
high.21  Therefore, the current screening mechanism does not function effectively as a shield to 
protect the accused and scrutinize unwarranted charging decisions.  Thus, Taiwan’s major 
problem in the field of charging decisions is that the “screening mechanism” is ineffective at 
                                                
16Fa Wu Bu Xin Wen Gao[Press Release, Ministry of Justice], Zhen Dui Shi Si Ri Mei Ti Bao Zai Shei Jian Cha 
Jian Cha Guan Yi Wen Fa Wu Bu Shuo Ming Ru Xia [Ministry of Justice Response to Media on the topic of who 
check prosecutor](Taiwan), Aug, 15, 2011, available at 
http://www.moj.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=239773&ctNode=27518&mp=001 ( last visited Aug. 20, 2012). 
17Xing shi Su song fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 156(2013)(Taiwan). 
18 Dong Hai Zhi Lang Luo Wang Ji Fu Ren Jia Shu Han Yuan [The rapist of the Tung hai University student was 
captured, the original accused’ family call for investigation of the prosecutor], Zhong Yang She[CNA NEWS] 
(Taiwan), Nov. 8, 2011, available at http://n.yam.com/cna/society/201108/20110813059953.html (last visited Aug. 
30, 2012). 
19 Jian Zuo Ni Lei Le Ma? Zhui Qi E Jian Xi Lie Ji Zhe Hui Zhi San [The Prosecutor, Are You Tired? In the Pursuit 
of Evil Prosecutor Conference III], Si Fa Gai Ge Gi Gin Hui[Judicial Reform Foundation](Taiwan), Mar. 29, 2012, 
available at http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/RTE/myform_detail.asp?id=3557 (last visited Aug. 30, 2012). 
20 Judicial Reform Foundation, Ming Jian Si Fa Yuan: Xing Su Xin Zhi Zuo Tan Hui Zhen Li[Conference on the 
New Enactment of Code of Criminal Procedure Minutes],37 SI FA GAI GE ZA ZHI [Judicial Reform 
Magazine](Taiwan), Feb. 15, 2002, available at http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/RTE/myform_detail.asp?id=1549 (last 
visit Oct. 23, 2012). 
21Id.  
8 
 
removing cases that do not warrant trial.  Conversely, an effective filter would shield the 
innocent from unfounded prosecutions, and it would also function as a cost-saving valve that 
protects defendants’ rights and prevents social and financial costs.   
 
The current body of research points out the problems of prosecutorial charging decisions, 
yet it does not address possible solutions.22  Moreover, reforms to the current screening 
mechanism are not found in the literature, nor are there any evaluations of the current screening 
mechanism.  It is, therefore, the task of this dissertation to analyze current deficiencies of the 
mechanism and to institute potential alternatives that eradicate unfounded or erroneous 
prosecutions. 
 
II. Methodology 
 
In achieving the goals of this project, the methodology of “comparative analysis” is the 
major underpinning.  Current legal theories from various bodies of research are referenced to 
identify the characteristics of the major systems of the United States and France.  Furthermore, 
the advantages and disadvantages of the screening mechanisms are addressed, such as the grand 
jury and preliminary hearing mechanisms in the United States, and investigating judges (juge 
d’instruction) in France.23  Comparative studies not only compare and contrast the different 
origins and ideology of legal systems, different exercises of the affected institutions, legal actors 
with which a system is involved, and legal culture that a system generates, but also aim to 
                                                
22 Wang, supra note 1, at 359. 
23 Renee Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for An American Murder in The 
French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 801-802 (2001). 
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achieve effective transplant in the receiving countries.24  As Judge Richard Posner stated, “It is 
important, however, to adapt the imported code to the local culture, a task for local, not foreign, 
lawyers who know something about the country whose law they are borrowing.”25  He indicated 
that “both foreign law and application of local customs as formal law are well-tried methods by 
which a nation can adopt a legal code without starting from scratch.”26  Professor Vernon 
Valentine Palmer said that “[a]s an abstract matter, comparative law has but one method to 
compare and contrast norms, institutions, culture, attitudes, methodologies, and even entire legal 
systems.”27  The legal transplant construction includes interpretation and reinterpretation of the 
legal procedural traditions, the roles and functions of participant personnel, and the practice of 
those who are informed by existing legal cultures.28  After all, blind transplantation is ineffective 
if those factors are not properly considered.           
 
Borrowing of foreign law, i.e. legal transplant, is not unfamiliar in Taiwan since Taiwan 
was once colonized by Japan.  The historical path of Taiwan’s criminal procedure system is an 
example of the imposition of an external system through colonization.  Later on, the Taiwan 
criminal justice system was modeled after the German system until a recent shift leaning towards 
the adversarial system of the United States, starting around a decade ago.29  Many of the 
                                                
24 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163, 164-
166 (1995). 
25 Richard A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 The World Bank Research 
Observer (No. 1), 5-6 (1998), available athttp://elibrary.worldbank.org/content/article/1564-6971-13-1-1-
11;jsessionid=3no9o2sa60dmv.z-wb-live-01 (last visited Oct 5, 2012).   
26Id. at 6. 
27 Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 262-263 (2005). 
28 Ed Cape, Jacqueline Hodgson, Ties Prakken & Taru Spronken, Procedural Rights at the Investigative stage: 
Towards a Real Commitment to Minimum Standards, 1 (2007),available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440229.  
29Quan Gou Si Fa Ga iGe Hui Yi Xin Wen Gao[National-wide Judicial Reform Conference News Release](Taiwan), 
Jun. 4, 1999, available athttp://www.judicial.gov.tw/aboutus/aboutus05/aboutus05-04.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
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transplant processes of legal institutions in criminal procedure of Taiwan echoes Judge Posner’s 
axiom that it is important to adapt the foreign laws to local culture and customs. 
 
The data obtained from the judicial authorities and the empirical project indicate that 
cases that bore insufficient evidence have been screened out in extremely low numbers when 
compared to the total number of cases being prosecuted, together with the conviction rate of 
specific types of felonies, such as corruption, being quite low in comparison to other types of 
cases. This reinforces the idea that the newly enacted screening mechanism is rarely being used 
by judges and is simply not functioning effectively in Taiwan.  It may be the case that local 
judges are unfamiliar with this new law borrowed from abroad or are not trained to use it.  
Alternatively, it could be, as Judge Posner warned, that it is failing because it was not adapted to 
local culture and customs. 
 
To reform the current institution, this dissertation illustrates the structure of prosecutorial 
systems and screening mechanisms of the United States and France, along with Taiwan’s current 
system, including the screening procedure, screener neutrality, evidentiary rules, right to counsel, 
the threshold to prosecute, and discovery, in the analysis of the deficiency of our mechanism.  
Comparing the screening mechanisms from different countries, because they originated from 
different historical backgrounds as well as different legal cultures, could provide a potential 
vehicle for Taiwan to reform its current screening system.  
 
    
 
11 
 
III. Structure 
 
The current screening mechanism for prosecutorial charging decisions is ineffective at 
removing cases that do not warrant trial.  This presents a series of questions: Could there be an 
alternative mechanism that would achieve the goals of the screening process and regain public’s 
confidence?  Could we extract some guiding principles from alternative screening mechanisms to 
reform our own structure?  What are the components of other alternatives that enhance and 
effectuate the screening mechanism?   
 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters.  Chapter 2 examines different legal 
systems, their underlying ideologies, legal institutions, roles of the legal participants, interplay of 
authority of the participants within each system, and legal cultures among these participants.  It 
not only focuses on the differences of two legal families, the common law family and the 
continental law family, but also on the law in action as well.  In other words, this dissertation 
conducts a systematic analysis of the prosecutorial systems in the United States, France, and 
Taiwan to examine the variance of each country and to grasp comprehensively the prosecutorial 
organizational structures, underlying legal ideologies, roles, charging function, personnel, and 
authority that the prosecutor has, which interact with her behavior in performing her duties, and 
exerting her authority.  Only through a full understanding of the decisionmaking and its context 
could we know what kind of screening mechanism and what kind of procedure should be 
adopted in weeding out the unfounded prosecutions.           
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Chapter 3 then analyzes the screening mechanism of the United States, Taiwan, and 
France, focusing on the goal, operations, procedures, evidentiary rules, right to counsel, right to 
call witness, etc.  It discusses advantages and disadvantages of those screening mechanisms, such 
as the grand jury and preliminary hearing mechanisms in the United States and investigating 
judges (juge d’instruction) in France.  The proposed reforms of the U.S. grand jury procedures 
are analyzed in order to gain a more comprehensive picture so that we might use our 
understanding of these reforms as a vehicle for Taiwanese reform.  Some of the disparities in 
states-level preliminary hearings, which differ from federal preliminary hearings, are included in 
this chapter for a clearer picture.  With regard to the French judicial investigating, it is not a 
screening mechanism in the sense of “screening” a case; rather it is a judicial investigation.  The 
reason it is included as a potential object for discussion is because this process functions as a 
check and a review to the investigation conducted by the police and prosecution. 
 
This dissertation also looks at the law in action of the French investigating judge, its 
operation, function, and effectiveness.  Given criticisms of the investigating judges’ relationship 
with the prosecutor and, accordingly, doubting their neutrality, we also illustrate recent calls for 
abolishing the position.  In addition, the legal culture formed amongst the prosecutor, 
investigating judge, and trial judge is as a judicial family, i.e., judicial corps, which might 
influence its supervision function and contribute to recent proposed reform, this dissertation 
quote one empirical study that comports the former idea as an essential cause to consider in the 
application of this mechanism.    
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Chapter 4 analyzes the reform of the screening mechanism that adopts adversarial style 
procedures, which emphasize mandatory and independent screening that occurs before the trial.  
This is distinguished from the pretrial procedure, which incentivizes the screening judge to 
review, and emphasizes evenhanded, more participatory process from the defense, the right to 
counsel, evidentiary rules, illegal means of acquiring evidence, screening time, discovery, and 
independent screening procedure.  This part identifies the structural defects and adopts its 
resulting reform, which could lead to a comprehensive solution for Taiwan.  Eventually, it is our 
intention to provoke thoughts that active participation and the installation of independent 
procedure will lead to the effective reform of the system.  This might ideally galvanize the 
judges into the using the screening function, and bring about meaningful effects on criminal 
justice.  
 
 Chapter 5 concludes that the current screening mechanism is ineffective and is indeed a 
paper tiger that could not deter unfounded prosecutions.  Only through a comprehensive 
procedural and structural reform in screening process could Taiwan achieve the goals of 
protecting the innocent, eliminating of the caseloads, advancing the prosecution quality, and 
diminishing the social costs. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE PROSECUTOR 
 
I. Major Criminal Justice Models 
 
As a comparative matter, two major legal systems of modern criminal justice exist around 
the world.  The common law system features are most similar to the adversarial style, and it is 
followed in England, the United States, Canada, etc., each with their own distinct features.  The 
continental law system, mostly including continental Europe, ranges from nonadversarial (the 
Netherlands), to less strongly nonadversarial (Germany), to a mix of adversarial and East Asian 
influence.30  The continental law system is more like a hybrid or mixed system and is no longer 
strictly inquisitorial.31 
 
Although these two legal systems basically comprise the whole world’s criminal justice 
systems, there are no two countries that adopt identical systems.  However, a gravitation toward 
converging the different systems has become an ongoing trend.  Systems are becoming more or 
less adversarial around the world.32  In continental Europe, for example, Europeans often 
describe their systems as mixed, in that the initial investigative phase is primarily inquisitorial, 
and the trial phase mainly accusatorial, with the prosecutor serving as one party.33 
 
                                                
30 Richard S. Frase, The Search for the Whole Truth about American and European Criminal Justice, 3 BUFF. CRIM. 
L. REV. 785, 787-788 (1999).    
31See MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS, TEXT, 
MATERIALS AND CASES ON WESTERN LAW, 910 (2007).  
32See Frase, supra note 30, at 787(noting most of the countries around the world have rules of exclusion of some 
illegally seized evidence). 
33Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three “Inquisitorial” systems: 
France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L. J. 240, 242-243 (1977). 
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Even though continental Europe is still depicted and labeled as an inquisitorial system, it 
is no longer indicative of the term’s original meaning in ancient Europe as traditionally 
inquisitorial as expounded above.34  Hence, this dissertation replaces “inquisitorial”, as used in 
the traditional comparative sense, with “continental” model of criminal procedure to distinguish 
the criminal justice system of contemporary Europe from that of ancient Europe, but this 
dissertation uses the term “inquisitorial” when it refers to ancient style of criminal justice system 
in Europe. 
 
This chapter examines different legal systems, underlying ideologies, legal institutions, 
the roles of the legal participants, the interplay of authority of the participants within each 
system, the operation, and the legal cultures among these participants.  In addition, Professor 
Damaska had proposed that differences in the procedure are related to the characteristics of 
organization of the authority in continental Europe and the English-speaking world.35  The 
ideology underlying the different legal systems also affects the incentive of prosecutors and their 
agents.  The basic ideas, organizations, personnel, roles, and authority of participants interact 
within each system, as well as affect the structure of the process.  Prosecutorial organizational 
structure, roles that the prosecutor plays, and functions she performs interplays with her behavior 
in performing her duty and exerting her authority.  Understanding the variations of the two major 
                                                
34 In Taiwan, academia has various ways of interpreting the inquisitorial style, also name in Mandarin “jiu wen zhu 
yi” as traditional sense of no procedural right afforded to the defendant or coerced investigation in the Middle Ages 
in Europe.  After the French revolution in 19 centuries, in Europe, the accusatorial system was adopted that the 
defendant is entitled to right against self-incrimination, public trial and was presumed to be innocence before 
conviction. Therefore, there is no point to distinguish the inquisitorial and accusatorial system nowadays.  The 
modern continental Europe model is prevailed with “zhi quan zhu yi”, which specifically refers to the dominant role 
of trial judge rather than the prosecutor. See Jaw-Perng Wang, Dang shi ren jin xing zhu yi zheng zhi ping 
yi[Discussion of the debate Over the Adversarial System], 43 XING SHI FA ZA ZHI[CRIM. L. J.](No. 4) 32, 34-
35(1999) (Taiwan). 
35Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L. J. 480, 481 (1974). 
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legal systems is critical in grasping, comprehensively, the role, function, authority, and exercise 
of power by the prosecution.       
 
1. Continental System 
 
The distinctive feature of a continental system is the procedural structure and authority of 
trial judges in contrast to that of an adversarial system.  The term “inquisitorial” in the ancient 
sense, often referred to a system of coerced means of investigation to extract confessions, or 
investigating and trial powers held by identical authorities in carrying out the investigation and 
adjudication of cases, or where the trial judge makes a ruling on the basis of the case files.36  
Some also consider that “inquisitorial” refers to judges playing an active role in the conducting 
of trials and investigating the facts.37  There is no doubt that coerced means of investigation have 
been abolished in modern times and banned by modern criminal procedure whether in the 
continental, mixed, or adversarial systems.  There should be no traditional inquisitorial style of 
system in existence in the modern world.  The inquisitorial style of criminal justice system that 
prevailed in ancient Europe has been markedly transformed.  “Inquisitorial” refers to “proof-
taking used in continental law, where the judge conducts the trial, determines what questions to 
ask, and defines the scope and extent of the inquiry.”38 
 
                                                
36Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, at 242-243. see also Craig M. Bradley, The Convergence of the Continental 
and the Common Law Model of Criminal Procedure, 7 Crim. L. F., 471, 472,477-478 (1996) (noting that 
“Americans tend to equate inquisitorial systems with coercive interrogation, unbridled search, and unduly efficient 
crime control”) (‘an inquisitorial system of justice was inextricably linked to torture and unreliable results”).  
37 GLENDON, ET AL., supra note 31, at 198. 
38 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 655 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 8th ed. 2004). 
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The roles and functions of prosecutors in continental systems differ from those of their 
counterparts in adversarial systems.  Their roles and functions inextricably intertwine with their 
authority in any part of criminal procedure in either system, with the wax and wane of the power 
between judges and prosecutors within the two major systems defining the line.  Under a 
continental system, the actor who carries responsibility for putting the evidence and facts 
together and identifying the truth is the judge.  She is expected to arrive at the true facts by 
combing through evidence, examining witnesses, and questioning the defendants.39 Continental 
Europe refers to most of their criminal justice system as a mixed system, usually with the 
adoption of the accusatorial principle by the bifurcation of the trial stage, by trial judges, and the 
prosecution and investigation stages by prosecutors.40 
 
The emergence of prosecutors was a reformation to the conventional combination of the 
prosecutorial function and the adjudication function into one inquisitorial judge on the basis of 
her own investigation.41  The German prosecutor was actually created to reduce the court’s role 
from being in charge of the investigation to merely being an impartial function of adjudication.42  
However, worry still existed that prosecutors would overzealously charge the accused.  Then, the 
Prussian minister of justice, Savigny, prevented this overzealous role by investing prosecutors 
with an impartial judicial character.43  This means that the prosecutor is asked to be objective in 
the administration of her power and justice.     
                                                
39Even though there are variations, such as “the public prosecutor may substitute for or share with the judge the 
responsibility for pretrial investigation.” see Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, at 242. 
40 There are some variations in European countries. For example: French has a different setting that investigating 
judges conduct felony investigations, which differs from that bifurcation.    
41John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 446 (1974). 
42Id. at 449. 
43See id.(noting that prosecutors retain the impartiality by investigating both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, 
and prosecutor can appeal on behalf of the defendants if she considered that the adjudication was error).   
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In the continental law system, criminal investigation is conducted by a neutral judicial 
officer, i.e., the prosecutor who collects and proffers both favorable and unfavorable evidence in 
the case file, i.e., dossier.  The prosecutor is charged with an obligation to investigate, while the 
trial is dominated by the judge.  What matters to the prosecutor is to complete investigations, 
search for the truth, collect the evidence, and prepare dossiers.  Given the impartial role, a 
dossier contains inculpatory and exculpatory evidence as well as complete information of any 
prior criminal record of the charged defendants.44  The right of defense counsel to investigation 
is not recognized by law, and is limited in action even if the defendant actually conducts her own 
investigation.45  During the investigation, the dossier is closed to everyone and the investigative 
phase is under the protection of the secrecy principle.  The defense has full right to access of the 
dossier once charged. 
 
The presiding judge reviews the dossier and informs the defendant of the accusation.  She 
advises the accused of his right to silence and then hears the accused’s account of the 
accusations.46  She is in charge of calling witnesses for examination, the order in which 
witnesses will be examined, and conducting most of the questioning of the witnesses.47  
“Witnesses at trial are witnesses of the court, not of the parties, and are questioned in a way that 
                                                
44William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building An 
Adversarial Trial System on A Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE. J. INT’L L. 1, 12(1992); Frase, supra note 37, at 777.  
45Defense counsel does not have the sense of their version of investigation because of lacking of technical methods, 
and lacking of legal authorization. 
46Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 423 
(1992). 
47Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 44, at 12; see also Richard S. Frase, Main-Streaming Comparative Criminal Justice: 
How To Incorporate Comparative and International Concepts and Materials into Basic Criminal Law and 
Procedure Courses, 100 W. VA. L. Rev. 773, 777 (1998) (claims that “trial judges are considerably more active in 
other foreign system (e.g., Germany), and they completely dominate trials in the most traditional “Civil Law” 
systems(e.g., France)”). 
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is designed to produce balanced, rather than biased, testimony.”48  Courts in the continental 
model choose and examine the expert witness. Counsel is limited to supplementing the judges’ 
examination of witnesses.49  Prosecutors and defense attorneys play limited role at trial.  Unlike 
procedural and evidentiary rules in the U.S. adversarial style, witness examination is informal 
and subject to fewer rules at trial, accompanied by occasional questioning from the prosecutor 
and defense attorney.50 
 
Trials are carried out by a panel of judges, formed by a presiding judge and fellow judges, 
all of whom have full access to the file and are required to write the reasoned judgments that 
clearly illustrate how their decisions are reached.  The presiding judge’s role is active during the 
trial.  It is the judge, not the prosecutor, who positions himself opposite the defendant and plays 
an active role in the process.  The judge conducts what is tantamount to continuous investigation 
at trial.  The trial is brief and supposedly works quite efficiently.   
 
Continental ideology demands centripetal decisionmaking.  Since the unitary order is 
pivotal to hierarchical level of government, the exercise of discretion diminishes the demand, 
unless concrete directives for official action cannot be formulated.51  Professor Damaska has 
argued that the hierarchical model emphasizes certainty of decisionmaking, which demands 
                                                
48Bradley, supra note 36, at 472.   
49Id. at 483. 
50Kessel, supra note 46, at 424. 
51Damaska, supra note 35, at 484-485.  
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uniform policy and directives towards subordinate officials to pursue the unitary order 
nationwide, thus centralizing the authority of the ruler.52 
 
Demand for centripetal decisionmaking makes the central authority issue general 
directives to subordinates handling specific cases.  Public officials only administer guidelines 
and are not allowed to question these directives.53  These normative criteria insulate officials 
from outside pressures and considerations, making decisionmaking more of a nonpolitical, 
technical task.54  Preference for determinative rules and precise standards to guide public 
officials is favored in the continental system.  This explains the occurrence of compulsory 
prosecution arising out of the continental system, and also affects public officials’ perceptions of 
their roles.55  As Professors Pizzi and Marafioti depicted the basic features the continental law 
prosecutorial decision making:  
The civil law emphasis on uniform results manifests itself in a strong 
aversion to prosecutorial discretion.  The civil law system has no counterpart 
to the board prosecutorial discretion existing in the United States . . . . 
Prosecutors must file criminal charges whenever the evidence indicates that 
the suspect has violated the law.  If, for example, some evidence indicated 
that a suspect committed a serious crime, but the prosecutor believed that 
                                                
52See id.(argues that hierarchical model emphasizes certainty of decision-making, which demands uniform policy 
and directive towards subordinate officials to pursue the unitary order for nationwide, and centralizes the authority 
of ruler.  Three attributes of such models are the following: (1) “precise delineation of the province of each official“; 
(2)”authority is allocated along a gradient of importance”; (3) same level officials’ interrelationship, and separation 
of offices and incumbent.  Since the unitary order is pivotal to hierarchical model, the exercise of discretion 
diminishes the demand, unless “more precise guidelines for official action cannot be formulated.”); Pizzi & 
Marafioti, supra note 44, at 9-10. 
53Damaska, supra note 35, at 485. 
54Id. at 486. 
55Id. at 485. 
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there were reasons for not prosecuting the case, the prosecutor would be 
expected to file a formal criminal charge and seek dismissal of the charge by 
a judge, who has the authority to review the prosecutor’s decision.56 
 
Examples can be seen in the German prosecutorial system.  The German rule of 
compulsory prosecution was born in the mid-nineteenth century with the emergence of the public 
prosecutor.  Prosecutors’ offices are hierarchically organized structures, with a chief prosecutor 
for each judicial district in charge of reviewing the indictment.57  The prosecutors and chief 
prosecutors are subjected to the review and direction of the prosecutor general and Ministry of 
Justice.58  Because of worries that prosecutors and chief prosecutors would surrender to political 
pressure in exercising the power to prosecute and not prosecute, the German compulsory 
prosecution system arose to insulate prosecutors from external power.59  German prosecutors are 
required by the Code of Criminal Procedure article 152 section II to prosecute “all prosecutable 
offenses, to the extent that there is a sufficient factual basis.”60  “Public prosecutors must press 
charges as part of their duty.”61  It leaves no leeway for prosecutors, including the prosecutors 
and chief prosecutors, to decide whether to charge or not in the administering of justice.     
 
                                                
56Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 44, at 9-10. 
57Langbein, supra note 41, at 446, 449.  
58Id. at 449. 
59Id. at 450. 
60 John H. Langbein & Lloyd L. Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: “Myth” and Reality, 87 YALE L. J. 
1549, 1561-1562 (1978).   
61Damaska, supra note 35, at 503. 
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A few continental countries authorize non-prosecution with respect to all kinds of 
offences if the decision is consistent with public interest, namely the principle of expediency.62  
Other countries that do not allow felony-charging discretion permit “non-prosecution for 
misdemeanors if the culprit’s guilt can be regarded as minor, and there is no public interest in 
prosecuting.”63 
 
Another feature of continental ideology is hierarchical ordering of agencies that are 
involved in the administration of criminal justice.64  It is the concept of hierarchy that dominates 
the continental prosecutors’ office, organization, and administration of justice.  Both police and 
public prosecutors’ structure65are under rigorous ordering of central authority.  The refined 
stratification of the administrative governmental structure not only defines the authority and 
responsibility, but also achieves uniform policy and the predictability of decisionmaking.  This 
hierarchical structure, together with the comprehensive reviewability of decisions, is obvious 
even when recruitment and promotion of personnel are considered.66 
 
One major example is the French governmental system in the post-revolutionary 
Napoleonic regime.  It emphasized centralized power to rebuild political and social order to 
reform the pre-revolutionary Ancien Re’gime.67  As Professor Hazareesingh described that 
distinct feature of Napoleonic France, it included: 
                                                
62Id. at 504. 
63Langbein & Weinreb, supra note 60, at 1562. 
64Damaska, supra note 35, at 487. 
65Id. at 498. 
66Id.at 500. 
67JACQUELINE HODGSON, FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT of the INVESTIGATION and 
PROSECUTION of CRIME in FRANCE, 15-16 (2005). 
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an emphasis on power, authority, and technical competence, a strict sense of 
hierarchy, a clearly delineated system of rules, which were applied in a 
uniform manner and a scope of intervention in matters both public and 
private which was pervasive (in comparison with its predecessors).  The most 
important and durable feature of the Napoleonic system was the principle of 
centralization, which Napoleon consciously adopted from the Jacobin 
heritage of the 1790s. 68 
The basic ideology, inevitably, would influence the prosecutorial structure and its 
exercise of charging power.  Likewise, adversarial ideology also dominated its structure and 
exercise of power.  Basically, the two systems hold different ideology and charging styles.  The 
following articulates the adversarial system and its underlying ideology, which must be 
understand before analyzing Taiwan’s current system. 
 
2. Adversarial System 
 
Adversarial courts and legal practice often denigrate inquisitorial procedure by equating 
it with the inhumane torture of medieval England and Europe, meant to extract confessions.69  
But today, the continental model has transformed gradually from its origins to a mixed model.  
Some privileges, such as due process, the presumption of innocence, and those against self-
incrimination, guaranteed in the U.S. adversarial model, have prevailed in the modern 
                                                
68SUDHIR HAZAREESINGH, POLITICAL TRADITIONS IN MODERN FRANCE, 159 (1994).  
69Kessel, supra note 46, at 410. 
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continental model as well. 70   As a preliminary matter, the adversarial model should be 
distinguished from a mixed model as described in the continental procedure.  In this dissertation, 
the adversarial model indicates that of the United States. 
 
An adversarial model basically emphasizes combat between two advocates or 
adversaries, fighting for a favorable decision, playing under rules of fair play, trying to convince 
a neutral fact-finder or decision-maker of his or her side of the story.  The distinct feature of an 
adversarial system is that the judge does not conduct the factual and legal investigation, but relies 
on the basis of evidence and arguments presented by both sides.71  Each case, represented by the 
prosecuting attorney and challenged by the defense, will not be settled by the hands of judges 
alone.  The system operates more like a dispute between prosecutors and defense attorneys 
before a non-active arbitrator.72  The state and defense supposedly play an evenhanded game in 
the beginning of the criminal process. The competing dynamics between prosecutors and defense 
attorneys continue until the final decision.     
 
The adversarial model presupposes that antagonistic presentation of opposing truth is the 
best device for bringing out the truth.73  The participants’ active roles in adversarial criminal 
procedure are demonstrated by the dominant role of witness examination, mainly who will 
testify, in what order, and who conducts the examination.  The skill of both parties does 
influence the outcome of the trial.  “The inherent hostility that every government official feels 
                                                
70Id. at 416. 
71Id. at 414. 
72 Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L. L. J.1, 17-18 (2004).  
73Thomas Weigend, Should We Search for the Truth, and Who Should Do It?, 36N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. 
REG.(Issue	  2)396 (2011). 
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toward the accused is displayed and openly challenged, rather than operating such silentio 
against the defendants.” 74  American criminal trial attorneys are more hostile and antagonistic 
than are the attorneys in the continental model; some critics have depicted the trial as “ritualized 
aggression,” and the trial goal as “winning the case.”75 
 
Comparatively, the prosecution has more personnel and law enforcement, such as 
professional police, and investigators, in fulfilling investigation, and gathering evidence.  By 
contrast, the defendant is afforded with constitutional rights that could ensure him or her a fairer 
game against the state at various phases of criminal procedure.76  Attorneys for both sides argue 
for the exclusion of evidence, and for the application of discovery rules to expose more 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence so as to not skew the truth.  Even choosing a favorable jury 
using the peremptory or for cause challenges can be a critical move toward the outcome of guilt 
or innocence, regardless of actual guilt or innocence.   
 
Given the aforementioned costly and complex procedural rules and jury system, most 
cases settle in plea procedure due to the restricted resources that would prevent all cases from 
going to trial.  On one hand, plea procedure and plea agreement may ease the burden on an 
overloaded criminal justice system; on the other hand, they can skew the truth-finding goal of 
criminal procedure where plea-bargaining vastly substitutes the authentic trial procedure. 
 
                                                
74Bradley, supra note 36, at 472.  
75Kessel, supra note 46, at 434-435. 
76Bradley, supra note 36,at 473.   
26 
 
In this sense, prosecutors have the goal of winning cases and securing convictions, and 
even maximizing sentences.  This goal and mission in turn affects a prosecutor’s behavior at and 
prior to trial.  Prosecutors are still judicial officers in an adversarial system, but not in the same 
way as they are in the continental model.  Instead, they serve a dual role as advocate and minister 
of justice, while working for the executive branch. 
 
In contrast to the role of judges in the continental model, the judge is a neutral fact-finder 
and plays a passive role at trial.  Generally, the fact-finder role is filled by a nonprofessional jury, 
unless the defendant waives the right to a jury trial.  Judges are not charged with the function of 
inquiring as to the facts, applying legal rules, or reaching a just result.  Rather, American judges 
play a passive role and do not control the process to nearly the same extent as their continental 
counterparts.77 
 
That which is depicted above primarily centers around the trial procedure.  Professor 
Damaska has commented that the trial-centered model, i.e. adversarial procedure, fails to account 
for many other discrepancies between the two systems, arguing that differences in the procedure 
are related to the characteristics of organization of authority in continental Europe and the 
English-speaking world.78  Professor Damaska has depicted the U.S. system as “coordinate 
model of organization,” where a key feature of enforcement organizations is a parallel 
relationship instead of a hierarchical relationship.79  Federal criminal law enforcement and 
federal executive power adhere to the coordinate model, where criminal investigations are 
                                                
77Kessel, supra note 46, at 431,437. 
78Damaska, supra note 35, at 481. 
79Damaska, supra note 33, at 509-512. 
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conducted by different agencies.80  These federal agencies are subordinated only to the Attorney 
General and the Deputy Attorney General, and they do not report to individual prosecutors, but 
only to their agency’s officials.81  Although Federal prosecutors and agency structures are 
centralized, the feature of hierarchical subordination is not as rigid as in the hierarchical model.  
In most states, public prosecutors are elected officials with authority to coordinate local law 
enforcement, although theses powers are rarely used.82 
 
This kind of institutional arrangement of the prosecutor and agent organizational 
structure implies one feature of Anglo-American ideology, that centrifugal decisionmaking is 
imbedded in all types of local or federal institutions.83  Even when officials are organized as one 
unit, they remain independent from the prosecutors’ office.  Officials are not bound by 
predetermined rules; instead they tailor their decisions to individual circumstances.  There are 
standards, but they are less precise and more flexible in the coordinate model.84  The officials’ 
discretion is essential to all aspects of official authority.  Officials are not only rule appliers, but 
also the best rule creators with regard to each case.  Officials’ discretion is critical to the 
operation of governmental organizations, since their decision-making depends not only on 
preexisting standards and rules, but also on designing the best solutions that cater to individual 
situations.   
 
                                                
80See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 755-
756 (2003) (noting those agencies are referred as FBI, DEA, Homeland Security Department, Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, and so on).  
81Id. at 756. 
82Damaska, supra note 35, at 511-512. 
83Id. 
84Id.at 510. 
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Another feature of the adversarial model is the preference for discretion and flexible rules.  
American prosecutors monopolize the gateway to the criminal justice system.  Victims are 
precluded from filing private prosecutions against culprits.  Prosecutors have broad discretion to 
cope with local matters, which allows each United States Attorney or state prosecutor to 
determine the prosecutorial policy and enforcement priorities for particular offenses.  Moreover, 
the United States has dual jurisdictions.  At the state level, it contains fifty-one jurisdictions.  The 
severity of an offense, frequency of the commission of that offense, and priority of enforcement 
varies by state and jurisdiction.  It is neither possible nor practical to enforce unitary guidelines 
to each jurisdiction.  Hence, the American district attorney remains an autonomous power with 
few constraints on her decision to press a charge or determine the number of charges.85 
 
In order to maintain a system of checks and balances between the executive and 
judiciary, the design of separation of powers triggers judicial reluctance to review prosecutorial 
discretion with regard to non-prosecution.  Professor Pizzi described “adversarial tradition in 
which judges are assigned a neutral and passive role with respect to charging decisions and the 
development of evidence at trial . . . .  Except [where] . . . a prosecutor’s action violates the 
Constitution, an American judge has no power to reduce or reshape criminal charges to fit the 
evidence or the equities of a particular case.”86  This differs from its counterpart of the 
continental model as discussed above.  
 
 
 
                                                
85Id.at 510. 
86Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 44, at 13. 
29 
 
3. The Case of Taiwan 
 
3.1. Historical Development of Criminal Justice System in Taiwan  
 
Ancient Chinese attitudes towards law were deeply influenced by Confucianism.  He 
emphasized propriety to resolve issues; in other words, he stressed conformity to prevailing 
social norms.  Nonetheless, propriety can only resolve all existing problems in an ideal world.  
Law was an instrument to maintain order and provide for prevention of crime by deterring 
potential criminals with the threat of punishment.87  There existed no prosecutorial system. 
Criminal cases were complaints brought by victims.  Victimless crimes, like treason, were 
initiated by the magistrates’ investigation and adjudicated on the basis of her information.88  It is 
thought that the power of adjudication and prosecution were tied together in the same local 
government official’s authority (as then called “parent official”; fu-mu guan) to make such a 
decision, which was the same as in the ancient inquisitorial system.89 
 
Prior to 1895, Taiwan’s legal system was ruled by Chinese legal tradition.  In 1895, 
Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing dynasty as a spoil of war.  Japan maintained sovereignty 
                                                
87Hsun-Lung Wu, The Comparison of Prosecutorial Functions in the U.S.A. and in Taiwan, at 36-37 (2001) 
(unpolished J.S.D. Dissertation, Standard University) (on file with author). 
88Id. at 38. 
89TEY-SHENG,WANG, TAI WAN JIAN CHA SHI-ZHI DU BIAN QIAN SHI YU YUN ZUO SHI QUANG[Taiwan’s 
Prosecutorial History-Institutional Transformation and Practice] ,1-6, Ministry of Justice Research Project (2007) 
(Taiwan). 
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over Taiwan for the following fifty years, until being defeated in the Second World War in 
1945.90 
 
Prosecutors as court officials initially emerged from the Taiwan Residency General Court 
Statute in 1896.91  Taiwan Residency General implemented a more inquisitorial-like procedural 
code, transplanted from Japan, which was also modeled after European Continent, by order 10 in 
1905.92  “The Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure was transplanted into Taiwan at the end of 
the Nineteenth Century.  It adopted the French semi-inquisitorial system rather than the Anglo-
American accusatory method in public trial.  The procurator charged the suspect with certain 
crimes . . . as the French tradition treated judges and procurators as part of the magistrate.”93  The 
judge was active at trial, often extracting a confession from the accused rather than acting as an 
umpire.94  The authority of prosecutors makes the justice more like prosecutors’ justice.  
Prosecutors could wield magistrate-like authority to detain suspects to secure their appearance.95 
 
After the first half of the Twentieth century from 1895-1945, the colonization by Japan 
finally ended.  Because of its defeat, Japan had to return Taiwan to China after World War II in 
1945.  Subsequently, a government originating from China ruled Taiwan in the second half of 
the century.  “The troops of Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China (ROC) and 
                                                
90See Nuno Garoupa, Veronica Grembi & Shirley Ching-Ping Lin, Explaining Constitutional Review in New 
Democracies: The Case of Taiwan, 20 PAC RIM L.& POL’Y J.(No.1) 1, 5, 8 (2011) (noting since Qing dynasty, the 
legal system between Taiwan and China were separated). 
91 WANG, supra note89, at1-16-1-20. 
92Id. at 1-21. 
93Tey-sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Towards a Liberal Democratic Country, 
5 WASEDA PROCEEDINGS COMP. L. 304, 328(2002).  
94Id. at 328. 
95See WANG, supra note 89, at1-20, 1-24 (noting after nearly a century, prosecutor’s power to detain a suspect was 
held unconstitutional and the authority to order pretrial detention by the prosecutor was repealed in 1997 by the 
Justice of Constitution Court). 
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Director-General of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang; KMT) as well as the Supreme 
Allied Commander in the Asia Region at that time, took control of Taiwan on behalf of the 
Allied Force in 1945.”96  At that time, Taiwan received the legal system from China that had 
been westernized since the Qing dynasty.   
 
While Taiwan was colonized by Japan, the parallel political regime of China was still 
ruled by the Qing dynasty.  The Qing dynasty had instituted Da Li Yuan (the Supreme Court) 
and other levels of courts, namely trial courts, as well as a high court, by the Code of Da Li Yuan 
Court Organization in 1906, which set forth the institution of prosecutor for the first time in 
China.97  Four years later, the Code of Court Organization, modeled after the European 
Continental legal system, was enacted and issued by the government of the Qing dynasty.  
According to the Code of Court Organization, the Prosecutors’ office is an independent 
institution that is attached to each court, which is separated from the court concept.  Prosecutors 
took the responsibilities of investigation, prosecution, litigation, and direction of execution of 
sentencing.98  To conclude that the prosecution system was settled in the Chinese legal system at 
the end of the Qing dynasty is not overstated.                
 
The end of the Qing dynasty gave birth to the Republic of China in 1912.  The 
prosecutorial system remained unchanged.  In 1928, the Chinese government promulgated the 
first Code of Criminal Procedure, following the European continental model, instituted public 
prosecution as the principle of charging, and detailed streamlined criminal procedures.  In 1932, 
                                                
96WANG, supra note 89, at1-39; Wang, supra note 93,at 304-305; Garoupa et al., supra note 90, at 8-9.   
97WANG, supra note 89, at1-41. 
98WANG, supra note 89, at1-40,1-42, 1-43. 
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the Chinese government promulgated the Law of Court Organization, which designed judicial 
hierarchy that was composed of three levels of courts: the district court, the high court, and the 
Supreme Court.  Prosecutors’ Offices remained attached to each court.99  The Judicial system 
was effectively centralized under the Judicial Yuan, the highest judicial branch of government, 
with each of the three instances of court systems mentioned above containing criminal, civil, and 
administrative courts.   
 
“Followed by Chiang’s defeat in the Chinese Civil War, the KMT-led ROC government 
declared martial law in Taiwan in May 1949, and then in the same year retreated from the 
Chinese mainland to Taiwan.”100  The Peoples Republic of China won the civil war and has 
reigned on the Chinese mainland from 1949, while the government of the Republic of China, led 
by then President Chiang Kai-Shek, ruled Taiwan.  The legal system of the Republic of China 
has dominated Taiwan since the termination of colonization by Japan in October, 1945.  The two 
jurisdictions converged into one for four years, before separating again in 1949.  In 1949, the 
Republic of China central government shifted its seat of power to Taiwan, and the prosecutorial 
system remained the same under newly announced Marshal Law.101 
 
 Martial Law in Taiwan, a symbol of the authoritarian regime imposed upon the 
Taiwanese people by the ruling KMT party, did not end until 1987 when it was lifted by 
President Chiang Ching-Kuo, son of the former president, Chiang Kai-Shek.  A new critical 
                                                
99Wu, supra note 87, at 42.    
100Garoupa et al., supra note 90, at 8-9. 
101WANG, supra note 89, at 1-69, 1-70. 
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political liberalization opened up a new epoch toward democratization in Taiwan.102  This 
transition in politics not only transformed Taiwan toward becoming a newly formed democratic 
country, but also brought reform-minded activists, such as judges, prosecutors, attorneys, and 
scholars to a new path of criminal justice.103 
 
3.2. Modern System in Taiwan  
 
The traditional criminal justice system in Taiwan was influenced and transplanted from 
western law, including continental European law and Anglo-American law, with more influence 
coming from the former than the latter.  Because both the Republic of China and Pre-World War 
II Japan had adopted continental European legal system before occupying Taiwan, Taiwan was 
more inclined to adopt their legal system.104 
  
 The authoritarian regime in Taiwan, ruled by KMT party as well as strongman politics, 
continued from the post war period in 1949 to the end of Martial law in the late 1980s.  The 
judiciary was basically a hierarchically organized structure, and retained judicial autonomy in 
economic areas.  However, the judicial system was dominated and monitored by the political 
authorities as a means of disciplining judges, particularly in politically related issues.105  The 
political oppression of, and the constant clashes with, indigenous Taiwanese led to the arrest and 
execution of many political dissidents and prisoners.   
                                                
102Garoupa et al., supra note 90, at 9.   
103Margaret K. Lewis, Taiwan’s New adversarial System and the Overlooked Challenge of Efficiency-Driven 
Reforms, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 651, 652, 656-657 (2009). 
104Wang, supra note 93, at 305. 
105Tom. B. Ginsburg, Law and the Liberal Transformation of the Northeast Asian Legal Complex in Korea and 
Taiwan in FIGHTING FOR FREEDOM, 44-46 (Terrence Halliday, Lucien Karpik& Malcolm Feeley eds.2007). 
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It was not until the lifting of Martial law in 1987 that the authoritarian regime of 
Taiwan’s legal system began to transform.  The emancipation (liberation) of judges and 
prosecutors from tight political control,106as well as the emergence of an active bar, established 
roots for a democratic system.107  As the percentage of those passing Taiwan’s bar rose, the 
number of attorneys sitting for the bar boomed, which led more advocates to not only challenge 
the existing authority, but also to spur more liberal claims, such as the right to speech and the 
right of assembly, to promote ideas of independence and democracy against the government.108 
 
As the political environment began to burgeon, the political control of the judicial systems 
seemed to relax as well.  The administrative supervision of high courts and district courts also 
shifted the subordination from the authority of the Ministry of Justice to the Judicial Yuan during 
1980.  The Law of Court Organization was revised and all courts were apportioned to judicial 
authority.109  Only then did judges become independent from the Executive.  The prosecutorial 
system, including administrative supervision, headed by the Ministry of Justice, became 
subordinated to the executive power, which is separate from judicial power.  Prosecutors exerted 
the power of investigation, prosecution, litigation, and execution of the decision of penalty 
according to the Law of Court Organization act 60.   
 
                                                
106 Lewis, supra note 103, at 658. 
107Ginsburg, supra note 105, at 47, 55-62. 
108See id.at 47, 56-57(noting that bar exam was difficult for only few could enter the legal profession. The passers 
had no incentive to fight for a larger profession because of monopoly fee system.  The passing numbers did not 
expand dramatically until 1989.  The small private bar decreased the possibility of social movement litigation that 
challenged the government). 
109Wu, supra note 87, at 44-45.    
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Similar to a prosecutor in continental law system, the Taiwanese prosecutor was 
empowered to wield the authority of pre-indictment detention, as well as the power to issue 
search warrants and wiretapping warrants pursuant to the Code of Communication Protection for 
Surveillance.  In one famous criminal investigation, a number of important politicians were 
forced to resign because of their involvement in corruption.  Some were even put into pre-
indictment detention, which brought about awareness that the authority prosecutors possess is 
extremely powerful and uncontrollable. 110   Prolonged pre-indictment detention is heavily 
criticized by academics and the community, given that the prosecutor who investigates a case 
and searches for the truth will normally detain a suspect in order to obtain a confession or 
inculpatory leads.  To seek evidence and to extract confessions by means of pre-indictment 
detention is a violation of human rights.  One cannot expect that a prosecutor will play a neutral 
role in carrying out an investigation and deciding for or against pre-indictment detention like a 
judge does.  
 
 Around 1995, the Grand Justices of the Constitutional Court held it unconstitutional to 
place the pre-indictment detention power in the hands of the executive, and declared that the 
power would become ineffective two years following its announcement.111  In 1997, abiding by 
                                                
110Id.at 48-49.     
111See J.Y. Interpretation, No. 392(1995)(The holding of interpretation of 392 of the Council of Grand Justice 
provides “Criminal procedure, the judicial proceeding to try criminal cases, is one of the powers held by the judicial 
branch. It is a process with the purpose of carrying out the penal power of a state. A criminal trial begins with an 
indictment, which resulted from investigations. When a judgment is final, execution of punishment is necessary to 
realize the content of judgment. Therefore, these steps, viz., the process of investigation, indictment, trial, and 
execution of punishment, are closely related to trial and punishment -- they are different stages of the process of 
criminal justice. In this process, the prosecutor's offices act on behalf of the state to investigate, indict, and punish. 
Since the duty and function of a prosecutor's office is to carry out its role in criminal justice, its conduct within this 
sphere of state action shall be deemed "judiciary" in an expansive sense….The term "trial" defined in Article 8, 
Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Constitution means trial by court. He who has no authority to try a case cannot conduct 
this proceeding. The "court" defined in Article 8, Paragraphs 1 and 2, means a tribunal composed of a judge or a 
panel of judges empowered to try cases. According to Article 8, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution, if any organ other 
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the holding of the Constitutional Court, the power was eradicated.  The prosecutors’ power to 
issue search warrants was eradicated after several events in which prosecutors sought to 
investigate the infringements of intellectual property rights by searching the students’ 
dormitories of one national university, National Chen-Kung University, as well as searching 
Legislators’ dormitories and a major media enterprise.112  The authority to issue wiretapping 
warrants was also removed in 2007, given that the high approval rate of wiretapping applications 
could potentially invade privacy, as well as the doubtfulness that prosecutors would play an 
unbiased role in the initiation of tapping warrants.  In a word, the authority to issue any warrants, 
except arrest warrants, has now been transferred to a more unbiased judicial system. 
 
The above historical developments signal an ongoing revision of the authority of the 
prosecutor for the past decade, and one that demands any infringements of fundamental 
constitutional rights be screened by a neutral, nonbiased judicial authority, instead of by one who 
conducts the investigation and determines the warrant issuance.   
 
Traditionally, the prosecutor was charged with investigation, prosecution, and preparation 
of dossiers.  After the prosecution, the judge would review the dossier and inform the accused of 
the accusation.  At trial, the prosecutor usually bore a much lesser burden of proof in a criminal 
                                                                                                                                                       
than a court arrested or detained a person, such organ shall surrender the detainee to a competent court for trial 
within 24 hours of said action. Therefore, the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 101, and Article 102, Paragraph 
3, applies mutatis mutandis to Article 71, Paragraph 4, and Article 120, which empowers a prosecutor other than a 
judge to detain suspects; Article 105, Paragraph 3, of the same Code which empowers a prosecutor to grant a request 
for detention submitted by the chief officer of the detention house; Article 121, Paragraph 1, and Article 259, 
Paragraph 1, of the same Code which empowers a prosecutor to withdraw, suspend, resume, continue detention, or 
to take any other measures in conjunction with a detention….It is hereby declared that the abovementioned 
unconstitutional provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure”). 
112 Yu-Pi Tsai, Jing-Hao Chen Ji Lu Zheng Li[Documentation], Zheng Zhi Yu Fa Lu Qi Shi Mi Bu Ke Fen [Politics 
and Law are indispensable], E-News of the Political Science Alumni Association of National Taiwan University 
(Taiwan), available at http://politics.ntu.edu.tw/alumni/epaper/no7/no7_11.htm (last visited Jun. 12, 2011). 
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case, i.e. a formality of burden of proof, when compared with that of American counterparts.  
The judge would actively continue the prosecutor’s unfinished investigation.  The judge did not 
have any notion of “screening” prosecutorial charging decisions.  The prosecutor acted passively 
in court with regard to burden of proof; instead she just formally took a seat in the courtroom.113 
The defense occasionally would defend at trial, but not always.  As one scholar noted, 
“Historically, judges dictated trials: they held primary responsibility for questioning the 
defendant and witnesses, and the parties could directly question, or request the judge to question, 
witnesses only after the judge completed his inquiry.”114  The judge determined the final 
outcome after investigating and proving guilt or innocence. 
 
According to conventional thinking in Taiwan, the term “jiu wen zhu yi” means the 
Middle Ages European “inquisitorial” kind of torture and ordeal interrogation.115  But the term is 
no longer used to describe the Taiwan pre-reform era; instead the term “zhi quan zhu yi” is used, 
meaning “ex officio system,” which refers to the modern Continental model.116  In a nutshell, it 
is more like a “judge dominant inquiry” system considering the degree of involvement of the 
judge’s authority. 
 
Judges’ biased roles and their job of investigating criminal cases were criticized as being 
overly hostile to defendants, compared to the neutral role of judicial systems in other parts of the 
world.  Critics urged Taiwanese authorities to institute a fair trial system, implant a presumption 
of innocence, reinforce the prosecutorial burden of proof, reduce the role of the judge in 
                                                
113Lewis, supra note 103, at 651, 663. 
114Id. at 663. 
115Wang, supra note 34, at 32,34. 
116 Lewis, supra note 103, at 664. 
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investigating the defendant, and thereby change to an adversarial system.117  This movement was 
prompted by many voices from the legal profession and the community, such as law professors, 
the bar association, the media, and the judicial reform foundation.   
 
Eventually, Taiwan’s highest judicial authority, the Judicial Yuan, convened a 
nationwide conference, namely the National Judicial Reform Conference (hereinafter NJRC), in 
1999.  The NJRC reached conclusions, including criminal procedure reform from a continental 
system to a modified adversarial system.  In 2002 and 2003, the legislative authority separately 
enacted new provisions and revised criminal procedure laws to enforce the judicial reform 
conclusions.  NJRC conclusions were as follows: more party involvement in the process, 
protection of the defendants’ right to defense as a basic human right, and the need for reformers 
to look to the adversarial style of United States for insightful reformation.   
 
Although Taiwan desired to borrow comprehensive criminal procedure from the United 
States, reformers actually built a new style of process, which included simplified procedures to 
substitute for some of the formal procedures and plea bargaining.  The trial process also 
transformed significantly in 2003.  The Taiwanese criminal justice system underwent a 
significant reformation, becoming a modified adversarial system instead of a continental system, 
                                                
117Wellington L. Koo, Xing Shi Shen Pan Ru He Chao Xiang Dang Shi Ren Jing Xing Yuan Ze Gian Jin? [How to 
advance towards to the adversarial model at criminal trial?], Cai Tung Fa Ren Ming Jian Si Fa Gai Ji Jin Hui 
[Judicial Reform Foundation](Taiwan), Jun. 15,1999, available at 
http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/RTE/myform_search_result_detail.asp?txt=%E5%88%91%E4%BA%8B%E8%A8%B
4%E8%A8%9F%E6%B3%95&Submit=%E9%96%8B%E5%A7%8B%E6%90%9C%E5%B0%8B&sel=%E5%8F
%B8%E6%B3%95%E6%94%B9%E9%9D%A9%E9%9B%9C%E8%AA%8C&id=1869 (last visited Sep19, 2012). 
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but critics have noted that the new system is “adversarial in name for all cases but only in 
substance for a small fraction thereof.”118 
 
As traditional continental ideology goes, the conventional judges’ role in Taiwan was 
fairly active at trial rather than passive.  After the reform, the most critical characteristic of the 
new system is the neutral role transformation and the authority of the trial judge in possessing 
supplementary investigative powers under limited exceptions at trial.  While the party-contested 
structure is adorned with the process of the presentation of each side’s story and balanced power 
to challenge each other, the reformed system still demands that the judge take the initiative to 
investigate evidence under the condition of ensuring fairness and justice, as well as for matters of 
significant interest to the defendant.119  In the meantime, new law has defined the role and 
obligation of prosecutors at trial, including bearing the burden of proof and the obligation of 
proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  The prosecution must bear the burden of proof at trial 
instead of playing a dummy role (i.e. taking an empty seat) in the courtroom.120  Additionally, 
the presumption of innocence has been articulated for the first time in Taiwanese law, as 
announced many times by the Constitutional Court.  Both of these are fundamental principles 
that comport with the ideology of adversarial procedure.    
 
The reformation is inclined toward the adversarial process to enforce the balance of 
power between the parties and allowing both parties to present their evidence before a passive 
                                                
118 Lewis, supra note 103, at 655. 
119Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 163 II (2013)(Taiwan). 
120Li Fa Yuan Di Si Jie Di Liu Qi Si Fa Wei Yuan Hui Xin Shi Su Song Fa Di Yi Bai Liu Shi Yi Tiao Ji Di Yi Bai 
Liu Shi San Tiao Xiu Zheng An Zeng Qiang Dang Shi Ren Jing Xing Zhu Yi Ji Cai Xing Xin Zheng Gong Kai Zhi 
Du Zhi Ke Xing Xing Gong Ting Hui Wei Yuan Hui Ji Lu[Legis. Yuan, 4th Term, 6th Sess., Judicial Comm. Public 
Hearing], 90Li Fa Yuan Gong Bao[LEGIS. YUAN GAZ.] (No. 56) (Taiwan), 19-20 (2001). 
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judge.  The prosecution’s evidence, including inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, are all 
included in the dossier and available to the defense.  Each party is charged with direct 
examination and crossexamination of witnesses and the presentation of evidence.  The revision 
also assures that the prosecutor bears the burden of proof at trial.  The obligation of prosecutors 
to bear this burden of proof differs from the truth-finding obligations of judges in the continental 
model.  
 
Normally, the judge plays a neutral role at trial, except for the demand that the judge 
maintain fairness and justice in a supplementary investigatory (official inquiry) role.  They 
should not investigate the fact actively unless the fact finding affects the interests of the 
defendant or is to maintain fair justice.  As a result, whether judges play an entirely neutral role 
at trial, as is anticipated in the adversarial system, is fiercely debated; the Supreme Court 
criminal division has convened a meeting to determine this issue (see infra chapter 3 II).  
Accordingly, the roles of prosecutors and judges, more or less, still confuse the outsider and the 
society.  It is the tripartite role (judges, prosecutors, and defenses), and dynamic authority of 
participants in criminal procedure that actually construct the adversarial or non-adversarial 
features of criminal procedure.  Whether the new reform is that of an adversarial system or not, it 
is affirmed by legislative documentation that an adversarial system is the intent of this revised 
legislation.  It cannot be overstated that Taiwan’s new system represents more of a “mixed” 
model with an inclination toward the adversarial model.   
 
In sum, different models dominate different procedural designs, and influence the 
tripartite role and authority among judges, prosecutors, and defendants.  The functions of the 
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prosecutor will interplay with their goals and performance, which demonstrates their individual 
and distinctive incentive to better assist a prospective design of regulatory mechanism within the 
prosecutorial system.  Basically, it is not possible to delve into the comparative screening 
mechanisms of the prosecution without first researching the fundamental intuition, structure, 
function, and charging power of the prosecutor in a comprehensive and comparative perspective 
between the United States, France, and Taiwan, or between the common law and continental 
systems.  The following sections evaluate the functions and structures of prosecutorial systems to 
deepen our understanding of their operation in the United States, France, and Taiwan. 
 
II. Structure and Institution of Prosecutorial System 
 
1. The U.S. Structure 
 
Since the adversarial system emphasizes combat between two parties, the sport metaphor 
symbolizes that the prosecutor intends to win the case and seek a conviction, or even maximum 
sentencing.  As scholars noted, “prosecutors aim at obtaining a conviction in such a way that the 
criminal compensates society for his crime (hence achieving efficient deterrence of crime)[,] . . . 
the prosecutor is best characterized as a kind of lawyer who seeks the most efficient punishment 
in the interest of society.”121  This goal in turn affects her behavior at trial. Her role and goal 
influences how we should delineate the line for keeping them from being overzealous. 
 
                                                
121Nuno Garoupa& Frank H. Stephen, Why Plea-Bargaining Fails to Achieve Results in so Many Criminal Justice 
Systems: A New Framework For Assessment, 15 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUROPEAN AND COMP. L. 323, 349 (2008). 
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The power to investigate and to prosecute varies between countries and systems.  Some 
are charged with both investigation and prosecution; others are charged mainly with prosecution 
and screening of investigators’ cases; still others are in charge of investigating and prosecuting 
ordinary cases, while the investigating judge is in charge of investigating and prosecuting 
felonies.  The function and structure also interacts with the screening mechanism.  For example, 
one prosecutorial decision has to be submitted and reviewed by many layers of the internal 
hierarchy before an indictment is initiated; this process might at least do away with some 
unfounded cases if the internal checks hold a stricter standard.  The following begins with a 
detailed articulation of the prosecutorial structure and organizational control in the United States, 
France, and Taiwan. 
 
1.1. Federal Prosecutor 
 
According to the U.S. Constitution, the prosecutor is not part of the judiciary, but rather 
part of the executive branch.  The dual prosecutorial jurisdiction of the United States is divided 
into federal prosecutors and state prosecutors, who are distinct in regard to their jurisdictions, 
statuses, and methods of selection. 
 
In the Federal system, the Department of Justice (hereinafter DOJ) and Attorney 
General122head the federal prosecutors across the country.  The DOJ has several divisions, 
United States Attorneys, the National Security Division, the Criminal Division, the Litigation 
Division, the Civil Division, the Civil Rights Division, the Antitrust Division, the Tax Division, 
                                                
122 The United States Department of Justice, Functions Manual: Overview, available at:  
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/mps/manual/overview.htm (last visited July, 6, 2011).   
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and the Justice Management Division.  Originally, the position of Attorney General was created 
by Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1789.  On July 1, 1870, given the boom of litigation after the 
civil war, Congress enacted the Act to establish the Department of Justice and positioned it as an 
executive department of the government of the United States, handling all criminal prosecutions 
and civil suits in which the United States had an interest. 
 
Among the divisions, the Criminal Division123 is charged with the enforcement of all 
federal criminal laws, as well as the formulation and implementation of criminal enforcement 
policy.  The Criminal Division attorneys prosecute many nationally significant cases. In addition, 
the division also provides advice and assistance.  The Criminal Division is headed by the 
Assistant Attorney General, who oversees nearly 600 attorneys prosecuting federal criminal 
cases across the country and helps in developing the criminal law.124 
 
Other than the attorneys positioned in the Criminal Division of the DOJ in Washington 
D.C., the main actors across the United States enforcing criminal laws, pursuant to DOJ policy, 
are the U.S. Attorneys, who are the chief federal law enforcement officers in each federal judicial 
district and are responsible for federal criminal prosecutions and civil cases in which the United 
                                                
123See The United States Department of Justice, Criminal Division: About The Division , available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/about/ (last visited July, 6, 2011)   
 (The Criminal Division develops, enforces, and supervises the application of all federal criminal laws except those 
specifically assigned to other divisions. The Division, and the 94 U.S. Attorneys have the responsibility for 
overseeing criminal matters under the more than 900 statutes as well as certain civil litigation. Criminal Division 
attorneys prosecute many nationally significant cases. In addition to its direct litigation responsibilities, the Division 
formulates and implements criminal enforcement policy and provides advice and assistance. For example, the 
Division approves or monitors sensitive areas of law enforcement such as participation in the Witness Security 
Program and the use of electronic surveillance; advises the Attorney General, Congress, the Office of Management 
Budget and the White House on matters of criminal law; provides legal advice and assistance to federal prosecutors 
and investigative agencies; and provides leadership for coordinating international as well as federal, state, and local 
law enforcement matters). 
124Id. 
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States government is a party.  Aside from the Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General, 
there are 94 U.S. Attorneys located in federal jurisdictions.  U.S. Attorneys serve as the nation’s 
principal litigators under the direction of the Attorney General.125  U.S. Attorneys are appointed 
by the President and must undergo a political vetting process, which requires the consent of 
Congress, and are in fact subjected to top-down political pressures, as well as the Attorney 
General’s direct control over enforcement policy.   
U.S. Attorneys are authorized by statute and, pursuant to authority delegated from the 
Attorney General, have the broadest discretion in the exercise of such authority. Each U.S. 
Attorney exercises wide discretion in the use of his or her resources to further the priorities of the 
local jurisdictions and the needs of their communities.  They have supervisory powers over 
federal prosecutors and over their performance and discretionary powers.126  Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys are appointed by the Attorney General and can be removed from office by the 
Attorney General.  They are subject to the supervision of U.S. Attorneys in commencing 
criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
 
Even though hierarchical structure ranks the Attorney General, United States Attorney, 
and Assistant U.S. Attorneys in a top-down streamline form, prosecutors at the bottom do not 
work their way up the career ladder as prosecutors in the continental law system do, given that 
                                                
125See United States Attorney’s Office, Offices of The United States Attorneys: Mission, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/about/mission.html. 
Office of United States Attorneys, available at: http://www.justice.gov/usao/about/mission.html(last visited July, 6, 
2011) (Each United States Attorney is assigned to a judicial district, with the exception of Guam and the Northern 
Mariana Islands, where a single United States Attorney serves both districts.  United States Attorneys have three 
statutory responsibilities under Title 28, Section 547 of the United States Code:1. the prosecution of criminal cases 
brought by the Federal Government;2.the prosecution and defense of civil cases in which the United States is a party; 
and 3.the collection of debts owed the Federal Government which are administratively uncollectible). 
126Michael A. Caves, The Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Obligatory Charging under the Ashcroft Memo, 9 J. L.  & SOC. 
CHALLENGES 1, 9-10 (2008). 
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U.S. prosecutors are often not career prosecutors. U.S. prosecutors who reside in the lower ranks 
frequently work for benefits other than promotion.  Instead, they work for future prospective 
careers.    
 
According to manuals issued by the DOJ, U.S. Attorneys perform the functions of 
investigation, the direction of investigation, and the decision of whether or not to prosecute, 
mainly.127  Federal prosecutors possess discretionary power, so they are able to manage a heavy 
caseload with very limited resources to establish priorities among offenders, offenses, and law 
enforcement strategies. 128   The DOJ does not use centralized authority to restrain local 
prosecutors; instead federal prosecutors at the U.S. Attorney level are subject to minimal 
supervision to make independent decisions that are not subjected to approval or direction.129  
Most of the time, federal prosecutors are free to respond to local circumstances.   
 
The core concept of the prosecutorial function is the decision to charge, to strike plea 
agreements, and to make sentence recommendations.  Decisions regarding whether or not to 
charge, what to charge, and whether to bargain have been left in the prosecutors’ hands with very 
few limitations.130  The Supreme Court also supports that  
                                                
127See United States Attorneys Manual, available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/2mcrm.htm#9-2.010(last visited July 6, 
2011)(enumerating the authority of United States Attorney: A. Investigating suspected or alleged offenses against 
the United States. B. Causing investigations to be conducted by the appropriate federal law enforcement agencies. C. 
Declining prosecution. D. Authorizing prosecution. E. Determining the manner of prosecuting and deciding trial 
related questions. E. Recommending whether to appeal or not to appeal from an adverse ruling or decision. F. 
Dismissing prosecutions. G. Handling civil matters related thereto which are under the supervision of the Criminal 
Division). 
128 Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, at 242. 
129Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Current White   Collar 
Cases, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 165, 194-195 (2004). 
130 James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524-1525 (1981).  
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“prosecutorial decisions necessarily involve both judgmental and factual 
decisions that vary from case to case . . . . It is difficult to imagine guidelines 
that would produce the predictability sought by the dissent without 
sacrificing the discretion essential to a humane and fair system of criminal 
justice.”131   
 
Though the Supreme Court supports prosecutors having a wide range of discretion, there 
is still a need to restrain the exercise of that power.  It cannot be exercised unfettered, misused in 
a way that creates unequal enforcement, or employed as a tool to attack opposing political 
figures.  There are in fact limits that enforce these norms, although they are rarely used.  The 
kinds of limitations placed on prosecutorial discretion to charge include judicial checks on 
selective and vindictive prosecution.  However, these review standards brought by the defense 
are set quite high and may be brought only after a case is charged.  In this sense, very few 
limitations on the exercise of discretionary power mean that the decision making undergoes 
minimal review.  This type of screening to prosecutorial charging discretion differs from the one 
that this dissertation intends to reform. 
 
Given this nature, federal prosecutors in America are subject to external control from 
judicial review and political power.132On top of that, they are subject to internal policies and 
guidelines, which are an essential mechanism to assist in fulfilling their duties.  In the next 
chapter, this dissertation will evaluate major external screening mechanisms designed to keep 
prosecutors’ charging power in check. 
 
                                                
131McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313, 314 n37 (1987). 
132 William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: the Limits of Comparative 
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1325, 1342 (1993). 
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1.2. State Prosecutor 
 
There are, in total, fifty states and one district, the District of Columbia, across the United 
States.  Each state has one Attorney General.  State Attorneys General are elected generally and 
are executive officers.  Currently, the State Attorneys General in 43 states are elected.  The State 
Attorneys General are appointed by the governor in 5 states: Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, 
New Jersey and Wyoming, as well as the five jurisdictions of American Samoa, Guam, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.133  “In Maine, the Attorney 
General is selected by secret ballot of the legislature, and in Tennessee, by the state Supreme 
Court.  In the District of Columbia, the Mayor appoints the Corporation Counsel whose powers 
and duties are similar to those of the Attorneys General of the states and jurisdictions.”134 
 
The position of State Attorney General originatedin the mid-thirteenth century in the 
office of England’s "King's Attorney," but nowadays, her typical powers include: representing 
the state and state agencies before the state and federal courts, handling criminal appeals, 
occasionally engaging in serious state wide criminal prosecutions, and instituting civil suits on 
behalf of the state.135 
 
                                                
133National Association of Attorneys, General Frequently Asked Questions, How does one become an Attorney 
General? available at : 
http://www.naag.org/how_does_one_become_an_attorney_general.php(last visited Nov.11, 2012). 
134Id. 
135See National Association of Attorneys, General Frequently Asked Questions, What does an Attorney General do?, 
available athttp://www.naag.org/what_does_an_attorney_general_do.php(last visited Nov.11, 2012) (Their other 
authority include to issue formal opinions to state agencies; act as public advocates; propose legislation; enforce 
federal and state environmental laws; represent the public's interests in charitable trust and solicitations; and operate 
victim compensation programs). 
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Under the State Attorneys General, there are around 27,000 local prosecutors vested in 
2,341 jurisdictions, each of which is directed by one chief prosecutor.  One state prosecutorial 
district is usually comprised of one or more counties.136  Chief prosecutors are usually elected, 
but some are appointed.  97% of prosecutors at the state level are elected public officials.137  
Deputy and assistant prosecutors are selected by their chief prosecutors, and selections are based 
on their achievements, experience, and personal qualifications related to their ability to 
successfully perform the work of the office.138  According to the national survey of prosecutors, 
the number of assistant prosecutors in large districts ranges from 59, serving a population of a 
half million, to 151 in large districts serving a population of one million.139 
 
Chief prosecutors are responsible for all local prosecution.140  They are asked to manage 
the office for larger jurisdictions, while other prosecutors are asked to familiarize themselves 
with office structure, procedures, policies, the operation of local police agencies, and 
professional conduct. 141   However, State Attorneys General are not always in charge of 
                                                
136Manu Raghav, Why Do Budgets Received By State Prosecutors Vary Across Districts in the United States? 2 
(2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946233; However, in Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island, prosecutors’ 
offices have jurisdiction for entire State. see CAROL J. DEFRANCES, U. S. Department of Justice, State Court 
Prosecutors in Large Districts 2001, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, 2 ( 2001 ). 
137Pizzi, supra note 132, at 1337-1338. 
138National District Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards, 5.1-5.2,1-5.4, 3rd. ed. 2009,available at : 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20 
Commentary.pdf(last visited July. 8, 2011). 
139See DEFRANCES, supra note 136, at 2(noting the basis for hiring, promotion and retention decisions are assessed 
by their educational background, work experience, judgment, written and oral communication skills, trial advocacy 
skills, and other personal qualifications, such as time commitment).  see also Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and 
Overcriminalization: 
Thoughts on Political Dynamics and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 460 (2009) (noting majority 
of states employ direct election of chief prosecutors at local level).  
141 National District Attorneys Association, National Prosecution Standards, supra note 164, at 5.1-5.2,1-5.4. 
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prosecution.  Such is the case in Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island, where it is the assistant 
attorney general who is charged with all criminal prosecutions.142 
 
State prosecutors’ offices should develop policies and proceedings that guide the exercise 
of their discretion and assist in the performance of those who work in the prosecutor’s office.143  
The main reason for regulating policy is the reduction of variation and the increase of uniformity.  
Although policies and guidelines are issued by all state prosecutors’ offices, there are varying 
resources and cultures in different states.  Enforcement policies are set up according to local 
customs, enforcement priorities, available resources, and so on.  Therefore, district attorneys 
employ a wide range of discretion that caters to the above goals.  It is also the chief prosecutors 
who have to respond to the general public, as well as to the culprit, who ensure that justice will 
be done.  Their subordinates are “not elected and often operate with remarkably little 
oversight.”144 
 
The election campaign forces prosecutors to articulate their office’s policy and present 
records that match their enforcement policies.145  Theoretically, the electorate will also scrutinize 
their enforcement decisions by comparing their actions to their records.146  In retaining their 
positions, they are faced with the pressures of being reelected.  Under pressure from the public to 
establish their image as having a will to win and to combat crime, prosecutors must not only 
                                                
142Wu, supra note 87, at 54. 
143Id. 
144Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial regulation versus prosecutorial accountability, 157 PENN. L. REV. 
959,961(2009). 
145See Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call For A directive, Goal-Oriented Principle To Guide the    
Exercise of Discretion by Federal Prosecutors, 39 VAL. U. L. Rev. 625, 632-633 (2005) (noting election makes the 
District Attorney, i.e. state prosecutor, to articulate why should she being reelected, and to match her performance of 
employing discretion with her campaign promises). 
146 Id. 
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work to achieve a high performance record and maintain a high conviction rate to present to the 
public, but must also actively employ the power to prosecute whenever outcry from the 
community boils over after a particularly heinous crime, such as the murder of a child or child 
molestation by a repeat sex-offender.  Academia claims that “prosecutors are susceptible to 
political influences and under the control of political power as an American political 
tradition.”147  Thus, scholars have argued that prosecutors are subject to political gains and 
follow political incentives when making decision.148  But in practice, scholars have argued that 
“district attorney’s electoral contests are rarely measured assessments of a prosecutor’s overall 
performance.”149 
 
In a nutshell, district attorneys are subject to external political pressures merely because 
they want to be reelected and perhaps be moved to a higher position.150  For example, Los 
Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti, failing to convict O.J. Simpson, failed to continue his 
career in the 2000 election.151  On top of that, a state prosecutor is subject to external review just 
as its counterpart in federal jurisdictions.  But the external reviews, such as reviews on the basis 
of selective and vindictive prosecution, seem to be ex post, and are less direct means of 
supervising the prosecution.  Therefore, some more direct institutions or mechanisms are 
essential in order to evaluate the exercise of their charging power.  In fact, the direct judicial ex 
ante review of the charging power, i.e. the preliminary hearing and grand jury plays a major role 
in the supervision of the exercise of such power (see infra chapter 3). 
                                                
147William T. Pizzi, supra note 132, at 1338-1339. 
148 Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence 
Economics and Transitory Prosecutors,61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 5-6(2005). 
149Bibas, supra note 144, at 961. 
150Id. at 983. 
151Id. at 984. 
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2. Taiwan Structure 
 
As illustrated above, the role, goal, authority, and major ideology of continental 
prosecutors differs significantly from those of their American counterparts.  Taiwan’s historical 
transformation of criminal justice is patterned after the continental model; hence the roles, goals, 
and structures of the prosecutor are aligned closely with the continental model.  As Professor 
Damaska argued, the hierarchical structure of the prosecutor and centralized decisionmaking 
dominates enforcement agencies that administer criminal justice.  The prosecutorial offices and 
organizations are rigorously organized under this top-down structural institution.  Such devices 
intend to achieve uniform and consistent decisions.     
 
The following part analyzes the current structure and judicial attributes of prosecutors, as 
well as features from the career ladder within the structure, to comprehensively grasp 
institutional culture, which generates the underlying ideology that affects its charging decision 
making. 
 
Taiwan has no federal and state jurisdictions, but there is a unitary centralized 
prosecutorial institution that heads various levels of prosecutors’ offices.  Theoretically, the 
prosecutor is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, one department subject to the Executive 
Yuan (Execution branch).  However, the prosecutor is not to be classified as a pure executive 
officer, as is her counterpart in the United States.  The reason originates from the legal origins of 
the prosecutorial institution that can be traced from the Japanese system imposed through its 
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colonization of Taiwan.  After World War II, even though Taiwan was returned to China within 
a short period of time, the colonized criminal justice system did not collide with that of China’s 
system, because it is the continental law system after which the Qing dynasty was modeled in 
China.  It is, therefore, the continental law system, and its institutions, such as structure and 
personnel, that constructs the criminal justice system in Taiwan.  The continental legal system 
influence permeates even after the criminal justice system underwent dramatic transformations in 
2002 to 2003.  It could be readily identified with typical features expressed in the continental 
system.     
 
First, the prosecutorial system in Taiwan is a centralized structure with a strong 
hierarchical control over the organization.  The system is headed by the Ministry of Justice 
(hereinafter MOJ), composed of numerous units: the Legal Affairs Committee; the Department 
of Legal Affairs; the Department of Prosecutorial Affairs; the Department of Corrections; the 
Department of Prevention, the Department of Rehabilitation and Protection; and the Department 
of Government Employee Ethics.152  The MOJ is in charge of administration of the system of 
prosecutors and the legal affairs of the Executive Yuan and its subordinate organizations.  The 
MOJ is headed by the minister who is responsible for the Legislative branch.  To set up 
prosecutorial policy and to supervise prosecutorial administrative affairs is crucial to the 
administration of the system of prosecution.  Often, the prosecutorial administrative affairs 
involve policies of the comprehensive agenda of national enforcement policy, such as the 
                                                
152See Fa Wu Bu[Ministry of Justice], Zu Zhi Jia Gou[Organization and Structures](Taiwan), available at: 
http://www.moj.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=21441&CtNode=11390&mp=095 (last visited Sep. 20, 2011) (Some 
supporting setups are as follows : the Secretariat, Department of General Affairs, Department of Personnel, 
Department of Accounting, Department of Statistics, and Department of Information Management. In addition, there 
are some committees to fulfill special tasks). 
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domestic codification of international human right conventions, annual drug enforcement policy, 
enhancement of the convictions of corruption charge, and so on.  These policies are general 
directives of enforcement policy or investigation of specific offenses, such as corruption, human 
trafficking, hit and run, and so on.   
 
The Minister heads the Ministry of Justice, who also supervises the prosecutorial system, 
through means such as performance evaluations, promotions, chastisements, and personnel 
transfers, but does not internally supervise the prosecutor in individual cases.153  If the Minister 
desires to issue a directive regarding individual cases, she could only refer it to the Prosecutor 
General, who is not obligated to direct the subordinate unless she agrees with the directive.154 
 
The Prosecutorial system is attached to the court system.  Each level of the prosecutorial 
structure is attached to each court, but functions independently from the court.  The Supreme 
Prosecutors Office operates at the highest level of prosecutorial offices.  The second tier of 
prosecutorial bureaucrats consists of the Taiwan High Prosecutors Office, with their offices at 
Taichung, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Hualien.  Kinmen Island sets up a Fu Cheng High Prosecutors 
Office.  Hierarchically in the lowest level of prosecutorial system, there are 21 District 
Prosecutors Offices.155  The Prosecutor General is nominated by the President, with the consent 
of the Legislative Yuan, but she is not responsible for the Legislative Yuan except on the annual 
                                                
153LIN, supra note 3, at 188-191.  
154Wu, supra note 87, at 63-64.     
155Fa Wu Bu [Ministry of Justice], Suo Shu Ji Guan Jie Shao Jian Cha Ji Guan[Introduction to prosecutorial 
organizations](Taiwan), May 18, 2010, available at: 
http://www.moj.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=23546&CtNode=27334&mp=555 (last visited July. 2011). 
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budgets act.156She heads and supervises the whole prosecutorial system in regard to the criminal 
investigation and prosecution of specific cases.  This design offsets the influence of political 
control and makes her status more independent from politics in cases of investigation and 
prosecution. 
 
As a continental law system, the prosecutorial system puts heavy emphasis on centripetal 
and uniform decision making. This puts the whole prosecutorial system under the unitary 
command of the Prosecutor General of the Supreme Prosecutors Office in crime investigation, 
prosecution, assisting in private prosecution, undertaking private prosecution, directing the 
execution of criminal sentences, and performing other mandatory duties.  Given the concepts of 
uniformity and stability of decision making, the Prosecutor General not only may unify the 
opinions of specific legal issues in handling specific types of cases, but also may directly order 
specific instructions to specific cases, as well as supervise the performance of prosecutors.157 
 
According to the Code of Court Organization Articles 63 and 64, the Prosecutor General, 
or chief prosecutor in each district, has the authority to direct and supervise subordinate 
prosecutors and district prosecutors’ office prosecutors.  Subordinate prosecutors are obligated to 
follow directives and supervision.  Meanwhile, both the Prosecutor General and chief 
prosecutors may take over the cases anytime, or transfer the cases from the current managing 
prosecutors to other prosecutors.  The MOJ issued a project on “Transparency program on the 
                                                
156 Code of Court Organization art.66 (2011)(Taiwan). 
157Su-Ming Yang, Jian Cha Zong Zhang Ren Ding Tan Wu Shang Qian Giao Shou Zha Ling Yin Jiou Fei Koung Ru 
Yu[Prosecutor General Consider It Is Corruption, Thousands of Professors Might Be Imprisoned For Frauding 
Research Grant] (Taiwan), Jun. 15, 2012, available at 
http://news.chinatimes.com/focus/501011360/132012061500854.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2012). 
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Unitary Prosecutorial System,” which listed the possible scenarios in which they would take over 
a case or transfer it as follows: (1) the unification of appropriate application of law and 
prosecution standard when considered necessarily by the Prosecutor General or chief 
prosecutors; (2) there is a factual basis to recognize the existence of the managing prosecutor 
breaching current law, prosecutorial bias, or prosecutorial misconduct in exercising prosecutorial 
power; (3) at the request of managing prosecutors to ask for such exercise of authority when 
conflicts of opinions against superiors occur.158  The authority to takeover the case or transfer the 
case to another prosecutor strengthens the prosecutorial system’s ability to carry out the unified 
will of the superiors.  Even though the unitary prosecutorial system is already a law, the 
justification of this mechanism remains disputed in Continental Europe.159  The hierarchical 
superior prosecutor is entitled to take the case over, but the superior prosecutor remains subject 
to the demand of mandatory prosecution in the decision of prosecution.      
 
Each prosecutorial office is headed by a chief prosecutor.  The Chief prosecutor in the 
Taiwan High Prosecutors Office heads the first and second instance of district prosecutors’ 
offices.  The Chief prosecutor has the authority to direct and supervise the performance and 
decision making of prosecutors in that district.  She is empowered to supervise and direct the 
cases that are investigated by the investigating prosecutor or transfer the case to another 
prosecutor to perpetuate uniformity and stability.  A district prosecutors’ office is composed of 
many different units managing different type of offenses, including economic crime, corruption 
unit, intellectual property crime, child, and women protection unit, organized crime, etc.  A unit 
                                                
158Shou-Huang Chen, Jian Cha Yi Ti Xin Dong Li[New Momentum of Unitary Prosecutorial System](Taiwan), 
available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/work/work07/work07-01.asp(last visited July, 24,  2011). 
159 LIN, supra note 3, at 115-127.  
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that is comprised of more than six prosecutors will be assigned a unit head prosecutor.  Both the 
Chief Prosecutor and unit Head Prosecutor lead the district prosecutors’ office in that 
jurisdiction.  This kind of structure creates a density of supervision and strengthens the 
uniformity of decision making. 
 
Theoretically, unitary structure and top-down hierarchical control enhances the identical 
application and interpretation of the law. 160  Traditionally, the continental system denies 
prosecutorial discretion to prevent prosecutors from political or improper influence.  Through 
such rigid structures and supervision from top bureaucrats, the prosecutorial policies and specific 
orders could be enforced and secured as well.  In reality, different outcomes of identical types of 
cases handled by different prosecutors are not unusual events.  Even though supervision should 
maintain the system’s operation as unitary, the chief prosecutor is not able to keep close watch 
on all of the performances and works of subordinate prosecutors. 
 
Secondly, the recruitment, training, and selection of prosecutors are similar to what is 
seen in continental law countries.  Unlike prosecutors in the United States, prosecutors in Taiwan 
are neither elected nor appointed; they are governmental officials who pass the annual National 
Judiciary Examination, the most competitive judicial examination in Taiwan.161  They are not 
“attorneys” as are their counterparts in the United States, rather another group of civil servant or 
                                                
160Wu, supra note 87, at 65.     
161See Kao Xuan Bu[Ministry of Examination], Kao Xuan Tong Ji Nian Bao[Examination Statistics](Taiwan), 
available at  http://wwwc.moex.gov.tw/main/content/wfrmContentLink.aspx?menu_id=268 (last visited Oct. 12, 
2012)(The passing rate of judiciary exam ranges from 0.99% to 4 % for past decade).    
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government official.162  Still, they are the agent or representative of the government.  As 
Professor Langbein noted, the position of prosecutor was the result of separating the 
investigative function from the judicial function of an inquisitorial judge.163  In other words, 
whether one is a judge or prosecutor is simply a matter of exerting different judicial functions 
under the original judicial conception.         
 
Third, the promotion of the prosecutor in a continental model is merit based. Climbing up 
the career ladder paves the way to top official ranking, which incentivizes most of the 
newcomers and tenured prosecutors, if not selecting of transferring the tenured track to become a 
judge.  According to the newly enacted Judges Act, which also applies to prosecutors, the 
appointment, promotion, evaluation, suspension of official status, and discharge of judges and 
prosecutors are determined by prosecutorial personnel evaluation committee.  Only by having 
committed a felony or having been issued severe disciplinary sanctions can judges or prosecutors 
be suspended from their positions.  Without the consent of judges and prosecutors, they cannot 
be transferred to other positions.164  Under the same law, prosecutors are as secure in life tenure 
as judicial officers once they finish the probationary period of five working years, and garner 
their tenure status. The newly instituted Personnel Evaluation Committee plays the role of 
scrutinizing the performance and work ex post of both judges and prosecutors.  The Personnel 
Evaluation Committee evaluates and reviews the appointment, promotion, evaluation, suspension 
of official status, and discharge of prosecutors. 
 
                                                
162William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: the Limits of Comparative 
Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform,54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1325,1331-1332 (1993). 
163Langbein, supra note 41, at 446.  
164Judges Act, art. 42, 43, 89(2011)(Taiwan). 
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The new epoch is marked especially by the external checks and direct reviews of judges 
and prosecutorial duty and accountability, as well as a response to the outcry of society to weed 
out what the society called “dinosaur judges.”165  Much of this classification is the product of 
long-term discontent with some judicial decisions in finding defendants not guilty, as well as 
lenient sentences imposed on defendants with regard to sexual assault cases.  Moreover, it adds 
new mechanisms to removing disqualified judges and prosecutors from their positions that would 
influence the incentives and behavior of other judges and prosecutors in exercising their 
authority.  It is without any doubt that the law or legal institution would have an effect on human 
behaviors and even alter their behaviors.  What is unknown is the extent of the influence the new 
law would have and how the system and institution would respond to such transformation.     
 
3. French Structure 
  
The French government went through several changes from the traditional ancient 
authoritarian regime, the monarchy, the church, and the nobility, to the First French Republic, 
which was to take place under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1799.166  Conventionally, 
the French Republic emphasized the sovereignty of the French people, and believed that the 
power is exercised by its representative, the nation.167  Napoleon envisioned the country to be a 
                                                
165 In some sense, the judges crown by such term in a way to demonstrate society’s anger towards judges that are 
known to be making ridiculous decisions that is totally alien to the society, for example, one decision vacate lower 
court decision of sexual assault cases in demanding lower court in finding the fact that whether a seven years old girl 
consent to the sexual behavior.  This kind of decision is contradict to the common idea of society, and be judged as 
prehistoric ideology.    
166 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 65. 
167Id. at 15-16. 
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strong centralized state, under a rigid hierarchy and a finely delineated rule of government.168  
Under this traditional notion of the state-centered ideology, the early state ensured that the 
magistrature was subject to political authority and that the judiciary was applying technical law 
mechanically.169  It is, after all, the concept of state-centered government that dominates the 
judiciary and the criminal justice ideology.   
 
Under the state-centered notion, the prosecutor has been included in the larger judiciary 
circle.170  Historically from the Ordonnance Criminelle 1670, the investigation, prosecution, and 
trial were controlled in the hand of a single official, lieutenant criminal.171  The procureur 
(hereinafter prosecutor) was then bifurcated from the authority of the single person’s power.172  
The prosecutor is part of the judiciary, the French magistratures.  The prosecutor is responsible 
for reviewing evidence and determining whether or not to pursue a prosecution.  She is also 
“responsible for directing the police investigation and overseeing the detention of the suspect in 
police custody, including the protection of their due process rights.”173  The magistrature, as part 
of the civil service and a judiciary official, is envisaged as law machinery to which interpretation 
and application of law is delegated, as well as policy enforcing under the hierarchical structure of 
the prosecution.174  Therefore, there is a legally structured framework of supervision within 
prosecutorial nature.  
 
                                                
168 See id. at 16, 65-72 (discussing the French magistrature represents the judiciary and includes three kinds of 
judges, the prosecutor, the investigating judge and the trial judge).   
169Id. at17. 
170Id. at 68. 
171Id. 
172Id. 
173Id. at 75. 
174Id. at18-19. 
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France’s prosecutorial official system, like many in Continental Europe, is a centralized, 
hierarchical system that adopts the career judiciary system.175  Entrance into the judiciary is 
through competitive examinations, followed by collective training before graduation.  Trainees 
choose one of three judiciary careers and may move from one to the other.176  Through such 
professional and intensive training, the trainees bond together with a similar ideology in 
becoming members of the judiciary, i.e. magistrats, which relaxes what might otherwise be a 
“check and balance” relationship between the prosecution and trial.177 
 
In addition to the historical development, ideology, and role played, there remains the 
overlapping authority and structure within the magistrats.  The whole prosecutorial system is 
headed by the government minister, the Minister of Justice, together with the procureur 
generaux and the procureurde la Republique to the lower part of hierarchical pyramid.178  Each 
prosecutor is part of the Ministere Public and works within each local parquet (the collective 
name for prosecutors, known as ministe’re public) area (district prosecutor office), under the 
name of the procureurde la Republique.179  The prosecutor is in charge of the prosecution of the 
cases under the hierarchical structure led by the Ministry of Justice, while the sitting judge 
maintains her independence from the executive branch.180 
 
As Professor Hodgson has written, in order to ensure the democratic accountability of the 
prosecutor and the centralization and uniformity within the parquet, the hierarchical model 
                                                
175Id. at 69, 75. 
176Id.  
177Id. at 69-70.  
178Id. at 228. 
179Id. at 229. 
180Id. 
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controls and defines the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  As a continental law system, the 
prosecutorial system puts heavy emphasis on subordination to upper level authority and the 
Minister of Justice in France, especially when the Minister of Justice is able to issue instructions 
in individual cases, as well as to influence the promotion of the prosecutor.181  Also, the 
hierarchical accountability of the prosecutor is a form of democratic accountability of 
subordinates to assure consistent application of the law.182  But this hierarchical accountability 
creates loopholes for political interference, which creates tension between the ideas of 
independence of the prosecutor and the democratic accountability to the government minister.183  
Since 1993, any instructions with regard to a case must legally be in written form and kept in the 
dossier, but the hierarchical culture of instruction ensures that the new law is not followed in 
practice.184 
 
In order to divide the functions of prosecutor and investigating judge, the 1958 French 
Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter FCCP), a redrafting of the Code d’instruction 
criminelle in 1808, established the independence of juge d’instruction (hereinafter the 
investigating judge) from the public prosecutor.185  However, the investigating judge is also 
charged with a judicial function, which causes confusion, especially since more complex and 
serious crimes are in her authority to investigate.186  She conducts a neutral and wide range 
investigation while reviewing whether the case is founded or not, which can create conflict in its 
function and role-playing.  The investigating judge is entitled to conduct any lawful investigation 
                                                
181Id. at 76. 
182Id. at 80. 
183Id. at 80. 
184Id. at 76-77. 
185Id.at 27. 
186Id. 
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that she deems will assist in the discovery of truth and, unlike the prosecutor, is not subordinate 
to hierarchical control over the investigation.187  Structurally, she is not subordinate to the 
Ministry of Justice.   
 
As a nation with continental law tradition, the rigid hierarchical structure and democratic 
accountability to the government minister is intended to create a uniform, hierarchical, and 
indivisible entity through which criminal policy may be applied consistently, which comports 
with the hierarchical model of criminal justice noted by Professor Damaska.188  However, in a 
highly demanding uniform and hierarchical criminal justice system, the French prosecution 
adopts no mandatory prosecution, as articulated in the next section regarding the function of the 
prosecutor.  This, in turn, may intensify the systematic control over the prosecutor in order to 
maintain the ideology of uniform enforcement and consistent decision making.     
 
III. Function of Prosecutor 
 
This part will illustrate the charging function and charging discretion of the United States, 
Taiwan, and France.  When making comparisons of one function amongst different countries, 
this dissertation adopts a broader systemic perspective for the features of each country, because a 
pure “functionalism” or “functional equivalence” approach fails to capture the structural and 
legal cultural differences of the systems’ participants and their interrelationships189  Accordingly, 
                                                
187Id.at 209. 
188Id.at 229. 
189 For “system analysis” is a standard feature by decoding each element of one nation’s criminal justice because 
every parts interacts with other parts of criminal justice within the system.  See Richard S. Frase, Comparative 
Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform : How Do the French Do It, How Can We Find Out, and Why 
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this section looks broadly into investigation and charging, both in theory and in practice, to better 
understand how charging decisionmaking also intertwines with investigations, because the 
prosecutor makes the first screening in sifting out the cases.  Because the historical 
developments, structures, roles, legal cultures, and ideologies embedded in the prosecutorial 
system within different systems have been addressed in the former sections, the related parts will 
not be analyzed here. 
 
1. Prosecutorial Charging Function in the United States 
 
1.1. Charging 
 
American prosecutors’ primary responsibility is to seek justice, to ensure that the guilty 
are held accountable, to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction, and to respect the rights 
of all participants, not merely to convict. 190   The functions of the U.S. prosecutor are 
investigation, charging decisionmaking, litigating at trial, plea-bargaining with the defendant, 
and making sentence recommendations.  Basically, the critical authority of both federal and state 
prosecutors can be divided into three categories: investigation, prosecution, and litigation at trial.  
While charging is monopolized by the prosecutor, investigation and its direction are often 
conducted by government agents who control investigative resources, and often use their own 
                                                                                                                                                       
Should We Care? 78 CAL. L. REV. 539, 548-549 (1990).For “functionalism” or “functional equivalence” approach, 
it is an approach that assumes the legal system of every country faces essentially identical social problems, and 
focused on the function of law in resolving the social conflicts proposed by other countries.  Nonetheless, not every 
society face identical problem, even in social and economic alike conditions, and not all legal rules or laws are 
related to social life.  It reduced the law to a conflict resolution, regardless of its moral and political background.  
See Gunter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law, 26 Harvard International L.J. 411, 
434-439(1985). 
190ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, 5-6 (3rd ed., 1993). 
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discretion in determining whom to arrest and investigate.191  In reality, the investigations are 
conducted and developed by agencies, and eventually agencies have to pass the monopoly power 
to prosecutors to take the case and to seek convictions.192  It is typically not prosecutors who 
control the tactics, resources, and the extent to which the investigation reaches or develops. 
 
In a streamlined process, the prosecutor has enormous discretion to decide whether to 
take cases and review the cases to evaluate how the measures and tactics employed in the case 
would play out at trial.193  During the trial, plea-bargaining and plea agreement are constantly 
deemed as the best tools for ensuring convictions.  With a common phenomenon that 90% of 
cases are settled by plea-bargaining,194 this not only alleviates prosecutors’ burden of proof, but 
also makes the best use of prosecutorial resources.  
 
Usually, prosecutors could enhance their discretionary arsenals to solidify their position 
in deciding whether or not to reach plea-bargaining with the defendant.  They possess exclusive 
knowledge about favorable and unfavorable information, as opposed to the defense.  
Presumably, the prosecutor would not charge if the government really possessed information that 
would exonerate the defendant.  However, it would be possible as well that the defense may not 
be well informed of what exculpatory evidence and information is in the possession of the 
                                                
191See Daniel Richman, supra note 80, at 751,755,756,758,759 (noting that federal investigative agencies are not all 
housed in Department of Justice.  The Secret Service and the Customs Service are positioned in Department of 
Homeland Security.  The agents in Internal Revenue Service report to Secretary of the Treasury.  Postal inspectors 
are located in Postal Service. FBI, DEA and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives report crimes to 
their agency head, instead of prosecutors). 
192Id. at 758-759. 
193Id. at 778. 
194See generally Criminal defendants disposed of in the United States district court table 5.22. 2010, Sourcebook of 
Criminal Justice Statistics, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf  (last visited Sep. 20, 
2012). 
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prosecutor, and may be misled by this disadvantageous situation.  The defense is more likely to 
take the plea if the defense does not know about the favorable evidence.  Normally during the 
pretrial discovery, due to the demand by the Brady ruling (a right that the Constitution provides 
as part of its basic fair trial guarantee), the prosecutor needs to disclose exculpatory evidence to 
the defense.195  The principle is that had the Brady material been known to the defendant, he or 
she might choose to go to trial and might not be found guilty.196  However, the Supreme Court 
has taken a hands-off position in the plea bargain procedure and deemed that the federal 
prosecutor is not obligated to disclose impeachment information relating to any informants or 
other witnesses to a defendant before entering into a binding plea agreement.197  It leaves a 
loophole whereby a defendant who pleads guilty could demand Brady material that contains non-
impeachment evidence that is both favorable and material to the accused.198  If a defendant is not 
informed of the prosecution’s evidence before pleading guilty, it is not overstated that the 
defendant sometimes pleads guilty to what he or she has not committed.199 
 
Although one could argue that all plea bargains must be approved by the judge who has 
the authority to reject plea bargains, usually such rejection is not a common occurrence in that 
ratifying a plea bargain is the only way to keep the judge in control of her dockets.200  In 
addition, the preliminary hearing occurs before the plea and is actually not set up to ensure the 
                                                
195Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,748 (1970). 
196Andrew D. Leipold, Patrolling the Fenceline : How the Court Only Sometimes Cares about Preserving Its Role in 
Criminal Cases in THE POLITICAL HEART OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 177, 185 (Michael Klarman, David Skeel and 
Carol Steiker ed., 2012). 
197United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002). 
198 Leipold, supra note 196,at 183-184. 
199Id. at 185, fn 20. 
200Pizzi, supra note 195,at 1356-1358. 
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defendant acquires sufficient information.201  One could consider that prosecutors possessing the 
authority to plea bargain is a force nudging prosecutors into more of an adjudicator role.  It shifts 
the prosecutorial role from the party of an adversary to a role more like that of an adjudicator, 
namely a judge.   
 
With a common phenomenon that 90% of cases are settled by plea bargaining,202  this 
also means less than 10% of cases actually enter into the trial and are tested by opposition.  In 
this sense, to assure proper charging decisions, so that only warranted cases are allowed to open 
the gate of trial, is critical in every case because there is very likely to be no adversarial testing of 
the charging decision later.  Consequently, the crucial stage hinges on charging decisions and 
functions.  Only by a better institutional design that actually functions to sift out unfounded cases 
is the innocent person not induced to plea just because of being charged or being afraid of being 
punished for not taking a plea.  Hence, controlling and reviewing charging and charging 
discretion is a way to prevent wrongful convictions.  In the next section, a brief analysis of the 
charging discretion of prosecutors in the United States will be articulated. 
 
1.2. Charging Discretion  
 
Unlike the continental law system, which adopts “compulsory prosecution,” greatly 
confining prosecutorial discretion, the United States adopts a model of prosecutorial discretion 
that gives prosecutors enormous power to decide what the criminal law really means in their 
                                                
201Leipold, supra note 196,at 186. 
202Criminal defendants disposed of in the United States district court table 5.22. 2010, Sourcebook of Criminal 
Justice Statistics, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5222010.pdf  (last visited Sep. 20, 2012). 
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jurisdictions.203  It is difficult if not impossible to enforce one set of guidelines in so many 
jurisdictions, given that the United States has dual jurisdictions.  The severity of offenses, 
frequency, and priority of enforcements vary by state and even by jurisdiction within a state.  It 
cannot be a requirement that the same set of guidelines applies to every place.  Contrasted with 
the continental law system, the U.S. system itself tolerates more inconsistency in the 
enforcement of law and emphasizes individualized scenarios.  Flexibility in enforcing the 
criminal laws in the United States is a must, but that does not mean it is not subject to abuse.   
  
 There is no doubt that the entire criminal justice system from arrest to sentencing is filled 
with discretionary decisions, from police deciding to arrest a suspect204 or any other investigative 
agencies’ decision whether to refer cases to prosecutors, to the screening of the arrestee’s case 
(referred case) by a prosecutor who decides whether to accept or decline the case, to the decision 
of a grand jury to return an indictment, to the decision whether or not to plea bargain with the 
defendant, to the determination by a jury of guilt, to the sentence imposed by the judges.   
 
It is widely agreed that prosecutors have the power with regard to whether to charge, 
what to charge, how to charge, and when to charge.  Scholars have noted that “prosecutors 
exercise substantial discretion in deciding whether to charge crimes that require the mandatory 
minimum sentences and in deciding the severity of the charges under presumptive sentencing 
                                                
203 John L. Worrall, Prosecution in America a Historical and Comparative Account, in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE 
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3, 17(John L. Worrall and M. Elaine Nugent-Borakove ed., 2008). 
204 During the composition of this dissertation, there was a big event occurred about police discretion case which 
provoked the heat debate across the United States.  A black Harvard University professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. was 
arrested at his own house because a break-in report was made to the Cambridge police officers.  The professor 
showed some identification to prove his legal residence. Being accused of disorderly conduct, the professor was 
arrested, and taken to the police station.  It is actually maybe more like a racial-bias case where discretion was 
exercised reportedly by the professor based on racism.   see Charge Against Harvard Professor Dropped, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/07/21/massachusetts.harvard.professor.arrested/ (last visited Aug 4, 2009). 
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guidelines.”205  But discretionary processes tend to operate invisibly, out of judicial review, and 
“threaten the ability to channel and control official behavior through law.” 206   The 
decisionmaking of the prosecutor is also criticized for being too political in order to satisfy the 
public’s expectations and for bringing cases that are poorly investigated.207  The most frightening 
aspect of the use of power is to hold political bias against opposing party members in politically-
related cases or against those exercising civil rights.   
 
The Supreme Court and the American Bar Association both express different standards of 
prosecution threshold.  The Supreme Court in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, stated that “so long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely within his discretion.”208  The U.S. Department of Justice issued 
Principles of Federal Prosecution as internal guidelines 209   in “Part C. Selecting 
Charges.”“Except as hereafter provided, the attorney for government should charge, or should 
recommend that the grand jury charge, the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature 
of the defendant’s conduct, and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.”210  As its 
commentary states, prosecutors have to “produce admissible evidence sufficient to obtain and to 
sustain a conviction, or else the government will suffer a dismissal . . . . [D]efendants should be 
charged with the most serious offense that is encompassed by [their] conduct and . . . to result in 
                                                
205Rodney L. Engen, Have Sentencing Reforms Displaced Discretion over Sentencing from Judges to Prosecutors? 
in THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 73, 84 (John L. Worrall and M. Elaine  Nugent-Borakove 
ed., 2008). 
206Arthur Rosett, Discretion, Severity, and Legality in Criminal Justice in THE INVISIBLE JUSTICE SYSTEM,  
DISCRETION AND THE LAW, 24, 25-26 (Burton Atkins and Mark Pogrebin ed., 1978). 
207Bruce A. Green & Fred. C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, WIS. L. REV. 837, 845-846 (2004). 
208434 U.S.357, 364 (1978). 
209 Principles of Federal Prosecution (1980), 6 Federal Sentencing Reporter(No.6), 322-323 (1994).   
210Id. at 322. 
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sustainable conviction.”  The goal is to charge the precise crimes that reflect the defendants’ 
criminal conduct without overcharging or undercharging.211 
 
 Similarly, the National Prosecution Standards states “a prosecutor should file charges that 
he or she believes adequately encompass the accused’s criminal activity and which he or she 
reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at trial.”212  As Professor 
Abrams stated, the nature of discretion is the difficulty of including all the pertinent 
circumstances and law into general rules, and statutory law is not always easily adapted to the 
changes in public attitudes.213  There should be some flexible rules, leaving open the possibility 
for law enforcement to make alternative decisions to respond to the changing values of society.        
 
 While there is a demand for flexibility and adaptability in law enforcement, there is also 
demand for certainty, consistency, and stability.214  While one emphasizes flexibility, the other 
stems from the society’s need for the stability of the law and consistency of the law enforcement 
and cannot be ignored.  Any legal system should be able to balance between the two demands to 
refrain from extreme arbitrariness or absolutely static law enforcement.  
 
                                                
211When mentioning “over” or “under” charging, we already know the part that is “over or under” compared to that 
of the ordinary part, the former lack sufficient evidence to prove the “over” part.  As for the “under” part, there will 
be more than enough evidence to prove the undercharged case.  It could be argued that if the prosecutors know 
exactly what the law is and how to apply it, why do prosecutors choose to overcharge or undercharge?  We have no 
doubt that undercharging will not undermine the rights of the defendant to mount a defense or subject him to a 
disadvantageous status.  After all, it will benefit the defendants as well as prosecutors.  For prosecutors, they need 
less strength to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and easily achieve the end result needed to convict a defendant.  
For the defendants, they will either just enter into a guilty plea because of the lesser degree of offense charged 
against them, or still prepare to go to trial.  But the lesser charge will make it easier for them to defend themselves or 
receive lighter sentencing. 
212ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, supra note 190, at 4-6.  
213Norman Abrams, Internal policy: Guiding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-3 
(1971). 
214Id. at 3. 
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Due to the intrinsic nature of human weakness, unguided and uncontrolled discretionary 
power can easily damage justice.215  Standards, guidelines, and ethics codes regulate the 
discretion of prosecutors and guide prosecutors toward unified decisions within the prosecutors’ 
office.  However, these guidelines are not laws that were enacted by Congress.  They simply 
provide general guidelines for professional conduct.  Consequently, prosecutors are not bound by 
these guidelines, which create little incentive for following them.  What this standard does is 
simply reaffirm the prosecutor’s broad discretion without strong binding effect or any sanction 
attached to it.      
 
If the existing standard could have any impact on prosecutors, it would be like 
professional discipline sanctions.  Professor Gershman, a former prosecutor, noted numerous 
instances of infamous prosecutorial misconduct, none of which resulted in sanctions for the 
prosecutors.216  Eventually, these references are more like a paper tiger, or a placebo to cure the 
prosecutorial practice and conduct.   
 
In a nutshell, charging plays one pivotal function of prosecutors in that it not only opens 
the gateway to trial, but also heralds to society the content and contour of criminal law.  Along 
with the charging function, discretionary charging also magnifies the prosecutor’s power.  It is 
beyond dispute that there is a need to restrain discretionary prosecutor-dominated charging 
power.  External or institutional check from outsiders is one means of achieving supervision of 
prosecutors’ charging discretion or prevention of unfounded charging or zealous charging.  
Additionally, one should look to alternatives beyond resorting to professional standards because 
                                                
215KENNETH CULP DAVIS ET AL., DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE IN  EUROPE AND AMERICA, 8 (1976). 
216BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, §4-1(2d.ed., 2009). 
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internal checks and professional guidelines garner no confidence from outsiders.  Hence, chapter 
3 evaluates external institutional controls to improve the screening or supervising mechanism. 
 
2. Prosecutorial charging function in Taiwan 
2.1. Charging 
 
Prosecutorial charging decisions and the threshold to prosecute are heavily related to the 
design of the screening mechanism, in that the screening mechanism supervises that decision.  If 
weak or groundless charges are not screened and dismissed, defendants may face unlimited 
hardships, and every legal participant becomes involved in a meaningless procedure.217  Only 
when we look into how the prosecutorial charging decision is made will we, accordingly, 
discover the flaws of the screening mechanism and thus be able to devise an effective screening 
system.  This section articulates prosecutorial charging functions both in law and in practice in 
Taiwan, and how it interacts as a preliminary screening for police work.       
 
Because Taiwan’s criminal justice system is in transition towards a modified adversarial 
system, the role of prosecutors is hybridized, combining nonpartisan and advocate characteristics 
of investigation and trial.  In the phase of investigation, prosecutors play a neutral role that 
demands objectivity and impartiality.218  At trial, the prosecutor is one party of the adversarial 
                                                
217Frase, supra note 189, at 625.    
218Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 2(2013)(Taiwan)(providing that any public law 
enforcer who enforce criminal law shall emphasize equal footing to conditions both favorable and unfavorable to an 
accused.  An accused may request the public law enforcer specified in the preceding paragraph to take necessary 
measures favorable to the accused). 
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process,219 and is still required to play a nonpartisan role.  However, the trial itself bears the 
nature of combat and seeks to convict the accused.  This turns the prosecutor into an advocate, 
especially since the conviction and correction rate is considered as part of a comprehensive 
annual evaluation of her performance.   
 
Assuming that the prosecutor charged the defendant without sufficient evidence, and if 
the screening mechanism does not weed out the case, the case enters trial.  By what role should 
the litigating prosecutor deal with the case?  Based on its nonpartisan role, the prosecution shall 
be dropped if the prosecutor retains an unbiased role in the case.  By contrast, as an advocate, if 
prosecutors try to negotiate with the charged to extract a guilty plea or to plea bargain with the 
accused, the prosecutor may eventually obtain the conviction.  Hence, the role does affect the 
exercise of the authority the prosecutor plays.  Owing to this modification, the role of the 
prosecutor in Taiwan is slowly transforming.  Prosecutors positioned in such a hybrid system 
face an identity crisis of sorts and a conflict of roles between playing the objective role and 
playing the advocate role in the justice system.220 
 
On the one hand, the prosecutor considers themselves a part of the judiciary, one who 
actively investigates.  On the other hand, they advocate actively and achieve as many convictions 
as possible at trial.  Through analysis of the function of Taiwanese prosecutors, there are some 
conflicts in the ideology that are embedded in the Taiwan system.  Consequently, there exists 
                                                
219Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 3(2013)(Taiwan)(providing that the term "party" of 
this Code refers to a public prosecutor, a private citizen who files a complaint, or an accused). 
220 One Taipei district litigating prosecutor pointed out his attitude towards the accused, when facing the kind of case 
that he himself would not prosecute, but was prosecuted otherwise by other prosecutor, and chose to be silent in the 
face of an unjustified embezzlement case instead of being an advocate at trial. see Guang Chen, Mao Dun De Gong 
Su Ren[Contradictory litigating prosecutor], 66 She Tuan Fa Ren Zhong Hua Min Guo Jian Cha Guan Xie Hui Jian 
Xie Hui Xun[The Prosecutors Association Note ROC](Taiwan), 15 (2011). 
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doubt that a legal transplant will alter the legal practitioners’ thought and practice.  The 
prosecutor accustomed to a continental law model may have trouble adapting to adversarial 
procedures.221 
 
On the onset of the criminal process, the prosecutor is obligated to investigate any 
criminal offense upon knowing the suspect is accused of crime or occurrence of crime.222  Police 
officials have the duty and power to initiate an investigation to assist the prosecutor.  The 
prosecutor has the authority to direct police officers to conduct a preliminary investigation.  
Judicial police officers shall bind over the case file after their investigations, including the 
evidence within the file, to the prosecutor to continue a consecutive secondary investigation.223  
The prosecutor normally conducts the secondary investigation to oversee the legality of the 
police conduct and to decide whether the police officials have gathered sufficient evidence, as 
well as to determine whether officers have conducted an illegal search or seizure or obtained 
evidence through illegal means.  In addition, the prosecutor can conduct a secondary 
investigation, such as subpoenaing witnesses to testify under oath, questioning defendants, 
ordering laboratories to conduct scientific tests, blood tests, DNA tests, and gathering more 
comprehensive evidence in order to prepare for trial.   
 
                                                
221See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 44, at 4-6 (Professor Pizzi mainly depicts that Italy, a civil law tradition nation, 
leap from a classic civil law system to the one system that incorporated adversarial trial system into civil law 
structure).      
222Xing Shi Su Song Fa [The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 228,paragraph 1 (2013)(Taiwan)(providing that if a 
public prosecutor, because of a complaint, report, surrender, or other reason, finds a suspicion of an offense having 
been committed, she shall initiate an investigation).   
223Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 229, 230, 231(2013)(Taiwan)(providing that the 
officials who shall be deemed as judicial police officers and are obligated to assist a public prosecutor in 
investigating an offense). 
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Prosecutors may work closely with the police to investigate the offenses, or direct them 
upon finding criminal activity.  Nonetheless, the fact-oriented investigation for evidence 
collection is actually commenced by police due to their professional training, scientific methods 
in examining the evidence, personnel, and resources.224  It is usually in complex and high-profile 
cases involving crime ring, financial crime, or official corruption cases that the prosecutor is 
deeply involved with the investigation from the onset of the investigation.  The prosecutors’ duty 
is legal-oriented investigation, including the oversight of police investigations from the legality 
perspective, evidence sifting, law application, and charging decision making.225  As discussed 
above, the evidence presented and investigation conducted by the police is often incomplete and 
insufficient to charge, the witness testimony is not made under oath in pursuant to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure article 159, and bank statements or other written evidence is incomplete, and 
so on.  In addition, evidentiary rules, such as the exclusionary rule, demand that the prosecutor 
look into the police misconduct and to assess the means by which the evidence is obtained during 
the preliminary investigation.  The prosecutor is obligated to wrap up the entire investigation and 
is in charge of decision making.  Upon completion of the investigation, the prosecutor then 
decides the outcome of the investigation, whether to charge, defer, or discharge prosecution.    
 
According to Code of Criminal Procedure article 251, if the outcome of investigation 
demonstrates “evidence obtained by a public prosecutor in the course of investigation is 
sufficient to show that an accused is suspected of having committed an offense,” she is obligated 
to charge, which is called “mandatory prosecution” or “compulsory prosecution.”  There should 
be no discretionary prosecution in principle in Taiwan. In a system with heavy concern for 
                                                
224JAU-YIH HWANG, XING SHI SU SONG FA[Criminal Procedure], 141-142(2d.ed., 2009)(Taiwan). 
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uniformity and consistency, few freedoms are afforded the prosecutor to shield prosecution from 
political and improper influence or abuse of power, to prevent administrative hierarchical 
intervention, and to demand for unitary application of law and consistency of decision making.226  
Prosecutors’ judgment is solely based on evidence and law.  By mandatory prosecution, the 
prosecutor should be immunized from administrative and political influence, which leaves no 
leeway for superior prosecutors to control and direct concrete instructions.  In other words, the 
mandatory prosecution not only binds the managing prosecutor, but also binds the higher-
ranking prosecutorial officials, Prosecutor General or chief prosecutors, in their supervision of 
the subordinate performance.  In addition, such a system could prevent prosecutors from 
arbitrariness in the outcome of decision making. 
 
In practice, the prosecution is required to review the evidence in order to judge whether 
the case is supported by the evidence and to apply the facts to the law.  Usually, she is bound by 
mandatory prosecution and has no leeway, unless she ignores, misjudges, or intentionally abuses 
the mandatory prosecution.  In the face of the above situations, whether the prosecutor abuses 
prosecution or not, there should be a gatekeeper for the protection of the innocent.   
 
2.2. Charging Discretion  
 
In most continental countries, i.e. Germany, France, and Italy, discretionary power is 
exercised for reasons similar to those supporting it in the United States.227  Taiwan is no 
exception when it comes to prosecutors exercising their powers of discretion.  The compulsory 
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prosecution principally applies to all crimes except those offenses that are enumerated and 
allowed in deferred prosecution and discretionary dismissal categories.228  In other words, the 
prosecutor in Taiwan has no discretion in charging felony cases.   
 
There are several exceptions to mandatory prosecution in pursuing the purpose of 
“general prevention,” “specific prevention,” and “resource constraint,” to divert some suspects 
earlier from the criminal justice system in order not to stigmatize the suspects.  Scholars 
elaborate that Taiwan adopts mandatory prosecution in general with the exception of the 
prosecutorial discretion system.229  The following provides a nutshell summary of instances of 
prosecutorial discretion in Taiwan.   
 
First, prosecutors have discretion with cases involving certain specified crimes that are 
minor offenses that carry a maximum penalty of imprisonment for no more than three years, or 
are other offenses that are enumerated in article 376.  The Code of Criminal Procedure article 
253 states “If a public prosecutor considers it appropriate not to prosecute a case specified in 
article 376 after having taken into consideration the provisions of sentencing factors listed in 
article 57 of the Code of Criminal Law, he may make a ruling not to prosecute.”230  Article 57 
                                                
228Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 253(2013)(Taiwan)(providing that if a public 
prosecutor finds it appropriate not to prosecute a case specified in article 376 after having taken into consideration 
the provisions of article 57 of the Criminal Code, she may make a ruling not to prosecute) ; see also art.253-1 
(Taiwan)(see infra footnote 236).  
229 LIN, supra note 3, at 16-18; Different opinion indicates that the offenses enumerated in article 376 account for the 
majority of the cases.  The prosecutor has considerable discretion in handling these cases.  Hence, the opinion is not 
appropriate saying.  Hwang, supra note 218, at 304.  
230Zhong Hua Min Gao Xing Fa[Code of Criminal Law], art.57(2014)(Taiwan)(providing the sentencing factors 
before a judge make a sentencing, and the factors are as follows: 1. the motive and purpose at the time of 
commission of the crime; 2. the stimulation of commission of the crime; 3. the manners of the crime; 4. the life 
condition of the perpetrator; 5. the character of the perpetrator; 6. the education of  the perpetrator; 7. the 
relationship between the perpetrator and victim; 8. degree of the breach of the duty; 9. the harm done by the actus 
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lists sentencing factors for the judge to evaluate the degree of severity of the sentence.  Here, the 
law requires the prosecutor to consider both the offenses enumerated in law and sentencing 
factors before the prosecutor chooses not to prosecute.  The offences enumerated in article 376231 
of the Code might not be prosecuted after the prosecutor has taken the circumstances of article 
57 into consideration.  Since it was exercised by discretion, it should be named “discretionary 
dismissal.”232 
 
Another type of discretionary dismissal is grounded on the execution of a felony 
conviction.  When the accused has committed several offenses, one of which is a felony and has 
been convicted, and the other offense is minor and has not been indicted, to charge and convict 
the minor makes no difference to the felony conviction because the minor offense is not 
enforceable given the Code of Criminal Law.  Hence, at the discretion of the prosecutor, she 
could choose not to prosecute the minor offense.  For example, the defendant committed murder 
and theft.  If the murder is convicted for life sentence, the theft sentencing is therefore not 
enforceable when it comes to the execution of the sentencing.  The sentence is not enforceable 
because the first felony sentence is life imprisonment with or without a conviction for the minor 
offense.233  Even though the goal that discretionary dismissal intends to achieve is of great 
importance, both to the accused and the whole criminal justice system, the discretionary 
dismissal composes a minimal amount of cases disposed by the prosecutor.   
                                                
231These offenses are not felonies offenses because a felony refers to the offense that the minimal imprisonment is 
for five years or more. 
232Wu, supra note 87, at 154-156 (noting this as “easy dismissal”). 
233YU-XIONG LIN, XING SHI SU SONG FA XIA CE GE LUN PIAN[Criminal Procedure : Specific Provisions] 67(4th 
ed., 2004) (Taiwan); Xing Shi Su Song Fa [The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 254(2013)(Taiwan)(providing that 
if an accused commits several offenses for one of which is a felony and a final judgment has been finalized, the 
public prosecutor may decide not to prosecute if she finds that prosecution for another misdemeanor offense will not 
substantially affect the execution of finalized sentencing). 
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The last type of the exception is “deferred prosecution.”  It is intended to digest a great 
amount of cases to alleviate the mounting caseloads.  The category of offenses that fall within 
the deferred prosecution realm are those offenses excluding those punishable by death penalty, 
life imprisonment, or with a minimum punishment of imprisonment for not less than three years.  
The prosecutor is entitled to defer prosecution if she holds that deferred prosecution is 
appropriate after considering article 57 of the Code of Criminal Law and the maintenance of 
public interest.  Both article 57 of the Code of Criminal Law and the element of maintenance of 
public interest contain uncertain and abstract factors that afford the prosecutor broad discretion 
to defer the prosecution.  Critics have claimed that such standards are vague and obscure and 
lack objectivity.234  Others have claimed that article 57 should be limited to the circumstance of 
light culpability of the defendant; otherwise if the act is brutal and the criminal motive is ill, the 
deferred prosecution should be disallowed.235 
 
Although the prosecutor is entitled to defer prosecution, she may not abuse and take 
advantage of the authority to adopt deferred prosecution unless the suspect is actually guilty of 
the offense charged.  Otherwise, the prosecutor shall not impose the deferred prosecution on an 
innocent suspect.  After all, deferred prosecution still bears conditions that require the suspect to 
perform or comply with certain disadvantageous conditions in exchange for deferred 
prosecution.236 
                                                
234HWANG, supra note 218, at 312. 
235LIN, supra note 233, at 71. 
236Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 253-1(2013)(Taiwan) (providing that if an accused 
has committed an offense other than those punishable with death penalty, life imprisonment, or with a minimum 
punishment no less than three years imprisonments, the public prosecutor, after considering the conditions specified 
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To summarize, under the mandatory prosecution system, prosecutors may abuse charging 
power; instead of abusing charging discretion power.  In the States, it is beyond dispute there is a 
need to restrain the discretionary prosecutor-dominated charging power.  In Taiwan, it is the 
prosecutorial charging power that is in need of screening and checking whether the charging 
standard is satisfied.  Hence, screening mechanisms in two major criminal justice systems look 
into distinct parts of exercising the charging power; rather than examining identical concepts of 
charging power. 
 
3. Prosecutorial Charging Function in France 
 
The French criminal system uniquely emphasizes pretrial investigation in preparing the 
dossier and collecting complete evidence and information by the prosecutor in ordinary cases 
and the investigating judge in felony cases, rather than centering the trial on the examination of 
the dossier; thus, the pretrial investigation takes charge of investigation of the case and the trial 
performs only a procedural formality in France.237  Once the investigation and verification of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
in article 57 of the Criminal Code and the maintenance of public interest, finds that a deferred prosecution is 
appropriate, she may rule a deferred prosecution); art.253-2 (2013)(Taiwan)(providing that a public prosecutor may 
demand the defendant to comply with or perform the following conditions within a limited period of time in the 
deferred prosecution: 
1. To apologize to the victim; 
2. To make a written statement of repentance; 
3. To compensate to the victim for property or non-property damages to the victim; 
4. To pay a certain sum to the government or donate to a non-profit organization; 
5. To perform community services; 6. Take a drug rehabilitation, psychotherapy or other medical treatments; 
7. To comply with the order necessary for protecting victim's safety; 
8. To comply with the order necessary for the preventing committing more offenses). 
237See HODGSON, supra note 67, at 222(noting this is an inquisitorial procedure and the instruction process 
characterizes the roots of French criminal procedure).  
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dossier is conducted by the investigating judge, extremely few cases are acquitted at trial.238  
This section examines the prosecutorial charging function and its interplay with the operation of 
investigation, both in law and in practice, in France.   
 
3.1. Charging  
 
The prosecutor is in charge of the decision to prosecute as well as the decision to bring 
the case on appeal.239  Unlike the prosecutor in continental countries, the French prosecutor 
herself does little investigation even when a case is not referred to the investigating judge.240  
Instead, the prosecutor relies more on the police dossier.  Even though the prosecutor seldom 
investigates directly, and infrequently directs the police to investigate, the prosecutor serves to 
review the exercise of power by the police.241  She is responsible for reviewing the evidence, 
determining whether or not to pursue a prosecution, directing the police investigation, and 
supervising the detention of the suspect in police custody, including the protection of their due 
process rights.242  Therefore, the supervisory role is built within its function.   
 
Historically, in order to divide the function of prosecution and investigation, the 1958 
FCCP established the independence of the investigating judge from the public prosecutor.  The 
decision to charge a felony is required by the supervision and review of the investigating 
                                                
238See id. (noting the acquittal rate in the cour d’ assises is extremely low, and also quoting that several investigating 
judges told that only two or three out of all the cases sent to trial results in acquittal during the past ten years). 
239Jacqueline Hodgson, The French Prosecutor in Question, 67 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1361, 1366 (2010).  
240Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 261.   
241Frase, supra note 189, at, 557-558. 
242 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 75. 
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judge.243  Actually, the investigating judge also plays investigating, reviewing, and prosecution 
functions in felony cases.  The stage of judicial investigation is to bring the case to judgment, 
and is mandatory in a felony case, optional for a misdemeanor case, and exceptional for a petty 
offense.244  The investigating judge conducts her investigation and verifies the police and 
prosecutor dossier to decide whether the evidence will warrant the charges or will support a 
lesser charge, delict (hereinafter misdemeanor)or contravention(hereinafter regulatory crime), 
and she may dismiss the case or transfer the case to a correctional or police court.245  Only when 
the investigating judge concludes that the offense is a felony will she present the case to another 
screening chamber.246  In other words, both the investigating judge and the prosecutor are 
charged with the prosecution, investigation, and review of the dossier in different categories of 
offenses.     
 
3.2. Charging Discretion 
 
Contrary to the perception of the continental prosecution system, French prosecutors 
embrace broad discretion in the decision of whether or not to charge, and whether to charge more 
or less serious offenses than the evidence warrants.247  French prosecutors frequently lower or 
decline charges by discretionary power as do their counterparts in the United States.248  But as a 
                                                
243Frase, supra note 189, at, 625. 
244Juliette Tricot, France in TOWARD A PROSECUTOR FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION-A COMPARATIVEANALYSIS,vol.1, 
227 (Katalin Ligeti ed. 2013). 
245See HODGSON, supra note 67, at 75 (noting that French police are expected to prepare a complete, and inclusive 
case file that includes both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence, whether the offense is misdemeanor or most 
serious crime).   
246Id. 
247Frase, supra note 189, at 602, 610-611; Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, at 244; see also the Code De 
Procedure Penale[C. PR. PEN.] art. 40 (France). 
248Frase, supra note 189, at 602. 
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nation with continental tradition and ideology, France still emphasizes the rigid hierarchical 
structure and uniform decisionmaking in the exercise of their authority.249  Instead of adopting 
the mandatory prosecution model to achieve the goals of uniform and consistent decisionmaking, 
France imposes hierarchical control that defines and constrains the exercise of the prosecutors’ 
decisions.250  Within each prosecutor’s office, all decisions are under review by his or her 
superiors.251  Other than the control by high-ranking hierarchy, the announcement of official 
guidelines with regard to national policy (politique penale) is another way of maintaining the 
uniformity and equal treatment in their decisions.252  Although these policies are not legally 
binding, they are implemented locally by the procureur de la R’epublique, and the procureur 
g’en’eral.253 
 
In practice, the procureur de la R’epublique, and the procureur g’en’eral tend not to 
intervene with the charging decision, regardless of those guidelines, in the interest of respecting 
the autonomy of the each prosecutor.254  Those guidelines are applied in quite different ways 
according to local resources and political inclination of the procureur de la R’epublique.255  In 
addition, local variance of the criminal offenses in different regions influences the policy and 
local prosecution adapts accordingly.256  Such disparities are often criticized by the prosecutor, 
                                                
249 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 229.   
250Id.    
251Frase, supra note 189, at 560. 
252See Frase, supra note 189, at 560 (noting the prosecution policy is issued at high level officials); HODGSON, supra 
note 67, at 229.   
253HODGSON, id. 
254Id. 
255Id. 
256See id. at230(noting empirically, it is the resources that marks the differences amongst different regions.  In larger 
area, the prosecutor would not pursue minor offense given the fact the resource are apportioned to felony).    
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claiming that justice invites variability in different areas, and by scholars, claiming that it goes 
beyond the limits of acceptable local interpretation and undermines the certainty of law.257 
 
According to Professor Hodgson’s research, some senior prosecutors interviewed noted 
that their authority is flexible, and includes discretion to demand the defendant to compensate the 
victims, to satisfy the society without court procedure, and to choose not to prosecute when they 
deem that the decision to prosecute would worsen the current situation.258  By contrast, the 
research indicates that junior prosecutors are subject to more of the hierarchical influence where 
senior prosecutors provide guidance in handling the cases.259  Here, although the French 
practitioner’s legal ideology suggests that laws are to be applied stringently by the prosecutor, 
who is subjected to national-wide hierarchical structure and superiors’ supervision, 260 the 
practice seems to be in contradiction with the unitary enforcement.        
 
So, are those charges reviewed like their counterparts in the United States?  In fact, for 
cases that are misdemeanor and contravention, these are not subjected to review before trial.  
Only felony charges, which make up a small part of all trials, are screened for their bases.261  
Professor Frase offers possible justifications, including their hierarchical training, supervision, 
and specialization, decision to charge often made within weeks and made after complete 
investigation, and lack of nolle prosequi and plea bargaining, which incentivizes the prosecutor’s 
                                                
257Id,at 231. 
258Id,at 233. 
259Id,at 233-234. 
260Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 247. 
261 According to Professor Frase, there were 2255 convicted in felony trial, of total 1,029,432 convictions. See Frase, 
supra note 189, at 626.   
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self screening.262  The judicial investigating process and the investigating judge’s operation in 
examining felony charges will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
 
To summarize, prosecutorial charging decisions and discretion in France depend upon 
many variables that define and delineate the constraints on that authority.  The local hierarchy, 
local resources, and local crime rate are the major factors in the exercise of the authority.  France 
is a combined case with its discretionary prosecution system under the continental model.  The 
hierarchical control indeed might intensify the systematic control over the prosecutor in order to 
maintain the uniformity of legal order.  Nonetheless, as the empirical study mentioned above 
demonstrates, the hierarchical high-ranking official would rather maintain the prosecutor’s 
autonomy.  If the case is like this, then it seems that the kind of internal control and screening as 
adopted in the United States as a means of supervising and checking unfounded charges 
disappears.  Besides, even relying on internal checks and professional guidelines often raises 
some doubts.  Only in felony cases does it appear that the investigating judge could add another 
layer of reviewing the prosecution.  Does the judicial investigation function as a screening 
mechanism to the felony prosecution or does the investigating judge work closely with the 
prosecution and side closely with the prosecution?  In the next chapter, this dissertation examines 
different external institutional screening mechanisms in the United States, Taiwan, and judicial 
investigation in France, so as to extract and identify essential components for reform of Taiwan’s 
screening mechanism.      
 
  
                                                
262Id. 
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CHAPTER 3 SCREENING MECHANISMS 
 
Whether positioned in a continental (civil law) or common law system, prosecutorial 
charging decision-making still remains a mysterious Pandora’s Box-like symbol in the view of 
the public.  Even after the adoption of compulsory prosecution in the continental system, the 
decision process remains veiled.  Compulsory prosecution makes corruption of prosecutors less 
likely to occur and achieves the goal of unitary exercise of prosecutorial power.  However, 
compulsory prosecution in a continental law system mandates prosecution when prescribed 
requirements are met.  It therefore lacks the ability to elevate the quality of the decisionmaking 
because the prosecution standard is set at a level that provides no assurance of conviction.  By 
contrast, discretionary prosecution in the United States inherently makes such decision-making 
processes more complex, more unknown to outsiders, and a less standardized process to follow.   
 
As a consequence, the implementation of screening mechanisms prior to trial is strikingly 
important, not only to counteract the various disadvantages brought by the prosecution, but also 
to shield the innocent from unfounded prosecution.  Screening mechanisms theoretically consists 
of external and internal screening of prosecutorial decision-making.  Internal screening means 
systematic administrative supervision of decisionmaking from higher-ranking officials within the 
bureaucracy.  Given the dispersed bureaucratic official structure and dissemination of the 
governmental power in the United States, systematic bureaucratic control and supervision of 
prosecution is inherently not a plausible way to effectively check prosecutorial charging power.  
As for the Continental system, although subject to highly demanding hierarchical and unitary 
control within the bureaucracy, it is less trusted by outsiders.  Moreover, external screening often 
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bolsters public confidence in carrying out such checks on governmental power.  This dissertation 
therefore reviews and delves into the current external screening mechanisms in the United States, 
consisting of the preliminary hearing and grand jury; the judicial dossier-review screening in 
Taiwan; and the judicial investigation by the investigating judge in France, who conducts 
investigations neutrally and reviews cases presented by prosecutors and the police in felony 
cases.     
 
By delving into the research on the history, procedures, and evolution of screening 
practices and the exercise of the mechanisms used, laden with the advantages and disadvantages 
of each as perceived by scholars, judges, and attorneys, this dissertation seeks to provide insight 
into the essential structure, procedures, and institutions of an effective screening mechanism.  In 
reforming the screening mechanism in Taiwan, the comparative analysis affords comprehensive 
views for more solutions, alternatives, and possibilities.  Through the examination and extraction 
of ideas from the American and French systems, this dissertation could generate new proposals 
for the reformation of screening mechanisms in Taiwan.   
 
I. Screening Mechanisms of the United States 
 
As known in the U.S. legal history and Anglo-American legal systems, the grand jury is 
noted for its manner of fighting against oppression and setting a bulwark between the 
government and its citizens.  The grand jury was embedded in the U.S. criminal process by 
brandishing the flag of protecting innocent citizens in two historical cases against the British 
government during the U.S. colonial period.  Historically speaking, with an indictment by a 
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grand jury, people are more likely to have confidence in the decision to indict, it having been 
made by the people and democratic processes.  The grand jury was instituted to create a check on 
the power of government by the people in the community, and to create a check on the law 
imposed by central government that was enacted by the Crown.263 
 
The role that the grand jury plays today remains quite similar to its praised historical role.  
Its effectiveness, however, is in doubt.264  Despite skepticism and criticism from the community 
and scholars as to the effectiveness and non-independence of the grand jury, it is well supported 
by the Supreme Court and Congress.265  Whether the grand jury really functions in practice as it 
was originally designed is a debate among scholars, but the mechanism or its revised version 
could be a viable plan for Taiwan’s reform.   
 
Aside from the grand jury, preliminary hearings put forth another layer of screening.  In 
the sequence of criminal procedure, a preliminary hearing is held by a magistrate, usually within 
one or two weeks of the arrest, to decide whether the charge is based on probable cause.  A 
preliminary hearing provide an initial screening of the charge before an indictment or 
information is filed.  Normally, only after the magistrate screens the initial charges is the case 
then bound over to the grand jury.  Unlike the grand jury, however, a preliminary hearing is not 
constitutionally required for felony prosecution, and the prosecutor sometimes avoids the need 
for a preliminary hearing by first acquiring an indictment.  The following part articulates both 
                                                
263Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring The Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2337(2008). 
264See id. at 2337(criticizing the grand jury lost the role as “the voice of community”, which harmed members in 
poor and minorities.  Reform should be focused on making grand jury less independent of the people in local 
community); see also Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (And Cannot) Protect The Accused, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 260, 264-265 (1995) (Professor Leipold argues that grand juries do not and cannot protect the 
defendant against the charge and argues the problem lies on grand jurors).  
265 Leipold, supra note 264, at 269.    
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screening mechanisms of the United States in the sequence they occur in U.S. criminal 
procedure.    
 
1. Preliminary Hearing        
 
1.1. Purpose of Preliminary Hearing 
  
As a preliminary matter, the initial appearance of an arrestee before the court comes after 
a suspect is arrested.  The initial hearing occurs promptly within 48 hours after the arrest.  The 
goal of a Gerstein hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause for an arrest if the 
arrest is pursuant to a warrantless arrest, and also whether pretrial detention is needed.  The 
magistrate will then schedule the preliminary hearing.  In the case of felonies, the judicial officer 
or magistrate then informs the arrestee of the right to a preliminary hearing if the arrestee has not 
yet been indicted.  Such a right to a preliminary hearing is not required by the Constitution.  If 
the prosecution has obtained an indictment before the scheduled date of preliminary hearing, the 
preliminary hearing is mooted. 
 
At the initial appearance, the magistrate will advise the arrestee of charges, appoint 
counsel, and set bail if the magistrate decides not to continue to detain the arrestee.  The 
preliminary hearing must be held within ten days of the first appearance if the suspect is in 
custody.  If the suspect is not detained, the preliminary hearing is set within twenty days.  After 
the screening, if the prosecution has established probable cause by sufficient evidence, the case is 
then bound over to the grand jury in federal jurisdictions, as well as in those state jurisdictions 
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that adopt the grand jury mechanism.  In state jurisdictions that adopt the information stage, the 
case is bound over to the trial court.  If the arrestee has been indicted, then the arrestee is 
subjected to no preliminary hearing review. 
 
The preliminary hearing is meant to check whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed 
to trial.  The magistrate judge at such a hearing determines whether there is probable cause to 
believe “the crime” has been committed and the “defendant” committed the crime.266  If there is 
no probable cause, the defendant is discharged and the case is dismissed.  While its purpose is 
clearly to conduct another layer of screening of charges, its screening threshold is identical to the 
initial encounter by the magistrate to review the arrestee’s case.267  However, preliminary 
hearings bear additional features.  First, the preliminary hearing is conducted in an adversarial 
process, so that the defendant may test the prosecutor’s story.268  Both parties may elicit the 
witnesses’ testimonies, and preserve their testimonies for subsequent use to impeach the 
witnesses if inconsistent testimony occurs at trial. 
 
Second, the adversarial hearing advances a reliable determination of probable cause more 
than the initial ex-parte appearance before the magistrate.269  In addition, the preliminary hearing 
decision-making is made by professional judges, who are experienced in the legal determination 
of probable cause.  The independent review by a magistrate at least expels the doubt that such 
reviews are controlled by law enforcement.  Whether we trust the system or not, the legal 
                                                
2661 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §91 (2007). 
267See.id (noting that preliminary hearing is regulated by Rule 5.1, and initial appearance is regulated by Rule 5. The 
latter one is non-adversarial proceeding that occurs within 48 hours after the arrest).   
268See.id (noting that probable cause is the only official function of the preliminary hearing, and discovery is the by-
products).  
269Peter Arenella, Reforming The Federal Grand Jury And The state Preliminary Hearing To Prevent Conviction 
Without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REV. 463, 484 (1980). 
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determination of probable cause at least lies in the hands of neutral experts that bring a measure 
of confidence to the outcome.   
 
Third, the preliminary hearing adds another layer of review before trial to ensure that the 
initial decision of putting a suspect in custody was warranted.  Now the magistrate has not only 
heard the government’s theory of criminality in a case, it has seen some of the witnesses and 
reviewed some of the evidence that is likely to be presented at trial.   
 
Even though the purpose and function of the preliminary hearing advances additional 
review of the charging decision and benefits the defendant’s right to an unbiased screening, it is 
not required by the Constitution.270  In federal jurisdictions, the federal law has granted the right 
to a preliminary hearing for a felony charge.271  According to the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the prosecutor has leeway to bypass the hearing by bringing an indictment before the 
scheduled hearing.  If an arrest was made after the prosecutor obtains an indictment, a 
preliminary hearing is mooted.272 
 
In state jurisdictions, eighteen of them demand felony prosecution by indictment, but 
grant right to preliminary hearing within a specified time after an arrest.273  However, their 
                                                
270Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
271 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a)(stating “In General. If a defendant is charged with an offense other than a petty offense, a 
magistrate judge must conduct a preliminary hearing unless: (1) the defendant waives the hearing; (2) the defendant 
is indicted; (3) the government files an information under Rule 7 (b) charging the defendant with a felony; (4) the 
government files an information charging the defendant with a misdemeanor; or (5) the defendant is charged with a 
misdemeanor and consents to trial before a magistrate judge.)  
272WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 266, §91. 
273YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE. R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, MODERN CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, CASE- COMMENTS-QUESTIONS, 1011 (12th ed. 2008). 
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systems allow prosecutors to circumvent such hearings by the acquisition of an indictment.274  In 
information states, which allow felony prosecution brought by either information or indictment 
(although two totally deny the prosecutor the ability to charge by indictment), preliminary 
hearings are either abolished or exist as a merely theoretical tool that is rarely used.275  In a 
majority of information states, the State’s rules or laws demand a preliminary hearing as a 
prerequisite for prosecution by information.276 
 
The suspect may waive the right to a preliminary hearing for several reasons.  The 
suspect may try to avoid having the evidence exposed in a public hearing and avoid giving the 
government the opportunity to find curable defects in its own case.277  In addition, if the 
defendant is willing to plead guilty to the charge, the defendant usually waives such a hearing to 
have an expedited process to reach a plea deal with the prosecutor. 
 
1.2. Screening Procedure  
 
 The preliminary hearing is a formal, adversarial pretrial proceeding, held in open court 
before a magistrate.  The defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel at the hearing.278  
Unlike the adversarial proceeding at trial, the magistrate supervises the procedures and has the 
power to terminate the questioning once probable cause is reached or if cross-examination tries 
                                                
274Id. 
275Id. at 1011-1012. 
276Id. 
277Andrew Leipold, Preliminary Hearing, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, available 
athttp://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403000193.html. 
278See Fed. R. Crim. P.44(a)(stating “A defendant who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel 
appointed to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial appearance through appeal, unless 
the defendant waives this right.”) 
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to focus on other questions.279  The procedure begins by the introduction of evidence by the 
government, and the burden ends with the obligation of proffering testimony, as much as is 
needed, to establish probable cause for holding the accused for further action of the grand jury.280  
The prosecutor must present evidence in a public proceeding and, in so doing, provide the 
defense a chance to hear the prosecutor’s story as well as to discover some of the prosecution’s 
witnesses or evidence.  The defense may challenge the prosecutor’s case, present witnesses, 
introduce the defense’s evidence, and demonstrate that probable cause is lacking.  But the 
defendant is unlikely to offer affirmative evidence unless such defense could substantially 
undermine the probable cause established by the prosecution.281 
 
There are strategic evaluations that both sides will consider before the hearing.  First, a 
preliminary hearing can be treated by the defense as an informal means of discovery.282  Whether 
or not to reveal the prosecution’s ace card to the accused earlier in the preliminary stage may 
change the outcome of the trial, especially if the prosecution has already provided enough 
evidence to establish probable cause.  The prosecutor has to provide the names of key witnesses 
and the substance of their testimony to the extent that it establishes probable cause, which allows 
the defense to peek into the prosecution’s theory.283  Therefore, whether to reveal witnesses to 
prove each element of a case becomes a critical strategic question.   
 
                                                
279WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 266,§92. 
280U.S. v. Hinkle, 307 F. Supp. 125 (D.D.C.1969) . 
281 WRIGHT& LEIPOLD, supra note 266,§92. 
282See U.S. v. Hinkle, 307 F. Supp. 121 (D.D.C.,1969) (noting the hearing affords “the defendant not only the 
opportunity to contest the issue of probable cause, but also to use the preliminary hearing as a discovery vehicle for 
production of the government's case”). 
283Andrew D. Leipold, Preliminary Hearing, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403000193.html. 
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Second, testing the government witnesses at a preliminary hearing by cross-examination 
could afford the prosecutor a chance to find out the potential defects of her case, and inform the 
prosecutor of any incorrect theories or reveal the defense’s story.284  Although the scope of cross-
examination is circumscribed within the testimony of the direct-examination, as it is at trial,285 a 
complete cross-examination of a witness provides both parties with vital impeachment materials 
for future benefits at the trial.  A witness’s prior testimony under oath could be a sharp weapon if 
the witness changes his position and the testimony is inconsistent at the preliminary hearing and 
at trial.  A sharp cross-examination may push the witness to harden his position in favor of the 
government and inform the prosecutor of the flaws in the testimony.286  As a result, whether to 
conduct a harsh cross-examination really depends on a strategic judgment by the defense.   
 
In addition, the witness’ prior statement, which is testified to at the preliminary hearing, 
will be admissible under the condition that the witness is unavailable at trial to testify, but only if 
the defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness during the preliminary hearing.287  
Under this condition, the prosecution could introduce the prior testimony as substantive evidence 
in proving her case; therefore, she perpetuates the witness testimony earlier in the beginning of 
the criminal process to prevent the unavailability of a witness at trial.   
 
                                                
284Id. 
285WRIGHT& LEIPOLD, supra note 266,§92 (quoting Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F. 2d 1187, 1201(C. A. D. C. 1973)). 
286Andrew Leipold, Preliminary Hearing, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403000193.html. 
287Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158(2004). 
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Third, a preliminary hearing affords a chance for both parties to weigh the strength of 
both sides’ case to seek a potential plea agreement.288  The government could also modify its 
charge if it finds out it does not have a solid ground for conviction, and may reach a plea 
agreement earlier.  By contrast, the defense could learn the prosecutor’s case as well so that it 
could give in and be ready to concede if the government has a solid basis. 
 
Magistrates ensure that the cross examination aims at the establishment of probable cause, 
and, therefore, can cut-off cross examination when it seems to acquire more information than 
simply to test the witness’ testimony.289  Such questions may include: seeking the source of 
information, fishing for an informant’s identity, exploring the extent of the investigative 
procedure, obtaining discovery material, and probing for possible defenses.290 
 
In summary, the adversarial style of preliminary hearings accentuates the participation of 
the defense and allows the defense to review the basis and grounds of prosecution.  The defense 
is not merely a subject of prosecution, nor is it unarmed in showing that the prosecution is 
without probable cause.  However, to achieve the adversarial hearing is inseparable with the right 
to counsel, since the hearing relies much on professional lawyers and technicalities to 
counterbalance the power of the government.   
 
 
 
                                                
288Andrew D. Leipold, Preliminary Hearing, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403000193.html. 
289KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 273, at 1030. 
290Id. 
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1.3. Right to Counsel  
 
Since there are strategic considerations and professional judgments involved in whether 
to present witnesses, to cross-examine, and to present a defense, etc. at preliminary hearing, it 
should be noted that nothing could be achieved without the assistance of defense counsel.  The 
Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel applies to 
the preliminary hearing as it applies to every other critical step in the proceeding against the 
defense.291  The Court has said “the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against 
the state at any stage of the prosecution formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s 
absence might derogate from accused’s right to a fair trial[,]”292 and expressed that the right 
applies to critical stages in the proceedings, including the preliminary hearing.293  The Court 
listed critical defense goals as follows: 
Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary hearing is essential to 
protect the indigent accused against an erroneous or improper prosecution.  
First, the lawyer’s skilled examination and cross-examination of witnesses 
may expose fatal weaknesses in the State’s case that may lead the magistrate 
to refuse to bind the accused over.  Second, in any event, the skilled 
interrogation of witnesses by an experienced lawyer can fashion a vital 
impeachment tool for use in cross-examination of the State’s witnesses at the 
trial, or preserve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does 
not appear at the trial.  Third, trained counsel can more effectively discover 
                                                
291 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 7 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53 (1932). 
292 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 226 (1932). 
293 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 7-9(1970). 
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the case the State has against his client and make possible the preparation of a 
proper defense to meet that case at the trial.  Fourth, counsel can also be 
influential at the preliminary hearing in making effective arguments for the 
accused on such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examination 
or bail.294 
Given the many ways that counsel may influence the screening outcome, the preliminary 
hearing is considered a critical stage to which the right to counsel applies.  The Supreme Court 
has made it clear that a person has a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel “at or 
after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him whether by way of formal 
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment.”295  In other words, “once 
adversarial proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has right to legal 
representation when the government interrogates him.”296 
 
1.4. Evidentiary Rules 
  
Evidentiary rules often determine what information an adjudicator may base her decision 
on at trial.  Likewise, the rules determine what evidence the preliminary hearing magistrates may 
access in deciding the sufficiency to justify a trial.  Generally, in federal jurisdiction, the 
evidentiary rules do not apply to preliminary hearings according to the Rule of Evidence.  The 
                                                
294Id. 
295See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 (1977) (Williams was arraigned on the warrant before the judge in 
Davenport court, and he had been ordered by the court to confinement in jail.  During the trip that transferred 
Williams back to jurisdiction in Des Moines, Williams was questioned by the police officer in the car without the 
assistance of counsel.  Thusly, Williams was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel). 
296See id. at 401(citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)). 
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1972 Advisory Committee Notes acknowledged the need for the evidentiary rules to be as 
flexible in the preliminary hearing as they are in grand jury proceedings; otherwise, the federal 
prosecutor will bypass the preliminary hearing and proceed to the grand jury directly.297  The 
rules eventually rejected the admission of evidentiary rules because it increases administrative 
burdens and impedes the administration of justice.298 
 
The evidence most affected by the adoption of evidentiary rules at the preliminary 
hearing is hearsay evidence and illegally obtained evidence.  For the former, in some state 
jurisdictions, rules of evidence apply at their preliminary hearings.299  In others, no limitation is 
placed at the hearing.  These states often prescribe that the “finding of probable cause may be 
based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part.”300  The remaining jurisdictions either prescribe 
that certain hearsay is admissible, such as “experts’ written reports,” or that all hearsay is 
inadmissible unless specific exceptions apply.301 
 
                                                
297See 3C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, PETER J. HENNING, NANCY J. KING, SUSAN R. KLEIN, ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, 
SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE APPENDICES-TABLES-INDEX,73(2007)(noting the 1972 
Advisory Committee Note had admitted that it had been urged, at preliminary hearing, evidentiary rule shall adopt 
identical evidentiary rules applicable at trial in that the purpose of preliminary hearing should be to determine 
whether sufficient evidence to put the accused through the harshness of trial). 
298See Patricia W. Weinberg & Robert L. Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation to Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: 
An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1398 (1969) (noting that 
the application will increase the continuances of the preliminary hearing); see also WRIGHT& LEIPOLD, supra note 
266, §92(noting that the Rules of Evidence rejected this view majorly because of “administrative necessity and the 
efficient administration of justice”). 
299See Notes, The Function of the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure, 83 Yale L. J., 771, 779 
(1974)(noting that Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New York all apply 
evidentiary rule at preliminary hearing); see also KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 273, at 1028-1029 (noting that there 
are a somewhat larger group of states consider that rule of evidence is “largely applicable” to the preliminary 
hearing and allows the magistrate to consider certain types of inadmissible evidence). 
300KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 273, at 1029. 
301See generally KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 273, at 1029-1030(noting such exceptions are when the law proscribes 
“it is demonstrably inconvenient to summon witnesses able to testify to facts from personal knowledge” or “there is 
substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay is credible and for believing there is a factual basis for the 
information furnished”).             
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For the latter one, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 (e) stipulates that “At the 
preliminary hearing, the defendant . . . may not object to evidence on the ground that it was 
unlawfully acquired.”  The 1972 Advisory Committee Notes admits that current law in federal 
jurisdictions provides that it is in appropriate to bring the issue of unconstitutional means of 
acquiring evidence.302  Many states also do not apply exclusionary rule objections.  Only in a few 
states, defendants allowed to raise objections at preliminary hearings like a suppression 
hearing.303  However, whether evidentiary rules are adopted or not, the law does not preclude the 
magistrate from demanding a demonstration that evidence would be admissible at the time of 
trial.304 
 
Whether the rules of evidence apply to the preliminary hearing, and the extent to which 
the rules apply to the hearing, depends on the policy makers’ desire to screen out certain kinds of 
information that supports the prosecution.  However, only by adopting stricter evidentiary rules 
can a system achieve the original goal of protecting the innocent from government harassment 
and pre-stigmatization. 
 
1.5. Threshold of the Preliminary Hearing Screening (Bind-Over Standard) 
 
 The threshold standard of proof required to bind a case over determines the degree to 
which a case should be prepared by the prosecutor before sending it further in the process.  In the 
United States federal jurisdictions, the magistrate screens the case on the basis of the probable 
                                                
302See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 297, at 73(noting the law is supported by many Supreme Court decisions).  
303KAMISAR ET AL., supra note 273, at 1030. 
304 WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 266, §92; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 297, at 74. 
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cause standard, i.e. the bind-over standard, which sends the case to the grand jury stage.305  As 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 (e) provides, “If the magistrate judge finds probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed and the defendant committed it, the magistrate 
must promptly require the defendant to appear for further proceedings.”  Although the context of 
the statute manifests as probable cause to “believe an offense has been committed” and “the 
defendant committed a crime,” the probable cause determination actually bears various 
alternatives among various states.  In other words, there are different standards for qualifying the 
threshold in different states.  The first alternative is the “prima facie case standard.”  In one case 
in Pennsylvania, the lower court dismissed on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to 
establish substantial impairment of the capability to safely operate an automobile.306  The 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania held as follows: 
“A pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus is similar in purpose to a 
preliminary hearing.  The focus of the pretrial habeas corpus petition is on 
whether the Commonwealth possesses sufficient evidence to require a 
defendant to be held in government custody until he may be brought to trial.  
A petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper means for testing the 
finding that the Commonwealth has sufficient evidence to establish a prima 
facie case.  Proof of prima facie case consists of the following: the 
Commonwealth is required to present evidence with regard to each element 
                                                
305In the United States, there are two phases to which a probable cause standard applies.  The probable cause 
standard sets the baseline of suspicion degree at which an arrest, search warrant be initiated against a suspect.  Then 
the screening magistrate screens the case on the basis of probable cause standard, i.e. bind-over standard.  Thusly, 
first probable cause standard is a standard to which an arrest or search warrant applies.  
306See Com. v. Lutz, 661 A. 2d, 405 (1995) (Pa. Super. 1995) (noting the defendant was arrested on charge with 
driving under the influence of alcohol following an automobile accident.  At a preliminary hearing, the charge was 
held over for trial.  Defendant then filed a petition for Habeas Corpus with the allegation that the government failed 
to establish a prima facie case) (alteration omitted). 
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of the charges and to establish sufficient probable cause to warrant the belief 
that the accused committed the offense.307 
 The government presented evidence that the defendant drove an automobile intoxicated 
and the prosecutor presented testimony of the experienced officer on the scene.  The court 
recognized that the government proffered evidence as to each material element of the charge and 
established probable cause to warrant a belief that the accused committed the offense.308 
 
 Another court in Pennsylvania held that the prima facie standard was established by 
viewing the evidence presented by the commonwealth in the light most favorable to the 
commonwealth because “all reasonable inferences based on that evidence which could support a 
guilty verdict.”309  This standard does not weigh the credibility of the witnesses and does not rise 
to the level of that required to sustain a conviction.310  This standard, when applied in the 
preliminary hearing, more closely resembles the ruling on a motion for a directed verdict after 
the prosecution has presented its evidence.311 
 
There is another prong that considers probable cause determination; whether the evidence 
is sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a 
reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.312  In Michigan, a defendant was charged with felonious 
driving.  The district court refused to bind the defendant over for trial after the preliminary 
                                                
307Id. at 407. 
308Id. at 408. 
309See Com. v. Williams, 911 A. 2d. 548, 549, 550, 553 (Pa. Super. 2006)(noting the government presented 
sufficient evidence required to establish the prima facie case that the accused unlawfully possessed a firearm). 
310See id. at 552(citing Commonwealth v. Lutz to state credibility is not an issue at pretrial proceeding). 
311WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, PRINCIPLES of CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: POST-     
INVESTIGATION, 221(2004). 
312People v. Yamat, 714 N.W.2d 335 (Mich. 2006). 
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hearing because the prosecution had not established the defendant’s conduct.313  The Supreme 
Court of Michigan held that “the prosecutor must establish probable cause, which requires a 
quantum of evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to 
conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt on each element of the crime 
charged.”314  In this case, the prosecutor had met the standard, because she had shown that the 
defendant had actual physical control of the vehicle at the time of the incident.315 
 
The Michigan court in another case ruled that to satisfy the preliminary hearing standard, 
the prosecution “must present some evidence of each element.  If the evidence conflicts or raises 
a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt, the defendant should nevertheless be bound 
over for trial, at which the trier of fact can resolve the questions.”316 
 
 According to Professor LaFave, this standard is the most common type of probable cause 
required and is applied the same as the Fourth Amendment standard of probable cause for an 
arrest.317  However, this does not mean that the magistrate will duplicate the probable cause to 
arrest decision; instead, this only indicates the quantum of evidence to prove probable cause that 
is used in the preliminary hearing, which is identical to that used for arrest.318  In addition, the 
evaluation procedure of probable cause in a preliminary hearing is adversarial, which differs 
from the procedure adopted at an initial appearance, which is an ex-parte hearing.  Such a 
                                                
313Id. 
314See id.(noting the district court erroneously define the term of “operate” under Michigan Vehicle Code 257. 626 c. 
and the Supreme Court of Michigan interpreted that the plain language of “operate” requires only “actual physical 
control”, not exclusive control of a vehicle). 
315See id. at339, 340(noting the defendant grabbed the wheel and caused the car to drive off the road constitutes 
actual physical control). 
316People v. Redden, 799 N.W. 2d, 195 (Mich. App.2010). 
317LAFAVE, supra note 311, at 219. 
318Id. at 220. 
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screening assessment is more refined than that of the initial appearance and plays a more active 
screening role as to the charging decision than the initial reviewing of the complaint.  For 
example, one twin brother commits an offense, and when identified by witnesses both may be 
arrested as the probable cause to arrest standard cannot distinguish between the two.  But after a 
closer look at the preliminary hearing, the witness will have to give detailed testimony and will 
be subjected to cross-examine to find out which one is the actual offender.  Thus, the probable 
cause at a preliminary hearing requires more than just that the person probably committed the 
crime, as with the probable cause to arrest standard; rather, it requires the magistrate to entertain 
a reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt of the charged. 
  
1.6. Credibility or Affirmative defense issue 
 
 Although the defense is permitted to cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing, it typically may not fully attack the government’s witness to weaken the 
credibility of the testimony.  The preliminary hearing does not decide guilt or innocence.  Given 
that the goal of the screening is to evaluate the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence, most 
courts say that disputes about fact or credibility are to be resolved at trial.319  Any cross-
examination of the witnesses may be cut off if the magistrate considers that such a question is 
linked to credibility issues or is aimed at eliciting affirmative defenses.320  The limitation on 
questioning does not trigger a constitutional violation, in that the Supreme Court has noted that 
confrontation with witness is not constitutionally required at the preliminary process. 
                                                
319Andrew Leipold, Preliminary Hearing, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Encyclopedia.com, available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403000193.html. 
320Id. 
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   While some affirmative defenses are directly related to an acquittal, courts find that 
those do not negate the probable cause finding in many jurisdictions.  In other jurisdictions, 
magistrates allow the accused to present evidence of affirmative defenses, and make judgments 
of credibility.321  In People v. Redden & Clark, defendants Robert Lee Redden and Torey Alison 
Clark were found with 1.5 ounces of marijuana and 21 marijuana plants by police officers 
executing a search.  Both defendants turned over documents regarding their use of marijuana for 
medical purposes.  These documents were dated March 3, 2009, a date after Michigan Medical 
Marijuana Act (hereinafter MMMA), MCL 333. 26421 took effect.  At the preliminary hearing, 
both defendants asserted the affirmative defense pursuant to §8 of the MMMA, and presented a 
doctor’s testimony in support of their defense.322  The court quoted another case to recognize that 
“affirmative defenses in criminal cases should typically be presented and considered at trial and 
that a preliminary hearing is not a trial.”323  The court specifically noted that in a situation where 
the defense is complete and there are no conflicting facts regarding the defense, it could be 
argued that there would be no probable cause to believe a crime had been committed.324  The 
court then expressed the following: 
The district court must consider not only the weight and competency of the 
evidence, but also the credibility of the witnesses and it may consider 
evidence in defense.  As noted, however, the district court cannot discharge a 
defendant if the evidence conflicts or raises reasonable doubt concerning a 
                                                
321See id.(noting that charges that are challenged by such defense with little chances of success at trial should be 
dismissed). 
322People v. Redden, 799  N.W. 2d, 187-188 (Mich. App. 2010). 
323People v. Waltonen, 728 N.W. 2d, 881 (Mich. App. 2010). 
324Id. 
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defendant’s guilt because this presents an issue for the trier of fact.  There 
was evidence in this case that the defense was not complete and there was 
colorable issues concerning whether a bona fide physician-patient 
relationship existed, whether the amount of marijuana defendants possessed 
was reasonable under the statute, whether the marijuana in question was 
being used for medical purposes, and whether defendants suffered from 
serious or debilitating medical conditions.325 
Even though the court in Michigan allows the presentation of an affirmative defense, it is strictly 
applied and any conflicts in defense should be resolved at trial.   
 
1.7. Dismissal or Bind over   
  
 If probable cause is found or reached, the case is bound over to the next stage and the 
magistrate must promptly require the defendant to appear for further proceedings.326  If probable 
cause is not found, the defendant is discharged.  Such a decision (also called dismissal without 
prejudice) does not bar reinitiating subsequent charges for the same offense, as the Fifth 
Amendment Double Jeopardy protection has not attached yet.   
 
Such a probable cause finding is reviewable by motion in the district court, but such 
procedure is rare and is usually mooted by a subsequent indictment.327  Even when the court 
reviews the probable cause finding, a decision upholding that finding is not a final judgment and 
                                                
325Redden, 799 N.W. 2d, 195-196. 
326 Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1(e). 
327 WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 266,§92. 
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is not appealable.  In the event of a dismissal of the defendant, the prosecutor will often take the 
case to the grand jury and the grand jury may still indict, despite the dismissal of the case.328  
Appeal of the dismissal of the charge is grounded on the statutory prescription, and such appeal 
is within the jurisdiction of the district court,329 as is the probable cause finding.     
 
1.8. Conclusion 
 
First, it is unknown generally what the dismissal rate or the bind over rate is; therefore, it 
is hard to decide how effective the screening mechanism is.  Maybe one should look into the 
nature of adversarial procedures where both parties participate in the process and contribute 
input into the procedure, thus bringing the decision closer to the truth and making the screening 
more effective, instead of hearing only one version of the story.  In addition, without active 
application of the constitutional right to counsel in providing a professionally knowledgeable 
defense, the adversarial procedure will not work and screening will become a rubber stamp for 
the prosecution.  The screening determination by professional magistrates represents a much 
more unbiased, independent, and neutral model than that of the grand jury, as analyzed in the 
next section.    
 
Second, the preliminary hearing varies in its evidentiary rules and procedures in different 
jurisdictions in the United States.  The effectiveness of a specific kind of procedure is the major 
concern of this dissertation, but it is difficult to compare the effectiveness of each jurisdiction.  
                                                
328LAFAVE, supra note 311, at 223. 
329Id. 
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According to analysis by Professor Leipold, factors that will affect screening function are as 
follows,  
“(1)the extent to which cases in the jurisdiction are plea bargained before 
the preliminary hearing; (2) the extent to which prosecutors carefully 
evaluate their cases before the preliminary hearing, rather than using the 
hearing itself as a means of evaluating the charges; (3) the time and 
attention magistrates give a preliminary hearing; (4) the extent to which 
the prosecutor can introduce hearsay and other evidence that would be 
inadmissible at trial; (5)whether defense counsel is permitted to introduce 
affirmative defenses at the preliminary hearing.”330 
These factors could well serve as a template for any system undergoing legal 
transplantation for its screening mechanism. 
 
2. Grand Jury 
  
 Since its inception in Britain, grand juries have provided critical protections against some 
political and vindictive prosecutions against citizens.  It was instituted not only to reflect the will 
of the community, but also to integrate an element of democracy into the decisionmaking of the 
prosecution.331  It provides an opportunity for the community to express local views, even in 
                                                
330Andrew Leipold, Preliminary Hearing, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, Encyclopedia.com: available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403000193.html (alternation in original).  
331See Washburn, supra note 263, at 2342(noting “Democratic and populist elements of the jury may be critical in 
maintaining trust in the criminal justice system among the citizens“). 
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cases involving national law.332  Furthermore, it was intended by the anti-federalists to be a 
check on federal power against intrusion into state sovereignty. 
  
 Thus, exploring the grand jury from a historical or reformative prospective illuminates 
the institution of screening against erroneous and abusive prosecutorial judgment power, and 
provides a potential vehicle towards Taiwan’s reform.  Moreover, Taiwan has been undergoing a 
tremendous judicial reform since the emergence of criticisms towards lenient sentencing of 
sexual offenders.333  The outcry of the community for judicial reform to impose harsher 
sentencing on sexual offenders has resulted in several heavier than usual judicial sentences.  
Several social campaigns have advocated the need to pay attention to community voices and to 
demand a more participatory role of citizens in criminal justice.  The mainstream and new-born 
thought, if applied to the reviewing of charging decision, could only be found in the grand jury 
mechanism, not in preliminary hearings or any other institutions.  Would Taiwan be inclined to 
transplant the mechanism of the grand jury, due to its democratic element and civic participation?  
Whether this would be suitable for Taiwan requires further examination. 
 
 
         
 
                                                
332Id. at 2338-2339. 
333See Bai Mei Gui Xin Sheng, Fa Guan Ting Dao Le Ma?[White Rose Voice, Does the judge listen to it?], China 
Times Editorial(Taiwan), Sep. 27, 2010 , available at  
http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/RTE/myform_detail.asp?offset=320&id=2724 (last visited Sept., 10, 2011) (The so 
called “White Rose Activity” (Bai Mei Gui Yun Dong)tries to call for attention of judges to face their judgments 
that either impose over-lenient sentencing on sexual offender or apply the law erratically on sexual assault types’ of 
cases.) (This movement jeopardizes the independence of judicial system, which will influence the decision making.  
Critics worry populism is not the right path towards the reform). 
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2.1. History of the Grand Jury  
  
 Criminal charges were originally, and for a substantial period in history, pursued by 
private complaint.  The “appeal of felony” was instituted by victims or their relatives as criminal 
prosecution during the pre-Clarendon era.334  During the reign of Henry II, the system was 
changed.  Henry II desired to boost revenues through the judicial system, where justice was 
accessible only to those with the ability to pay; he also sought to curb the ever-growing power of 
the ecclesiastical realm, not being satisfied with sharing power with the church to which criminal 
cases were often brought, or with the practice in which clergy were not subject to being accused 
and tried before a state court.335  Wrestling with the Church’s power and feudal reign over 
judicial jurisdiction, the forerunner of the modern grand jury was made part of the English 
judiciary during the ruling of Henry II in the twelfth century.  In 1164, Thomas Becket, the 
Chancellor of England and first prelate of the English Church, signed the Constitutions of 
Clarendon, a document recognized by Church hierarchy concerning the rights of the English 
King.336  In Chapter 6 of the Constitutions of Clarendon, the accusing jury was charged with 
preventing abusive charging to bring a layman in ecclesiastical courts.337 
 
Henry II also pressured the English barons to accept the Assize of Clarendon.  In the 
Assize of Clarendon, Henry II established a new “presentment” system, the jury of accusation, 
                                                
334JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENEE LETTOW LERNER AND BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, 29, 32 (2009). 
335 Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing The Historical Role Of The Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 704-
705 (1972). 
336Id. at 703-706. 
337See Id. at 707 (noting that “later the Assize of Clarendon receives all of the credit as the ancestor of modern day 
grand jury). 
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providing a group of society to present its accusations.338  The accusing body was composed of 
twelve men from the hundred and four men of the township.339  The accusatory entity was in use 
during the reign of Henry II in the twelfth century.340  As originally conceived, the grand jury 
was not a barrier intended to protect citizens; instead, it was “government machinery” imposed 
for reign over feudal power, and was intended to satisfy the King’s desire for absolutism by 
taking away the power of feudal barons and weakening the ecclesiastical courts.341  During the 
King’s reign, citizens feared the grand jury, as it controlled a great deal of power in criminal 
justice.  
 
During the fourteenth century, the jury system was divided into two bodies: the petit jury, 
which was established to render a verdict of guilt or innocence at trial, and the indicting jury, 
which consisted of twenty-four knights chosen by the sheriff and had the responsibility of 
accusing alleged criminals.342  As mentioned, the grand jury was not instituted as a protecting 
institution against government.  Its function of protecting innocence had not arisen at this time, 
and would not do so until the seventeenth century.343  The following historical case is a proper 
example to translate this new development. 
 
                                                
338LANGBEIN, supra note 334, at 38. 
339See id. At 708-709 (noting that “the Assize of Clarendon made this accusatory body part of judicial machinery in 
all civilian cases affected by its provisions”).    
340 Leipold, supra note 264, at 280; Thomas P. Sullivan & Robert D. Nachman, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It :Why 
The Grand Jury’s Accusatory Function Should Not Be Changed, 75 No. 4, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 1048 
(1984). 
341Helene E. Schwartz, supra note 335, at 709-710.   
342John F. Decker, Legislating New Federalism: The Call for Grand Jury Reform in the States, 58 OKL. L. REV. 341, 
345 (2005).   
343SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY and PRACTICE, VOLUME 1, §1-2, 1-9 (2nd ed.2012). 
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Anthony Ashley Cooper, the First Earl of Shaftesbury and a member of the Church of 
England, originally supported the King, but later discovered Charles II’s true intention to 
proclaim the Roman Catholic Church the supreme religion in England.344  In June 1680, upon 
learning of Charles’ attempt to restore England to the realm of Rome, Shaftesbury presented a 
bill of indictment against Charles’s brother James, the Duke of York, to keep him from the 
throne.345  The King stopped the grand jury from acting on the bill and struck back by initiating 
prosecution against supporters of the Protestants.346 
 
In 1681, grand juries refused to indict Protestants Stephen Colledge and the Earl of 
Shaftesbury for treason, despite the power of Charles II.347  Faced with political pressure from 
the Crown and the judge, two grand juries in London still returned no bill despite having been 
warned that they would be considered criminals if they failed to indict.348  Charles II later sought 
indictment from a grand jury in Oxford, where grand jurors stood closer to the King, and won the 
indictment against Stephen Colledge for treason who was then convicted and executed.349  
Anthony Ashley Cooper eventually fled the country before the King acquired another indictment. 
  
                                                
344See generally Schwartz, supra note 335, at 713 (noting the Cavaliers suspected the King’s ecclesiastical goals, 
with the alert to the potential succession of Charles’s brother, James).   
345Seeid.at 712-714 (noting Charles II, a secret Catholic to restore England to the realm of Rome, led the country in 
the opposition direction of what mass citizens and members of both houses of Parliament in England held, which 
was anti-Catholic, and strengthened the Church of England). 
346Id. at 713-714. 
347See id.(noting the reason for rejecting to indict is that the London populace was mainly Whig and was reluctant to 
indict a fellow of Cavalier cause);See generally RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN 
THE UNITED STATES1634-1941, 1-3 (1963). 
348See BEALE ET AL., supra note 343, §1:2, 1-10 (The author notes that the presiding judge asked the jury to explain 
its failure to indict, and the foreman of the jury was questioned and imprisoned in the Tower).  
349See Schwartz, supra note 335, at 715-716(noting that Oxford, “a second grand jury was convened, which was 
known to be populated with more pliable citizens.”); see also Leipold, supra note 264, at 282 (noting that “second 
grand jury, again with a measure of official pressure, indicted Colledge.” “During the proceedings the King’s 
counsel and the witnesses were shut in the room with jurors, apparently even during the deliberations”) ;Washburn, 
supra note 263, at 2342. 
111 
 
This case and the following case heralded not only the role and function of the grand jury 
to be independent of political and executive pressure, but also the insistence of guarding citizens 
against arbitrary prosecution.  Some critics have taken a contrary viewpoint, that the Stephen 
Colledge case remains proof of the vulnerability of the grand jury to be manipulated under 
interference by corrupt royal members.350  But had the grand jury not been corrupted and 
manipulated by King Charles II with the selection of new grand jurors in a different venue, the 
outcome of the historical event would have been different.  There would have been no second 
indictment as well as no malfunction of the gatekeeper function as a protection against 
oppression.  As a consequence, the grand jury could maintain its fame for protection of innocent 
lives. 
 
Not until the end of the seventeenth century was the grand jury viewed as “a protector of 
liberty of English citizens.”351  Just as one jurist, Lord Chancellor Somers, analyzed “the source 
of the grand jury’s power [is] in the people, rather than the executive, so as to protect the people 
from unjust prosecution.”352  The idea that the grand jury symbolized a barrier between the 
accused and accuser later travelled to America where it became a more independent body against 
government, and even served as a quasi-legislative and executive body during the American 
colonial period.353  English colonies in America all adopted this accusing jury in instituting 
criminal charges, with an expansive role in administrative tasks.354  The first grand jury in 
America was held in Massachusetts in 1635 and soon took root in other colonies.  At the time, it 
                                                
350Schwartz, supra note 335, at 719-720.   
351Leipold, supra note 264, at 283; BEALE ET AL., supra note 343, §1-2, 1-8; Sullivan &Nachman, supra note 340, at 
1048. 
352Schwartz, supra note 335, at 720.  
353See Leipold, supra note 264, at 283 (noting an example that “a New Jersey grand jury proposed a tax on livestock 
and slaves”). 
354BEALE ET AL.,supra note 343, at §1-3, 1-11.  
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not only checked government by preventing overzealous criminal accusations from being 
charged, but also assisted local government.355 
 
Prior to the inclusion of this legendary body into the Bill of Rights, another famous case 
of screening and protecting citizens from colonial government by the grand jury arose.  John 
Peter Zenger was a newspaper publisher in New York in 1734.356  During the revolutionary 
period, grand juries played an opposition role against the British government and frustrated royal 
efforts to enforce unpopular laws.357  John Peter Zenger published the New York Weekly Journal, 
criticizing New York Governor William Cosby.  Governor Cosby sought to indict Zenger for 
seditious libel, but three successive grand juries refused to indict.358  Once again, the grand jury 
played an important role against government oppression and political pressure.  But under the 
protection of the grand jury’s decision, it is unknown whether the government failed to prove 
Zenger’s act constituted libel offense, or whether the indictment was disapproved of by the grand 
jury because the grand jury disagreed with how the law was being applied. 
  
As Professor Beale has noted, “the refusal to indict in these cases appears to have been 
based on the jurors’ approval of the conduct in question, and not on a finding that the defendants 
were innocent of the conduct charged against them.”359  During the Revolutionary period, grand 
juries also adopted patriotic resolutions denouncing the British, urging support of a war, and 
                                                
355Leipold, supra note 264, at 283-284; see BEALE ET AL., supra note 343, at §1-3, 1-12 (noting that evidence of 
using grand jury traced back as early as 1625 in Virginia).   
356Leipold, supra note 264, at 284;Washburn, supra note 263, at 2343. 
357 BEALE ET AL., supra note 343, at §1-3, 1-11, 1-14. 
358Id. 
359Id. 
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approving of new state constitutions.360  The grand jury was adopted by each of the new states as 
an important procedural safeguard, but not guaranteed as a right to be indicted by grand jury, 
except in North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.361  In 1789, James Madison submitted 
amendments to Congress, including one amendment that stated “in all crimes punishable with 
loss of life or member, presentment or indictment by grand jury shall be an essential 
preliminary,” which as modified was ratified on December 15, 1791 as the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution.362 
 
As new states were admitted, each adopted the grand jury system, which guaranteed that 
no one could be held to answer serious criminal charges unless he had been indicted or presented 
by a grand jury.363  Grand juries were particularly active in the new trans-Appalachian territories, 
where they performed functions in addition to approving criminal charges, and were 
independent, leading to clashes with prosecutors and judges.364 
 
By the middle of nineteenth century, voices arose to criticize and abolish the grand jury 
as an expansive and cumbersome relic, being a threat to individual liberty because of 
inquisitorial procedure; these criticisms reached their peak at the end of the nineteenth century.365  
The Supreme Court in Hurtado v. California366 ruled that prosecutions by indictments are not 
                                                
360YOUNGER, supra note 347, at 36. 
361BEALE ET AL., supra note 343, at§1-3, 1-17.For detailed historical discussion of adoption of grand jury in states 
constitutions in each state, see id. at §1-4, 1-15-1-20. 
362 See id.at §1-3, 1-19(The Fifth Amendment provides “ No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger”).  
363BEALE ET AL., supra note 343, at §1-4, 1-20. 
364Id. at §1-4, 1-20.   
365Id. at §1-5, 1-21; Decker, supra note 342, at 346.   
366Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
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applied to states criminal prosecutions either by the Fifth Amendments or by the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process clauses.  In other words, state prosecution, whether the indictment is 
mandated or not, is governed by state constitution, statutes, and procedural rules.367  It was not 
until this time that some states started to add more options for prosecutors to prosecute through 
information.  Currently, twenty-seven states have eliminated mandatory grand jury screening, 
adopting prosecution by information in at least some types of cases.  The remaining twenty-three 
states continue to be indictment states unless waived by defendants.368  In federal jurisdictions, 
the constitutional requirement of charge by indictment for capital and infamous crimes is an 
essential procedure in felony prosecutions.369 
 
2.2. Screening Function of the Grand Jury 
  
From an historical perspective, what makes the grand jury most desirable and reputable 
as an institution is its protective role against oppression from the Crown or the government.  
However, as a closer examination of historical examples demonstrates, the grand jury can be 
both protective and abusive against the citizens; this is seen in the Colledge case, where the 
government could always look for a different grand jury to indict.  Moreover, as Professor 
Leipold has stated, “even when a grand jury did act as buffer, their decisions appear to have been 
based more on the political nature of the charges and ideology of the jurors than on the strength 
of the accusation.”370  Thus, its major function seems to strengthen shielding against political 
accusation and persecution instead of ordinary criminal cases.  It is unknown whether the grand 
                                                
367BEALE ET AL., supra note 343, at §8-1, 8-14. 
368Id, at §8-2, 8-15. 
369Infamous crime refers to imprisonment for more than one year. 
370Leipold, supra note 264, at 287.  
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jury provides a screening function in normal criminal cases, although many believe that it does 
not. 
 
Based on empirical evidence from official statistics in federal jurisdictions, of all 17,487 
cases in 1984, the grand jury returned 17,419 indictments and only screened out 68 cases.371  The 
empirical statistics more or less show that the grand jury fulfills some screening function, and its 
role as a shield stands firm in the view of the judicial eyes.  The United States Supreme Court so 
far remains a supporter of the institution, upholds that the traditional function it played is 
effective even when faced with sharp criticism, and has recognized more than once that the grand 
jury shields citizens against government.372  A complete study of the mechanism and procedure 
of the modern grand jury, as well as the insights of proposals by reformists to modern grand jury 
procedure, may be able to advance the effectiveness of the proceeding as well.  Both are 
analyzed to further my alternatives to reform Taiwan’s current situation.   
2.2.1. Inquisitorial Nature of Screening Process 
 
In the federal criminal justice system, the right to a grand jury indictment in felony cases 
is protected and mandated by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, unless waived by the 
defendant.  In federal jurisdictions, the grand jury performs both investigating and indicting 
functions.  In states jurisdictions, the investigating grand jury may be specially convened, while 
                                                
371The figure is cited in Sullivan &Nachman, supra note 340, at 1047, 1050 n. 15 (1984) (Statistical Report of the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fiscal Year 1984); see also RONALD JAY ALLEN, JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, DEBRA A. 
LIVINGSTON& WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 962 (2ed., 2005) (noting that the 
dismissal rate of the grand jury appears to be less than one percent). 
372United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-687 (1972) 
(noting the grand jury’s dual function of determination probable cause, and protecting citizens against unfounded 
prosecutions.) ; United States v. Williams, 112 U.S. 1735, 1742 (1992).   
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the indicting grand jury may be convened regularly, such as every month.373  After the grand jury 
finishes the investigation and/or prosecution, it will return a true bill or no bill.  The trial will be 
activated by an indictment, namely a true bill with a signature by prosecutors in federal 
jurisdictions and state jurisdictions whose jurisdictions adopt grand jury mechanism.   
 
One striking feature of the grand jury is the inquisitorial nature of its procedure, which 
differs from a jury trial.  Unlike the adversarial jury trial or preliminary hearing, no rival parties 
may be present during the grand jury session, which permits only prosecutors to present a one-
sided story without ever hearing the defense or a counterargument by the target.  What 
prosecutors may present are witnesses’ testimonies, material facts, and documents.  The one-side 
story presented may be the truth, a partial truth, or largely false, and is highly likely to be a 
biased story.  Given that the prosecutor is not obligated to present favorable evidence or 
exculpatory evidence, the facts will not be tested or challenged by the target, i.e. the prospective 
defendant.  As a consequence, the grand jury is exposed to a single version of the facts and asked 
to apply a legal standard - is there “probable cause” to believe that the suspect committed the 
crime-to those facts.374 
 
 Additionally, there are not many procedural safeguards to protect the prospective 
defendants.  The prosecutor is the exclusive legal expert who dominates the whole proceeding; 
there is no judge present to protect the target’s rights during the investigation or screening.  The 
                                                
373Samuel Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage?, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 807, 809 (1972). 
374Leipold, supra note 264, at 297-298.  
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target of the investigation may not know she is being investigated in the current procedure.375  It 
is fair to conclude that the target’s fate is in the prosecutor’s hands even with the screening filter 
of the grand jury.  The ex parte feature sounds a cautionary note to prosecutors to stand by 
neutrality, and to remember that the interest of criminal prosecution is not simply winning the 
case.376 
 
 The non-rivalrous, ex-parte procedure makes the mechanism seem less effective in that 
no balancing mechanism exists for the protection of the target.  Moreover, the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel is not applicable in grand jury proceedings because the right attaches only when 
adversarial judicial proceeding commences.377  Being devoid of the right to counsel and the right 
to defend oneself (i.e. the right to testify) undermines the fundamental value of procedural 
fairness, which in turn makes the process inquisitorial in nature and unable to shield innocent 
citizens.  This puts a target in an unfair proceeding where she has no legal right to challenge the 
charge or defend oneself before the grand jury, but only to rely on the discretion of the grand 
jury to allow her to testify on her own behalf if she wants to do so.378  A target indicted by the 
                                                
375 United States Attorney’s Manual, Title 9- 11.153 prescribes that when a target is not called to testify the 
prosecutor, in appropriate cases, is encouraged to notify such person a reasonable time before seeking an indictment  
to afford him or her an opportunity to testify before the grand jury, subject to the conditions set forth in USAM 9-
11.152. 
376See James F. Holderman& Charles B. Redfern, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct In The Federal System 
Revisited, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 547-548 (2006) (noting that United States Attorney Manual states “ The 
prosecutor’s responsibility is to advise the grand jury on the law and to present evidence for its consideration.  In 
discharging these responsibilities, the prosecutor must scrupulously fair to all witnesses and must do nothing to 
inflame or otherwise improperly influence the grand jury”).  
377Id. at 556. 
378Id. at 553.  But United States Attorney’s Manual, Title 9 §11.152 prescribes that : 
“Accordingly, under normal circumstances, where no burden upon the grand jury or delay of 
its proceedings is involved, reasonable requests by a "subject" or "target" of an investigation, 
as defined above, to testify personally before the grand jury ordinarily should be given 
favorable consideration, provided that such witness explicitly waives his or her privilege 
against self-incrimination, on the record before the grand jury, and is represented by counsel 
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grand jury suffers comprehensive unfairness and disadvantages in such an ex parte process.  It is 
not an overstatement to say that the grand jury investigation and screening adopts an inquisitorial 
procedure.   
2.2.2. Grand Jury Process 
 
Theoretically, the grand jury has dual functions, but the functions are not separate in its 
procedure.  The mixed function of the grand jury enables the grand jury both to investigate the 
potential crime as well as screen the evidence.  Thus, the grand jury has the authority to call 
witnesses themselves, question witnesses, subpoena additional documents, and discuss the case 
with the prosecutor regarding the facts and evidence.379  The goal is to determine whether the 
threshold of the prosecution’s burden of probable cause has been satisfied, whether the charge is 
warranted and to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to believe that the target 
committed the specified crime.380 
 
In practice, prosecutors call witnesses one at a time into the room, ask questions, and 
present documentary evidence.381In some simple cases the prosecutor may only call one witness, 
the law enforcement agent who is managing the case, to brief facts and to summarize other 
witnesses’ testimonies, which is in the form of hearsay evidence.382  Prosecutors control the 
                                                                                                                                                       
or voluntarily and knowingly appears without counsel and consents to full examination under 
oath.” 
379 Leipold, supra note 264,at 266, 305. 
380Id. at 294. 
381Id. at 266; Holderman & Redfern, supra note 376, at 548-549.     
382See Fred A. Bernstein, Note, Behind The Grey Door: Williams, Secrecy, And The Federal Grand Jury, 69 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 563, 577-578(1994)(noting the whole presentation process in state grand jury may last only for three 
minutes). 
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evidence that will be disclosed to the grand jury and present inculpatory evidence that constitutes 
probable cause to believe the target committed the crime.  After the case is fully presented ex 
parte, the witness and court reporter leave the room to allow the jurors to deliberate; their task is 
to decide whether to accept the prosecutor’s recommendation and return a true bill charging the 
suspect with a crime.  If the grand jury finds sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, it 
will indict; otherwise, it will return a no bill.   
 
 Theoretically, grand jurors are allowed to take the following information into 
consideration in deciding whether to indict: 
“(1) in most jurisdictions, in keeping with historical tradition, grand jurors are 
authorized to consider any information known to the grand jurors personally; 
(2) grand jurors can ask their own questions of witness offered by the 
prosecution; (3) grand jurors have authority to insist that additional witnesses 
or physical evidence be subpoenaed; (4) many jurisdictions recognize a 
supervisory authority of the court to insist that the grand jury consider 
particular evidence where that is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice; 
(5) in those jurisdictions that place an obligation on the prosecutor to present 
to the grand jury material exculpatory evidence known to the prosecutor, a 
prospective defendant may seek to take advantage of that obligation by 
making such evidence known to the prosecutor; and (6) although the grand 
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jury traditionally is an ex parte proceeding, a few jurisdictions give the 
prospective defendant a right to testify before the grand jury.383 
 Although a grand jury can take a different approach in state jurisdictions, most protective 
procedural safeguards are not available in federal jurisdictions.  In addition, the grand jury is 
composed of lay citizens without legal training or education, and it is doubtful that it could 
operate independently from the dominance of prosecutors.  The grand jury appears to be a rubber 
stamp for the prosecutor and for whatever charges she wishes to pursue.  Furthermore, the 
function seems to be more dampened because the prosecutor is not required to turn in 
exculpatory evidence or favorable evidence to the grand jury, as was declared by the Supreme 
Court.384  Without reform, it is unknown whether the grand jury can fulfill its intended role as a 
protective force against unfounded prosecution in modern days.  Other than the democratic and 
participatory features that attract attention, unlike the preliminary hearing, the grand jury allows 
no right of defense, nor the right to cross examination of the witness as an adversarial procedure 
does.  Most obviously, the grand jury requires a greater degree of procedural fairness and 
participation of the party whom is being investigated before it can play a true screening role.   
 
2.2.3. Threshold of the indictment   
 
The threshold level of evidence for a grand jury to indict is not identical to that for the 
petit jury.  Whether prosecutors have proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial is different 
to that of whether prosecutors have presented sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that 
                                                
383LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 311, at 241(alternation in original). 
384See infra Williams case.  
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the target committed the crime.  What the threshold level for indictment should be depends on 
the goal the screening mechanism intends to achieve.  Obviously, the lower the standard, the less 
effective the screening function and the fewer cases eliminated.  Conversely, the higher the 
standard, the more the screening mechanism comes into play.   
 
How much evidence satisfies the sufficiency requirement may differ from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  The basic rule of sufficiency demands that prosecutors establish probable cause to 
believe that a defendant has committed the crime.  The probable cause standard385 originally 
arose from judicial screening by magistrates, before or after an arrest, which is only permitted 
under the Fourth Amendment if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has 
committed the offense.  It not only constitutes a first screening that looks into whether the 
alleged suspect is about to commit or has committed the offense, but also protects the factually 
innocent by checking whether probable cause has or has not been found.  However, mere 
probable cause is a “weak screen for factual guilt, i.e. the accused who actually commits the 
substantive criminal law offense with the requisite intent without any excuse or justification, 
because it focuses on whether the defendant committed the proscribed conduct.”386 
 
If the pretrial screening is aimed not exclusively at factual guilt, but at demanding the 
state to meet the legal guilt requirement,387 the higher the threshold is set for evaluating legal 
                                                
385See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 175-176(1949) (noting probable cause to arrest “exists where the 
facts and circumstances within knowledge and of which the reasonably trustworthy information sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed by 
the person to be arrested”).  
386See Arenella, supra note 269, at476-479 (noting factual guilt accused means the accused who actually commits 
the substantive criminal law offense with the requisite intent without any excuse or justification.  In order to 
determine factual guilt accused, procedural mechanism must be provided to judge the legal and factual issues). 
387See id. at 479 (noting legal guilt means the final result of that criminal process). 
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guilt before indictment, the more screening value it could achieve.  Currently, there is no 
threshold distinction between the preliminary screening and the Gerstein hearing or the issuing 
of an arrest warrant.  Some courts claim that the probable cause to arrest is identical to probable 
cause to indict.388  Because there is no evidentiary limitation by which the magistrate considers 
the existence of probable cause, evidence that is excluded and suppressed at trial is freely used in 
the two screening phase.389  If the grand jury screens on the basis of an identical standard to 
determine whether the government’s evidence would warrant a reasonable person to believe the 
accused has committed the crime, then it is to be expected that the grand jury cannot effectuate 
the screening function.  As Professor Arenella noted “Whether the grand jury screen factual or 
legal guilt depends on the type of probable cause standard it applies and what evidence it 
considers.”390  It is senseless to adopt identical screening standards in two chronological phases 
of the pretrial process.  As mentioned previously, the probable cause to arrest standard is 
functionally incapable of screening legal guilt because it considers all types of evidence, 
including inadmissible evidence.391 
 
A viable solution would be for the grand jury to raise the screening standard to improve 
its function for weeding out both factual and legal innocence cases that cannot withstand the 
more stringent evidentiary rules applicable at trial.  For example, some state courts have 
suggested the use of a prima facie evidence of probable cause, which requires prosecutors to 
prove the case to a degree where the evidence amounts to a prima facie case that a potential 
                                                
388See id. at 485-486 (noting that some courts limited the grand jury screening to factual guilt by equating both 
probable causes). 
389Id. at 478-479. 
390Id. at 485. 
391Id. at 478. 
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defendant had committed a crime.392  New York, for example, provides “The grand jury may 
indict person when evidence before it both establishes all elements of crime and also establishes 
reasonable cause to believe that accused committed crime to be charged; [the] first prong 
requires that people present prima facie case and [the] second prong dictates degree of certitude 
which grand jurors must possess to indict.”393 
 
Although the prima facie standard brings much more confidence to the screening process, 
it is debatable whether such a standard requires evaluation of the quantity of the government’s 
evidence and expertise of application of evidentiary rules to the offense.  Despite being fraught 
with technical difficulties and the need for expertise, the probable cause decision made after 
adopting stricter and higher standards would be much more reliable and would bring the decision 
closer to being correct and to the degree of legal guilt that warrants a future conviction.  While 
advocating a higher standard, one also cannot ignore the fact that a grand jury indictment is not a 
conviction reached at trial.  To demand the prosecution to reach beyond reasonable doubt in the 
screening stage imposes unnecessary harshness on the prosecution as well.  The reasonable point 
is somewhere in between.  
 
2.2.4. Evidentiary Rules 
 
 To prove that a person is legally guilty demands strict evidentiary rules applied at trial, 
where only admissible evidence that could withstand strict suppression hearing may be used to 
                                                
392See id. at 487 (quoting that dismissal of an indictment because the indictment was not supported “by any 
evidence, competent or otherwise, to establish a prima facie case”); LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 311, at 241. 
393People v. Jennings, 504 N.E. 2d 1080 (N.Y. 1986). 
124 
 
prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.  Both hearsay evidence and unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence are inadmissible to convict the accused.  The use of illegally obtained evidence or 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
jeopardizes the integrity of criminal justice and dishonors defendants’ constitutional rights.  To 
deter police misconduct, strict evidentiary rules bind the admissibility of evidence at trial in 
adjudicating guilt.  However, to indict a person is not the equivalent of convicting a person.  
Should identical evidentiary rules be applied to the grand jury proceeding as well?   
 
The Fifth Amendment requires that federal prosecution for felonious crimes must be 
initiated by grand jury indictments or presentments, but there is nothing more in the language of 
the Constitution.  The Supreme Court has rejected an argument that an indictment should have 
been quashed because the grand jury had relied on “some,” not “all” inadmissible evidence.394  
Whether an indictment wholly based on inadmissible evidence should be quashed is still in 
question.  Moreover, the extent of the adoption of evidentiary rules at the grand jury stage differs 
among jurisdictions.  Federal and state evidentiary rules in the grand jury differ as well.  It 
depends on the goal and function that a screening system intends to achieve.  The more screening 
a system wishes to accomplish, the more that the evidentiary rules applied at trial should equally 
apply to the screening phase. 
 
As our analysis proceeds, we will find out if the benefits of such an application outweigh 
the associated costs.  On the one hand, the adoption of complete evidentiary rules is not practical 
in that there is no suppression hearing commenced at the grand jury, there is no sitting judge to 
                                                
394Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 247-248 (1910).  
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decide the admissibility of evidence, and adoption would make the screening a replication of the 
trial, which is an unnecessary process.  On the other hand, judging from effective screening and 
the avoidance of wrongful indictments, the application of evidentiary rules enables a more 
correct charging evaluation and brings the outcome closer to the outcome of the trial. 
 
In federal jurisdictions, the Supreme Court has demonstrated antagonistic views towards 
application of evidentiary rules in grand jury.  First, the Court has declined to quash an 
indictment because it was supported by incompetent evidence.395  In Costello v. United States,396 
the defendant challenged an indictment that was based solely on hearsay testimony by three 
investigators who had not directly witnessed the alleged transactions.  The three witnesses only 
summarized the vast amount of evidence of the transactions and presented hearsay evidence.  
The Court expressed two major reasons to knock down the challenges.  Starting from America’s 
English ancestor, the Crown, the grand jury’s freedom to consider unlimited information should 
not be hampered by rigid procedural rules that aim to ensure a fair determination of guilt or 
innocence.397  Therefore, such unlimited information and evidence enables the grand jury to 
evaluate a prospective defendant’s guilt, and the kind of screening function it exercises will be 
only to single out factual innocence, not legal innocence.       
 
The Court also noted the potential pretrial delay as an adverse consequence in the 
determination of the adequacy and competence of evidence if such evidentiary challenges were 
allowed.  The Fifth Amendment does not require the grand jury to look into evidence on that 
                                                
395Id. at 245. 
396Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
397Arenella, supra note 269, at 492. 
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issue.  Besides, such evidentiary inquiry ensures no assurance of a fairer trial because the rules of 
evidence would be applied to the trial as well.  The Court concluded that “a legally constituted 
and unbiased grand jury, like information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough 
to call for trial of the charge on the merits.”398  As a consequence, there was justification in 
rejecting application of “rigid procedural or evidentiary rules”399 that were designed to ensure 
fairer decisions of legal guilt in the adversarial procedure.  This is a reflection of the Supreme 
Court’s view that the grand jury is set to single out factual guilt.400 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that judicial supervision of the quality and quantity of the 
evidence relied upon by the grand jury “would run counter to the whole history of the grand jury 
institution, in which laymen conduct their inquiries unfettered by technical rules.”401  The 
Court’s rationale does not support the notion of challenging the indictment based on the 
competency or adequacy of evidence.  Rather it obviously conveys that the goal of grand jury 
screening is not to weed out the legally innocent, but only factually innocent citizens.  The 
Costello decision has had an influence, not only on the admissibility of hearsay evidence in 
grand jury screening, but also to other incompetent evidence that could not be used otherwise at 
trial.402 
 
In its subsequent Calandra ruling, the Court followed the Costello philosophy and 
rejected challenges to the indictment on the basis of evidence obtained in violation of Fourth 
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Amendment.  The Supreme Court again found that the adoption of the exclusionary rule would 
impede the grand jury in the performance of its investigative and accusatory functions, which 
could be inconsistent with its historical role.403  The Court declined to extend the rule to the 
grand jury because it would render no great deterrent effect to illegal police conduct, but would 
sacrifice the historical role of the grand jury.404  The Court concluded “the grand jury’s sources 
of information are widely drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected by the 
character of the evidence considered.”405 
 
Historically, the grand jury was an accusing body, which did not play the role it plays 
today as a shield against the government; instead, it acted as a tool of the Crown.  With the 
occurrence of a few famous historical events between the government and citizens, it 
transformed into a protective entity against oppressive government power.  By analysis of the 
historical transformation to shield against unfounded charges in England, the grand jury should 
not indict on the basis of the hearsay evidence, since the nature of hearsay evidence is unreliable 
and its use easily results in unfounded charges.  To be sure, if the grand jury intends to be a 
buffer between the government and citizens, cases that bear the impossibility of acquiring legal 
guilt (conviction) should be eliminated; otherwise screening functions are impeded by the 
admission of these types of evidence.406 
 
                                                
403See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 344-345 (1974)(noting “an indictment valid on its face is not subjected to 
challenge on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of inadequate or incompetent evidence; or even on the 
basis of information obtained in violation of a defendants’ 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination”). 
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Justice Powell argued that most prosecutors would not indict based on illegally seized 
evidence because they are unlikely to request an indictment where a conviction would not be 
obtained.407  But to rely on governmental self-restraint in order to rebut this attack against 
indictments is not likely to withstand criticisms.  The screening mechanism is required because 
oppression and abuse of government power do exist in modern days.  An example is the 
Supreme Court’s fashioning of the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct in obtaining 
evidence.  If we trust that the police would not encroach on the Fourth Amendment right of the 
people, there would be no need for the Supreme Court to fashion the exclusionary rule to 
restraint the police misconduct.  Obviously, such an analogy applies to the prosecutor as well.  
Checks and balances are constantly required to review authority because self-regulation may not 
occur. 
 
Most states follow the federal rules by state statutes or judicial rules; they do not bar the 
grand jury from considering inadmissible evidence and disallow judicial review of the evidence.  
For example, in Illinois, the exclusionary rule does not bar the grand jury from hearing illegally 
obtained evidence and use of illegally obtained evidence does not warrant dismissal of the 
indictment.408  There are also states that reject a “no review” rule.409  For example, New York’s 
Criminal Procedure Law § 190.65 (1)states that “Subject to the rules prescribing the kinds of 
offenses which may be charged in an indictment, a grand jury may indict a person for an offense  
when (a) the evidence before it is legally sufficient to establish that such person committed such 
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408People v. Delaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277 (Ill. App. 2 Dist. 1993). 
409See Arenella, supra note 269, at563; see also N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 210.30 (4) (Consol. 2013)(stating “If  the  
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determine the motion to dismiss or reduce”). 
129 
 
offense provided, however, such evidence is not legally sufficient when corroboration that would 
be required, as a matter of law, to sustain a conviction for such offense is absent, and (b) 
competent and admissible evidence before it provides reasonable cause to believe that such 
person committed such offense.”410  Therefore, New York bars the use of inadmissible evidence 
in support of the indictment and provides an ideal model for the grand jury system by restricting 
the nature of evidence that should be admissible and competent; otherwise, an indictment might 
be dismissed. 
 
To rely solely on trial to vindicate all adversarial principles seems to undermine core 
values we try to protect and to delay the protection of the integrity of justice as well as delaying 
the deterrence of law enforcement misconduct.  Pretrial screening would be effective if some 
strict evidentiary standard were to be adopted, and we could be assured that not only factually 
innocent would be shielded from trial, but that the legally innocent would not be subjected to a 
harsh trial and the consequential costs.411  Procedural safeguards and rigid evidentiary rules 
adopted at trial are equally important in the screening process, even though the trial has not 
commenced yet.  The state should be obligated to present admissible evidence to accuse a person.  
The aforementioned values should be equally applied in the criminal justice process earlier to 
reduce the wrongfully indicted from being convicted.  Through such stringent processes we 
could ensure the indictment does not stigmatize any innocent, but only the legally guilty who 
deserve criminal punishment.   
                                                
410See N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§70.10(1) (Consol. 2013)(defining clearly that “Legally sufficient evidence” means 
competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the 
defendant's commission thereof; except that such evidence is not legally sufficient when corroboration required by 
law is absent”). 
411Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 
1124(2005). 
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2.2.5. Judicial Review of the Sufficiency or Competency of Indictment 
 
Judicial review of the grand jury proceedings is often raised at the stage after indictment 
but before trial commences, although there are still some limitations imposed on the scope of the 
review due to the grand jury secrecy requirement.412  In other words, judicial review of an 
ongoing investigation should be restricted under the demand of secrecy and not obstruct the 
grand jury investigation.413  According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(A), 
pretrial motions regarding defects in the grand jury “instituting of prosecution” must be raised 
prior to trial.  Given that the scope and extent of this dissertation is the evidentiary basis and 
sufficiency of evidence in supporting the indictment, the judicial review discussion is 
circumscribed within the topics of “sufficiency” and “competency” issues.                      
 
Whether to adopt the probable cause to indict or prima facie standard, “sufficiency” and 
“competency” of evidence to support the indictment is a critical question for pretrial procedure.  
Criminal defendants often seek to challenge the validity of indictments on the basis of 
sufficiency or the competency of the evidence.  But after Costello, all federal courts refused to 
review indictments on the basis of evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.414  The Costello 
                                                
412See BEALE ET AL., supra note 343,§9:19, 9-82-9-84(enumerating four reasons that influenced the scope of the 
judicial review of grand jury proceedings. The first is being independent actor of the prosecutor or the court.  The 
second is the grand jury secrecy.  The third is the court’s reluctance to impede the grand jury investigation while the 
case is still under investigated.  The fourth is the doctrine of separate of power that to impose restrains in reviewing 
the conduct of the prosecutor).   
413Id. at §9:19, 9-84.  
414 See Arenella, supra note 269,at 487-488. (noting historically the rule of evidence at trial applied to the grand jury 
by quoting United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727, 735(C.C. N. D. N. Y. 1852)). 
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Court not only permits the incompetent or inadmissible evidence to support an indictment, but 
also rejects judicial review of the indictment on the basis of such evidence.415 
 
In states, there are different practices that allow challenges to the sufficiency issue by 
judicial review.  For the majority of states, however, an indictment is not subject to the kind of 
challenges that leads to dismissal of the indictment.416  Those states that adopt the federal 
Costello rule reject motions to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the grand jury did not 
have sufficient evidence before it.417  Several others modify Costello minimally and “allow the 
challenges based on the total absence of evidence establishing a necessary element of the crime 
or challenges based on the absence of any testimony from a witness competent to testify.”418  In 
Illinois, courts have determined that it is not necessary to present evidence for each element of 
the offense charged in the indictment.419  The court has expressed that it will not consider the 
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence in dismissing an indictment except for a challenge on the 
grounds of “wholly” inadequate or incompetent evidence.420  In both types, courts recognize that 
the prosecutorial misconduct exception applies to these challenges.   
 
For those states that reject Costello, the challenges of sufficiency or competency of 
evidence are permitted through statutes and judicial decisions.  They have held that the defendant 
                                                
415Id, at 493. 
416LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 311, at266. 
417Russell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 405 S.W. 2d 683, 684 (1966); State v. Blakey, 635 N.W. 2d 748, 751 (S. D. 
2001). 
418LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 311, at266. 
419People v. Young, 581 N.E.2d 245 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1991). 
420See id. at 242, 245(noting that defendant was charged with possession of more than 10 and less than 30 grams of 
cocaine. The police conducted a random sample testing of the suspect substances weighed only 1.86 grams of the 
total amount of 16.87 grams substances. When the validity of the testing is sustained, it was proper for the officer to 
testify that the substances tested positive for the amount of 16.87 grams). 
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with substantial grounds for dismissal of an indictment should not be compelled to enter trial.  
The court will not dismiss the indictment simply because the grand jury had considered the 
incompetent evidence; instead, the court will sustain the indictment if there was sufficient 
competent evidence to support a charge.421However, “where the inadmissible evidence was so 
prejudicial as to necessarily have influenced the grand jury, the indictment may be dismissed 
notwithstanding otherwise sufficient legal evidence.”422 
 
In New York, it provides the judicial review that the court could dismiss or reduce the 
indictment before trial when there is legally insufficient evidence to establish that the accused 
committed the offense.423  In People v. Bello, the court ruled that the reviewing court could 
consider the following: 
Whether the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the People, if 
unexpected and uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction by petit jury.  
Legally sufficient evidence is defined in CPL 70.10(1) as “competent 
evidence which if accepted as true, would establish every element of an 
offense charged.”  In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal 
sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt.  The reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to “whether the 
facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply 
                                                
421LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 311, at266. 
422Id. 
423See N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 210.30 (4) (Consol. 2013)(stating “If  the  court  determines  that  there is not 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence before the grand jury may  have  been  legally insufficient,  it  may in 
its discretion either (a) deny both the motion to inspect and the motion to dismiss or reduce, or (b) grant the  motion 
to  inspect  notwithstanding  and  proceed to examine the minutes and to determine the motion to dismiss or 
reduce”). 
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proof of every element of the charged crimes” and whether “the Grand Jury 
could rationally have drawn the guilty inference.”424 
  In another case, the court indicated “On a motion to dismiss, the reviewing court's inquiry 
is confined to the legal sufficiency of the evidence and the court is not to weigh the proof or 
examine its adequacy. Indeed, all questions as to the quality or weight of the proof should be 
deferred”425 
 
In Alaska, the court expressed that a court could dismiss an indictment where the 
presentation of inadmissible evidence and the “remaining evidence is insufficient, or the 
probative force of admissible evidence was so weak and the unfair prejudice engendered by the 
improper evidence was so strong that it appears likely that the improper evidence was the 
decisive factor in the grand jury’s decision to indict.”426 
 
In addition, while many lower courts follow the Costello-Calandra rule, some allow an 
exception where there is prosecutorial misconduct that affects the decision to indict.427  The 
prosecutorial misconduct theory refers to the court supervisory authority to preserve the integrity 
of the judicial process by dismissing indictments that were based on prosecutorial misconduct 
that mislead the grand jury.428  These state courts will “review the evidence support for an 
                                                
424705 N.E.2d 1209, 1210, 1211 (N.Y. 1998). 
425See Peoplev. Galatro, 639 N. E.2d 8 (N.Y. 1994)(quotes People v. Jennings, 504 N.E.2d 1079). 
426The defendant’s prior bad acts evidence testified by two persons was barred and inadmissible evidence to prove 
“attempted” kidnapping and sexual assault offense and the court dismissed the two counts in that the evidence was 
likely the “decisive factor” in the decision to indict on these two counts. See Clark v. State, 953P.2d 159, 163 
(Alaska App. 1998). 
427BEALE ET AL., supra note 343, §9:25, 9-104. 
428LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 311, at260. 
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indictment in conjunction with challenges based on prosecutorial misconduct or on a violation of 
the defendant rights by the grand jury itself.”429 
 
Lastly, perjured testimony before the grand jury may be related to the sufficiency issue.  
Read strictly, Costello would bar such challenges, because they are related to the sufficiency or 
quality of evidence, and some courts will refuse to dismiss the indictment as long as the grand 
jury hears some other competent evidence.430  The reasoning is that the place to decide the 
reliability of evidence or testimony lies at trial, not in the screening procedure.   
 
But growing discomfort over the philosophy of Costello to rely on the trial to cure errors 
of the grand jury prompted other federal courts to adopt a different approach.  Some federal and 
state courts have followed “due process” approach, while others prefer “court’s supervisory 
power” approach.431  For example, in United States v. Basurto,432 the court indicated that the 
“Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is violated when a defendant has to stand trial on 
an indictment which the Government knows is based partially on perjured testimony, when the 
perjured testimony is material, and when jeopardy has not attached.”433  The Circuit court 
reversed the conviction and established that the prosecutor’s constitutional duty is to inform the 
grand jury of the perjured testimony and not to allow the case to be tried based in part on 
                                                
429BEALE ET AL., supra note 343,§9:26, 9-142-9-143 (2nd ed.2012). 
430Arenella, supra note 269, at 545-546;  Coppedge v. United States, 311 F. 2d 128, 131-132 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
431BEALE ET AL., supra note 343,§9:8, 9-38. 
432492 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974). 
433See id. at 785(The accused was indicted for violation of statutory offense because of perjured testimony). 
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perjured testimony.434  In Illinois state court, “courts could properly dismiss an indictment based 
upon perjured testimony if the denial of due process is established with certainty.”435 
 
However, the Basurto ruling is only one deviation from Costello.  After Basurto, different 
circuits adopted different approaches.  The Ninth Circuit has changed Basurto, so that judicial 
review of the evidence at the grand jury has resulted in dismissal of an indictment only in 
flagrant cases where known perjury relating to a material matter has been presented to the grand 
jury.436 
 
The Sixth Circuit had used the “court’s supervisory power” to dismiss an indictment 
when long standing misconduct had been demonstrated.  It concluded that the court should 
review the untainted part of the evidence to decide if there was still sufficient evidence to support 
a conviction only if it was satisfied that the government could meet the burden of proof.437 
 
The Supreme Court in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States adopted a different 
approach.438  The trial court dismissed all 27 counts, one of which was the claim that the state 
knowingly presented misinformation to the grand jury.  The Court set up the prejudicial standard 
for non-constitutional errors in the grand jury proceedings where, unless such errors “prejudiced” 
                                                
434Id. at 786. 
435State v. Rivera, 390 N.E. 2d 1259, 1267 (1979). 
436See Arenella, supra note 269,at 548 (noting the Supreme Court rejected two appeals to indicate that only when the 
perjury leads cases to the issue of materiality, should the trial judge dismiss an valid indictment); United States v. 
Kennedy, 564 F. 2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Bettencourt, 614 F. 2d 214, 216 (9th Cir. 
1980) (noting that prosecutorial misconduct must be flagrant that violates the due process). 
437United States v. Adamo, 742 F. 2d 927, 940, 941 (6th Cir. 1984). 
438The district court dismissed an indictment on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct and irregularities in the 
grand jury proceedings. See Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 251 (1988). 
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the defendants, the district court could not dismiss an indictment.439  The Court also defined 
prejudice to mean that “the violations substantially influenced the grand jury’s decision to indict” 
or “if there is grave doubt that decision was free from such substantial influence.”440  According 
to the ruling, the Court categorizes such acts as prosecutorial misconduct and applies the 
harmless error standard.  Therefore, for lower federal courts, it is still unclear whether the due 
process standard remains.   
 
There is no doubt that an indictment based on perjury, knowingly presented by 
prosecutors, constitutes prosecutorial misconduct.  However, if the indictment is based on 
sufficient and other competent evidence; it may still establish probable cause even if the perjury 
is presented at the grand jury.  But, if such perjury testimony is material to the indictment and 
influences the decision to indict, should the defendant be granted a motion to dismiss an 
indictment?   
 
Normatively, we could not accept that any innocent person is charged on the basis of 
false testimony that influences the decision to charge.  As noted earlier, the prospective 
defendant is not allowed to confront or cross-examine his or her accuser at the grand jury.  To 
detect whether testimony is perjury or not usually relies on other contradictory witness’ 
testimony, or cross-examination, in discovering inconsistencies or problems of credibility.  Such 
judgment of perjury requires procedural safeguards such as the right of confrontation, i.e. cross 
examination, and right to counsel, which are attached to an adversarial trial.  Without procedural 
                                                
439Id. at 255. 
440See Id.(The Court also noted that for constitutional error that makes the proceedings fundamental unfair, 
constitutes the presumptive prejudice.  The court is not required to access the prejudicial impact). 
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safeguards, the detection of any perjury before the returning of an indictment is not possible, nor 
is it possible for the grand jury to find any viable means to discover perjury.  Since procedural 
safeguards, like cross-examination, are not available to the defense in the grand jury, the pretrial 
screening mechanism is not able to screen ex ante the perjury testimony.  The perjury testimony 
is more suitable to be resolved at trial because such issues are highly related to credibility, but 
not related to admissibility or competency. 
 
Because the grand jury is not adept at conducting an appropriate investigation of whether 
the testimony was falsely made, the defendant should be allowed to file a motion to dismiss an 
indictment that is grounded on such material perjury that influences the decision to indict.  The 
judicial review of the indictment on the challenge of perjury testimony should be permitted to 
one where the perjury testimony substantially affected the decision to indict and the prosecutor 
had reason to know such testimony was perjured.  Only then could we safeguard the innocent 
from being falsely accused and prevent them from entering trial. 
 
2.3. Shortcomings of Grand Jury Mechanism 
 
As put forth in previous sections, it does not take much effort to identify the 
shortcomings of the grand jury.  Major criticisms focus on the effectiveness of the screening 
function rather than the investigative function.  Many doubt the capability of grand jurors to play 
such a role in the determination of charging decisions, especially where complex crimes and 
complex legal issues are involved.  Many also doubt the independence of the grand jury from the 
control of prosecutors in the absence of the assistance of the judiciary.  It goes without saying 
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that these doubts are not groundless, as demonstrated by the famous saying in 1985 by the Chief 
Judge of New York State, Sol Wachtler, who noted that “a grand jury would indict a ham 
sandwich.”441 
 
Analysis of the grand jury defects may be divided into two categories.  One category 
consists of the procedural defects; another consists of the defect in the ability to determine the 
threshold issue.  The former part is the procedural unfairness that is embedded in the 
characteristics of the grand jury, including the inability of the target to be present during the 
grand jury session to testify, to cross examine witnesses, and to present a defense.  The latter 
refers to the fact that the legal threshold of probable cause might be indistinguishable from the 
former stage of investigation, i.e. arrest, or preliminary hearing.  These two defects need to be 
addressed and reformed to improve the current system. 
 
The most striking part of the grand jury, also the part that condemns it, is its inquisitorial-
like procedure.  As many are enchanted with the adversarial style of criminal procedure in the 
United States and elsewhere,442 it is commonly recognized that the distinguishing features of the 
adversarial system emphasize procedural rights that uphold constitutional values and afford 
adequate remedies.443  Both parties are entitled to present their version of the stories.  The 
prosecution bears the burden of proof and presents admissible evidence at trial.  The truth will 
come out after debates back and forth by opponents during the proceeding to reshape and to 
                                                
441See Washburn, supra note 263, at 2336 (noting this metaphor becomes a cliché’). 
442See William T. Pizzi, The American “Adversary System”?100 W. VA. L. REV. 847, 852 (1998) (noting that there 
is no dispute that European trial systems have been influenced by the United States legal system with regarding to 
the rights of accused at trial and rights of the suspect during the investigation).   
443See Frase, supra note 30, at 786 (noting that the role of attorney becomes more active in several European 
countries and several countries have replaced the judge-dominant trial with partial adversarial proceedings). 
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amend the charging facts presented by prosecutors.  What makes the adversarial procedure 
appealing is the balance of power between the rivalries. 
 
A conviction demands stringent procedural safeguards to guard the individuals’ rights 
and strict evidentiary rules in admitting evidence and evaluating the probative value of evidence 
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Typically, the adversarial model assures the right of 
the accused to confront witnesses, the right against self-incrimination, the presumption of 
innocence, as well as the need for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  However, no constitutional 
requirement mandates an adversarial nature in other parts of criminal procedure, such as in 
screening mechanisms, or the investigation stage.  The Supreme Court in Gerstein acknowledged 
that an adversarial procedure is not constitutionally mandated to make a probable cause to arrest 
decision, but adversarial procedure might “enhance the reliability of probable cause 
determination in some cases.”444  As far as the adversary is concerned, the grand jury screening 
mechanism maintains the traditional form of accusing body and the inquisitorial process, which 
only allows the accusing side a voice, without affording an equal status and evenhand to the 
accused.  Is it an institution out of date? 
 
The Supreme Court, especially from the Warren Court, instituted many rights of 
defendants, in order to shield suspects from overreaching and overzealous law enforcement 
during investigation.  Given the nature of preliminary hearings, it would be easy to recommend 
that a more adversarial style or at least some form of adversarial procedure should be applied to 
the grand jury.  If that is the case, the two screening mechanisms become similar and redundant.  
                                                
444Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 122 (1975). 
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Certainly, it is not desirable that multiple identical screening mechanisms are necessitated to 
double check the prosecution by an identical reviewing procedure.  This argument should not be 
taken as a support for the view that the grand jury should maintain ex parte proceeding, however; 
the grand jury mechanism should arrange for more procedural safeguards or rights to promote 
fairer procedures to the potential defendant.  Exactly as Professor Leipold has noted, “we are left 
with a situation that each additional procedural protection is desirable, but full procedural 
protection is undesirable.  What is needed is a logical stopping point for the procedural 
critique.”445  The following analyzes major defects individually.    
 
2.3.1. Inferior Status of the Target with Uncertainty of Evidentiary Rule            
 
 During the grand jury investigation, only one witness or only one target is allowed to be 
present at a time during the session, and defense counsel are never permitted in the grand jury 
room.446  Targets have no right to testify for themselves in federal cases; hence, no right to 
defend themselves, regardless of whether the benefits of testifying outweigh the cost of not 
testifying, or whether testifying makes facts clearer for the jurors.  If they do appear before the 
grand jury, the powerless target or witness, without legal expertise and legal counsel, could not 
recognize whether to answer grand jurors’ or prosecutors’ questions or not, or whether he or she 
is entitled to exercise the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.447 
 
                                                
445See Leipold, supra note 264, at 290(noting the Supreme Court has held that the grand jury does not encroach upon 
the legal rights of witnesses called before it). 
446See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976)(noting that right to counsel does not attach when 
prospective defendant was questioned in the proceeding). 
447United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 49-50 (1992). 
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Those Supreme Court rulings worsen the prospective defendant’s status in a grand jury 
hearing, in that she has no right to present favorable evidence, to challenge the admissibility of 
evidence, or even to present a defense; this circumscribes the function of the grand jury.  Given 
the rulings, the target is investigated in a more damaging inquisitorial-like environment.  All 
these obstacles expose grand jurors only to the government’s story as presented by prosecutors, 
doing away with any defense and possibly skewing the facts.  Accumulatively, these obstacles 
render the grand jury not only an unfair, but also an ineffective screening institution.448 
 
Screening should protect more than just the factually innocent, it should also preclude the 
legally innocent from undergoing the trial in an effort to reduce the social cost.  According to 
Costello-Calandra rule, a screening procedure may only single out the factual guilty to trial; but 
it should not exist exclusively for “factual guilty” screening.449  After all, a correct conviction is 
the ends of criminal justice.  A wrongful conviction is what a criminal justice system attempts to 
avoid.  If the screening procedure evaluates and selects, cautiously, defendants that more closely 
satisfy the threshold of legal guilt, the screening could prevent the occurrence of wrongful 
convictions.   
 
Following this vein of thought, the same set of evidentiary rules should be adopted at the 
pretrial phase as at trial, as a fair procedural protection in considering whether prosecution could 
support a conviction or not.  As Professor Arenella has noted “any pre-indictment evaluation of 
legal sufficiency will be complicated by the uncertain admissibility of some of the government’s 
                                                
448See Bernstein, supra note 382, at 579(noting that the collapse of indicting grand jury occurred with the 
acquiescence of the Supreme Court in Costello);see also Fairfax, Jr., supra note 6, at342-344(noting that around 
95% of cases indicted by federal grand jury). 
449Arenella, supra note 269,at 492. 
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evidence, an uncertainty that will be resolved only after indictment.”450  Thus, the reform 
proposals of the grand jury, or reform of Taiwan’s screening mechanism, must advocate moving 
in such a direction. 
 
The goal for the grand jury is to weed out cases that bear insufficient evidence to support 
a conviction, including cases that rely on inadmissible evidence, weak cases that could not 
support a conviction, or cases that might arise from political issues that result in political 
persecution which is inherently unwarranted.  Thus, the grand jury, as an intermediate switch 
between trial and investigation, should be redesigned in a way that actually distinguishes 
groundless cases from those supported by sufficient evidence.  In order to effectively screen 
cases, the better way would be to provide fair procedures that equalize the parties and affords 
prospective defendants more procedural protections, such as the right to assistance of counsel 
and the right to testify. While being cautious not to replicate the petit jury in grand jury 
screenings,451the intent is only to afford more rights to present opposite versions of the same 
event, as in the adversarial style. 
 
2.3.2. Threshold Problems  
 
Another defect of the grand jury concerns the screening (proof) threshold determination.  
Whether the prosecutor proffers sufficient evidence to prove probable cause is one thing, but 
whether the evidence has risen to a standard that convinces grand jurors of the screening 
                                                
450Id. at 480. 
451Leipold, supra note 264, at 289.   
143 
 
threshold is another.  Grand jurors are lay citizens without legal experience in weighing evidence 
to decide probable cause after prosecutors present the facts and evidence.  In reality, grand jurors 
have no idea of the quality of charges and the quantity of the evidence.  The grand jury basically 
is unable to review the case without the assistance of prosecutors.  It is predictable that jurors 
will align with what prosecutors, the only legal experts, present during the grand jury proceeding 
and conclude that probable cause exists to support a true bill.452 
 
By comparison, for petit juries, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a more succinct and 
simple judging standard because any reasonable doubt should undermine the standard and result 
in an acquittal.  If petit jurors find proof that satisfies this standard, they find the accused guilty.  
Even though the jurors have less experience in assessing evidence, weighing credibility, and 
nailing down flaws in testimony, such a task requires no special legal skill.453  The legal level of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the maximum in quantity and quality.  In any event, the petit 
juries are able to determine the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
In contrast, screening threshold or probable cause determination “is qualitatively different 
than a trial jury’s verdict, and these differences are crucial to the ability of the two panels to 
perform their respective functions.”454  Since there is no way to quantify screening thresholds, no 
one can define how much evidence is sufficient to amount necessary to surpass the screening 
threshold.  Certainly, grand jurors without legal training and experience could not decide on the 
threshold alone.  The problem lies in the uniqueness of the screening threshold, which is 
                                                
452Id. at 294. 
453Id. at 296. 
454Id.  
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different from reasonable doubt.  The notion of probable cause or a screening threshold requires 
more complex calculations, applications, perceptions, and explanations, an uneasy task for 
laypersons.  Therefore, it is doubtful that the grand jury could play such role in weighing 
screening thresholds or probable cause determinations as its sibling, the petit jury, does with 
reasonable doubt.   
 
There are several other instances where the “probable cause” standard is applied in other 
phases of criminal procedure.  One is the arrest of a suspect by police before applying for an 
arrest warrant; another is the decision by a magistrate whether to issue a search warrant; yet 
another is the preliminary hearing to review a prosecution by a magistrate.  All apply identical 
standards by professionals who handle professional decisions routinely.  One-time grand jurors 
or even several-times jurors with several months experience, rely on prosecutors in the grand 
jury room for their determinations, instead of their own evaluation or judgment.  Unlike the jury 
trial, defendants are not afforded the right to counsel and jurors cannot listen to the defense’s 
argument to counteract prosecutorial bias.  Grand jurors do not hear from an adversarial defense 
before determining the screening threshold and are not afforded an independent legal expert to 
assist them to make such determinations.  
 
2.4. Abolition of the Grand Jury 
 
Modeled as a check on prosecutorial charging discretion, the grand jury in modern days 
has not garnered the fame it did in the past.  On the one hand, skepticism repeatedly raises its 
head.  The death knell of the grand jury has never ceased to be tolled by both the abolitionists 
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and reformers.  On the other hand, voices argue that the grand jury should be maintained in its 
original form, a sentiment echoed in current Supreme Court rulings. 
 
The abolitionists are skeptical of the modern grand jury’s independence and ability to 
filter out cases to shield the innocent.455  Judge William J. Campbell suggested replacement of 
the grand jury by prosecutorial information and a full preliminary hearing before a magistrate 
judge.456  However, abolition would not be a viable plan because the elimination of felony 
prosecution by a grand jury conflicts with the mandatory requirement enshrined in the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution.  As originalism of the Constitution illustrates, the aim of the 
grand jury is to hear the voice of community, to resist the authority from the central government, 
and to protect innocents from political oppression.  As such, the grand jury clause is viewed as 
an “anti-federalist” check on federal power.457 
 
There is no conclusive evidence to prove that the current federal grand jury fails in the 
function of screening and aids in unfounded accusations.458  As two practitioners noted in their 
article, of all defendants indicted, 65.2% pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, 12.5% were 
convicted at trial, 3.5% were acquitted at trial, and 18.8% were dismissed.459  In a conservative 
estimation, prosecutors have a conviction rate of over 85%, which indicates no widespread error 
or abuse as to whom to indict by the federal prosecutor.460  Practitioners also described how 
“experienced grand jury members ask incisive questions of witnesses, make helpful suggestions 
                                                
455William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174 (1973). 
456Id.  
457Washburn, supra note 263, at 2346. 
458Sullivan & Nachman, supra note 340, at 1052. 
459Id. at 1058. 
460See id. at 1059 (The authors noted that the dismissed part covers various situations, including prosecutors dismiss 
an indictment because of insufficient evidence).  
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as to which witnesses or documents the prosecutor should subpoena and which leads the 
prosecutor should pursue.  In addition, the grand jury gives the prosecutor a preview for how the 
case will appear to a petit jury.”461  The institution represents community voices towards the 
target investigated or the issue in question in that specific case.462 
 
The last and most important question is whether the participation of the grand jury helps 
to prevent overzealous prosecutors during the secret procedure.  Citizen participation plays a 
critical role in shielding the accused from oppressive power or authority when the legitimacy of 
the law or its application is in question.  If a valid law is evil in and of itself, then mechanical 
application of general law would lead to injustice and bring about an evil result that caters to the 
needs of authority or government.  It would be too late to amend the law by the time the 
Congress abolishes it or the Supreme Court announces it unconstitutional.  Therefore, from 
Shaftesbury to Stephen Colledge to Zenger, the grand juries had vetoed prosecutions by 
returning no bills.  It showed the will of the community not to charge offenses which were 
unpopular or unjust,463regardless of whether these political dissidents committed the charged 
offenses or not.  In other words, the grand jury not only screens the sufficiency of evidence, but 
also reviews the legitimacy of laws intended to be applied and the legitimacy of the application 
of general laws in the specific case.464  Also, the Supreme Court has expressed that “the grand 
jury is not bound to indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained.”465  This expression 
is a clear indication that the grand jury operation can be representative of the political nature and 
                                                
461Id. at 1052. 
462Fairfax, Jr., supra note 6, at 352. 
463See Washburn, supra note 263, at 2346 (noting that speech of criticizing government, which Zenger was charged, 
ought not to be illegal).  
464Id. at 2346. 
465Vasquez v. Hillery, 474, U.S. 254, 263 (1986). 
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ideology of the jurors where the legitimacy of the application of law is in question in the view of 
the community.   
 
Citizens’ collective participation in the decision not to indict would enhance the 
democratic value and the legitimacy of the decision.  The peoples’ will is the bedrock of the 
legitimacy of law.  Peoples’ involvement in the criminal justice system increases the democratic 
process of the decision and supports the prosecutor when a true bill is returned in high profile, 
corruption, or cases involving political figures.  It can be used to prevent an opponent’s 
accusation of bias in the charging decision-making.  Even in ordinary cases, peoples’ 
involvement as a check on prosecutorial power enhances the system’s democratic value.  By 
contrast, a non-indicting decision by the grand jury acknowledges that the case presented was not 
considered a crime by contemporary social norms.  Supporters have consistently recognized this 
role and function since establishment of the body. 
 
Idealistically, the image of citizen participation in criminal justice is a valuable institution 
in a democratic society.  The kind of idea is not new; jury trials are a common practice in 
common law countries.  Likewise, having a grand jury to check on government power is 
identical to peer-review to assure that the judgment is not manipulated by external influence.  
Citizen participation by peers also gives rise to confidence and trust, in that the citizens’ direct 
input in the determination of the prosecution means that citizens share the responsibility that 
traditionally was attributed to government power, thus bringing the decision closer to public 
morality.466 
                                                
466Washburn, supra note 263, at 2340-2341. 
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2.5. Reform of the grand jury 
 
Other grand jury critics advocate that reform would be the most plausible way to afford 
new life to the screening mechanism.  Reformers, such as the House of Delegates of the 
American Bar Association, recommended that grand jury witnesses be afforded the right to 
counsel.467  The laypersons of the grand jury, in seeking the truth and evaluating factual guilt, are 
aided only by prosecutors without a fair counter-balancing voice in evaluating the whole story.  
It is not only the nature of the grand jury that is unable to screen out unfounded cases, but the 
procedure it operates that is inadequate for the task.  As Professor Leipold points out, “the flaw is 
structural.”468  Probably, one challenging notion with which reformers are faced is the concern of 
the Supreme Court that any reform of the grand jury procedure might not only delay the return of 
the indictment, but also redundantly repeat the trial jury’s work.  Such concerns are reasonable.   
 
The U.S. criminal process retains an accusatory process469 that encompasses adversarial 
trial procedures as well as proof beyond a reasonable doubt, elaborate pretrial evidentiary 
screening, the rigorous evidentiary standards of the trial, privilege against self-incrimination, and 
lay adjudication.470  Although the grand jury also plays an investigative and not just an 
adjudicative role, the grand jury screening function is rather more like a pre-adjudicative role.  
As the adversarial procedural model affords more procedural safeguards for the accused when 
                                                
467See Norval Morris, A Plea for Reform, Book Reviews, 87 YALE L. J. 680, 681-682 (1978) (noting the House of 
Delegates voted 186 to93 to recommend that grand jury witness be afforded that right. Prosecutors are against these 
reforms for the easiness of acquiring a return of true bill or investigating crime).       
468 Leipold, supra note 264, at 311. 
469Abraham S. Goldstein, The State and The Accused : Balance of Advantage In Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L. J. 
1149, 1150 (1960). 
470Id.; Arenella, supra note 269, at 465-466. 
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compared to that of the inquisitorial model, it is well understood that reform to the grand jury 
procedure, leaning toward the adversarial style, is preferable to one that is fashioned after the 
inquisitorial model.  Professor Leipold has noted that, “unless there is a clash of adversaries, 
grand juries composed of non-lawyers will be left to make a foregone legal conclusion, and thus 
will be a shield in name only.”471  This requires reform more oriented toward party participation 
and adversarial procedures.  The procedure that was devised to screen the prosecution should 
adopt to some extent the adversarial style and afford the accused (target) more of an even-handed 
arsenal to evaluate the prosecution.  While it would be unwise to comprehensively replicate the 
adversarial process, adoption of some adversarial procedures would provide a fair process for the 
target and effectuate the screening mechanism in an unbiased way.   
 
Besides, in the United States, where a guilty plea is often the norm, the pretrial procedure 
becomes the critical venue in adjudicating the defendant’s guilt.472  Therefore, Professor Arenella 
argued the “pretrial process should provide greater protection of the accusatorial values 
embodied in our legal guilt requirements.”473  As Professor Arenella borrowed Professor 
Packer’s terminology of “legal guilt” in describing the safeguards in whole criminal process:  
“our system’s legal guilt requirements are the most distinctive for their 
attempt to maintain a fair accusatorial process before conviction (a fair 
balance of advantage between the state and the accused) by safeguarding the 
                                                
471See Leipold, supra note 264, at 311, 313(noting “as long as the grand jury proceedings is non-adversarial and as 
long as the jurors are asked to make a legal determination based on a single set of facts, there will be no reason to 
believe that prosecutors will refrain from submitting cases because they fear a no bill”). 
472See Arenella, supra note 269, at 468- 470 (noting proving a factual guilty beyond reasonable doubt, i.e. conviction, 
requires fairness process which generates reliable outcome and requires the state to satisfy a fair process before 
reaching the outcome). 
473Id. at 473. 
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individual’s rights during the investigatory process and by requiring a reliable 
and independent adjudication of guilt before application of the criminal 
sanction.”474 
These fundamental values should be equally applied to the pretrial process and the indicting 
process, to afford the accused the ability to challenge the accusation against oneself.                    
 
Currently, the capability of the accused to present evidence is seriously dampened under 
grand jury practice.  In addition, the state is not obligated to present reliable and legally obtained 
evidence, which deteriorates the fundamental values we desire to achieve.  Justice Stevens 
observed that “the prosecutor’s duty to protect the fundamental fairness of judicial proceedings 
assumes special importance when he is presenting evidence to a grand jury.”475  As the Court of 
Appeals for the third Circuit recognized: 
But the costs of continued unchecked prosecutorial misconduct are also 
substantial. This is particularly so before the grand jury, where the prosecutor 
operates without the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary, and 
virtually immune from public scrutiny.  The prosecutor's abuse of his special 
relationship to the grand jury poses an enormous risk to defendants as well. 
For while in theory a trial provides the defendant with a full opportunity to 
contest and disprove the charges against him, in practice, the handing up of 
an indictment will often have a devastating personal and professional impact 
                                                
474See id (noting his version of legal guilt means the final result of that criminal process, which differs from the 
usage by Professor Packer who used the term to indicate procedural requirements that is not related to factual 
question of the actual person involvement in the charged offense). 
475United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 62, 63 (1992). 
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that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo.  Where the potential for 
abuse is so great, and the consequences of a mistaken indictment so serious, 
the ethical responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of the 
judiciary to protect against even the appearance of unfairness, are 
correspondingly heightened.476 
 
That being said, to effectuate the screening function, avoid delayed pretrial process, and 
the inefficiency of a repetitive trial, there are three major fields that should be reformed to cater 
to these goals.  First, adopting the evidentiary rules that are applied at trial to exclude hearsay 
evidence and illegally obtained evidence.  Second, requiring a higher screening standard to 
enhance the quality of the government’s case, and incentivize the prosecutor to offer better 
evidence so that the grand jury can evaluate the prosecution on grounds that could potentially 
support a conviction.  Third, in order to check whether the government complies with those rules 
during the grand jury process, a post indictment motion to dismiss by the accused should be 
available to challenge compliance and screen the sufficiency of the government’s case. 
 
Neither hearsay evidence nor unconstitutionally obtained evidence is admissible in the 
determination of guilt or innocence at trial.  Hearsay evidence is often unreliable, and illegally 
obtained evidence should be excluded despite its reliability to preserve other constitutional 
values.  Both hearsay evidence and illegally obtained evidence should be excluded from being 
presented to the grand jury based on the same reason, unless pursuant to specific provisions that 
                                                
476United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817(CA3 1979). 
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admit such evidence.477  Application of these evidentiary rules that are designed to ensure fairer 
decisions of legal guilt in the trial would be much more effective and reliable in the 
determination of the indictment.       
  
 Prosecutors should not present illegally obtained evidence in support of their 
indictment.  Not only does admission of such evidence undermine the integrity of justice, but 
also it could indirectly encourage unconstitutional misconduct by the police and other agencies.  
In allowing such presentation of evidence, the admission indirectly encourages such practice and 
provides a safe harbor for the prosecutor to bypass screening and move into trial.  As noted 
above, around 90% to 95% of defendants plead guilty and do not stand trial in exchange for 
advantageous sentencing.  Once indicted, if the defendant pleads to the charge, this kind of plea 
contributes to the miscarriage of justice and wrongful convictions if the relaxed screening 
mechanism plays no role in effective screening.   
  
 To avoid wrongfully convicting the innocent, proper screening aims to have such 
evidence taken away, thus providing a shield for the accused from repetitive damage, first from 
the illegal behavior by the law enforcement that obtained the evidence, and then from the use of 
the evidence to indict.  Critics have suggested that in cases where doubts of constitutionality of 
                                                
477Arenella, supra note 269, at 559, 562, 563; Given the vast amount of reports or examinations conducted before 
trial, there are some specific provisions that allow some hearsay exceptions in states, such as in New York State. See 
N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 190.30 (2) (Consol. 2013)(allowing “A report or a copy of a report made by a public  
servant  or  by  a  person  employed  by  a  public  servant  or  agency who is a physicist,  chemist, coroner or 
medical examiner,  firearms  identification  expert,  examiner  of  questioned documents, fingerprint technician, or 
an expert or technician in  some  comparable  scientific  or  professional  field, concerning  the  results of an 
examination, comparison or test performed  by him in connection with a case which is the subject of  a  grand  jury 
proceeding,  may,  when certified by such person as a report made by him or as a true copy thereof, be received in 
such grand jury proceeding  as evidence of the facts stated therein”);§ 190.30 (4)(Consol. 2013)(allowing “An  
examination  of  a  child  witness or a special witness by the district attorney videotaped pursuant to section 190.32 
of this  chapter may  be  received  in  evidence  in  such  grand  jury proceeding as the testimony of such witness”). 
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the evidence gathering arise, the indictment should not be dismissed, but a reviewing court 
should disregard the particular evidence in the determination of “sufficiency.”478  Accordingly, 
the reviewing court should only exclude the particular evidence in the evaluation of the 
sufficiency issue.  Dismissal will be issued in rare cases only when the indictment was based 
totally on such evidence.   
 
Second, the screening threshold is directly related to the effectiveness of the screening, 
and the capacity of the total caseloads that a criminal justice system bears.  The more stringent 
the standard is, the higher the possibility to gain conviction at trial, and the less wrongful 
convictions occur.  In In Re Winship,479 the Supreme Court noted that 
“the reasonable doubt standard is a prime instrument for reducing risks of 
convictions resting on factual error.  The standard provides concrete 
substance for the presumption of innocence-the bedrock axiomatic and 
elementary principle whose enforcement lies at the foundation of the 
administration of our criminal law. . . . Moreover, use of reasonable doubt is 
indispensible to command respect and confidence of the community in 
applications of the criminal law.  It is critical that moral force of the criminal 
law not be diluted by standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether 
innocent men are being condemned.  It is also important in our free society 
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his 
government cannot adjudge him guilty of criminal offense without 
                                                
478Arenella, supra note 269, at 564. 
479In Re Winship, 397, U.S. 361(1969). 
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convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty . . . . We 
explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against 
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 
As Winship states, the standard of proof should not dilute the moral force of criminal law.  If the 
grand jury intends to ascertain the potential target and shield innocent from unwarranted charges, 
the screening should raise the standard of proof to weed out cases unsupported by sufficient 
evidence and protect the legally innocent from being subjected to trial.  The rule of sufficiency of 
evidence requires that prosecutors prove their case to a higher degree than is demanded by 
probable cause.480 
 
The probable cause to arrest standard is a much lower standard for performing screening 
functions.  The probable cause to arrest or search standard in the pretrial process could not 
actually screen out legally guilty defendants.  In fact, it is mainly targeted toward the factually 
guilty person as Costello ruled.  Actually, as Professor Arenella puts it, “probable cause may 
exist despite factual innocence if the defendant lacked the requisite criminal intent or acted under 
circumstances that justified or excused the conduct.”481  In addition, it is meaningless to have 
screening standards set to such a low level in the pretrial process.   
 
                                                
480See N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 210.20 (Consol. 2013)(stating “Motion to dismiss or reduce indictment.1.  After 
arraignment upon an indictment, the superior court may, upon motion  of  the  defendant, dismiss such indictment or 
any count thereof upon the ground that:  (a)  Such indictment or count is  defective,  within  the  meaning  of section 
210.25; or(b) The evidence before the grand jury was not legally sufficient to establish the offense charged or any 
lesser included offense”). 
481Arenella, supra note 269, at 479. 
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Accordingly, one viable solution would be raising the screening standard to improve its 
function.  Some state courts have adopted the prima facie case of probable cause, which 
demands some evidence in proving each element of the offense, which if not rebutted, would be 
sufficient to support a conviction.  Where adopted, the prima facie standard could result in a 
more reliable decision and bring the prosecution closer to the degree of the legal guilt 
requirement that warrants a future conviction at trial. 
 
Third, one barrier to reforms such as these in the United States is the rule in Costello, the 
Supreme Court case that barred judicial review of indictment based on the quality of the grand 
jury evidence.482  Nonetheless, an institutional design that requires motions to dismiss an 
indictment on the basis of legal insufficiency of evidence should be required to review the 
transcripts of the grand jury to decide whether the government has presented evidence pursuant 
to the new proposed evidentiary rules and the threshold standard.   
 
Many U.S. states reject Costello, and have not had the problems that supporters of the 
Costello rule fear.  Neither before nor during the grand jury session is there a way for the 
accused to challenge inadequate submission of evidence and the insufficiency of the indictment 
issue; thus, there should be relief set up after the post indictment phase.  New York criminal 
statutes have given trial judges the power to dismiss the indictment before trial if the evidence 
presented was insufficient to support the charges.483  New York state courts have also ruled that 
                                                
482See id, at 493 (the Supreme Court not only permits the incompetent or inadmissible evidence to support an 
indictment, but also rejects judicial review of indictment on the basis of such evidence by court’s supervisory power 
in federal). 
483See N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 210.30(4)(Consol. 2013)( stating “If  the  court  determines  that  there is not 
reasonable cause to believe that the evidence before the grand jury may  have  been  legally insufficient,  it  may in 
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the reviewing standard is to inquire and consider whether the evidence viewed in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution, if uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction by petit jury.484  Post-
indictment screening allows the court to review the grand jury record and the evidence 
considered to decide whether to dismiss an indictment. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Through the analysis and comparisons of the disadvantages of these screenings, this 
dissertation sides with many other critics to suggest that a dramatic, or at the very least, a 
marginal reformation of the grand jury is an essential way to effectuate the screening function.  
Otherwise, the operation of the grand jury and its associated cost of exercise will not be paid off 
if those rudimentary structural defects are not eliminated and corrected.  Notwithstanding the 
grand jury being intended to be a buffer between the citizens and the state, given the limited 
safeguards afforded by the grand jury screening, a limited screening function is played out in its 
process.  Besides, research shows that the dismissal rates screened by preliminary hearings are 
much higher than those screened by the grand jury,485 not to mention the procedure safeguards 
with adversarial procedures, especially in states such as New York that vindicate the core values 
of criminal justice and result in a more reliable outcome of the screening mechanism.  As a 
result, the preliminary hearing is much more of a model for the reform of the screening 
                                                                                                                                                       
its discretion either (a) deny both the motion to inspect and the motion to dismiss or reduce, or (b) grant the  motion 
to  inspect  notwithstanding  and  proceed to examine the minutes and to determine the motion to dismiss or 
reduce”). People v. Bello, 705 N.E.2d 1210-1211 (N.Y. 1998). 
484Bello, 705 N.E.2d, at 1210-1211;People v. Galatro, 639 N.E.2d 8(N.Y. 1994). 
485See RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., supra note 371, at 962(noting that the dismissal rate of the grand jury appears to 
be less than one percent). 
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mechanism in Taiwan. In the following part, this dissertation will examine the contemporary 
Taiwan screening mechanism. 
 
II. Screening Mechanism in Taiwan 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, criminal charging in Taiwan adopts a mostly mandatory 
prosecution system.  This system actually emerged from distrust of prosecutorial authority in 
continental system and was created to bar the abuse of prosecutorial charging power.  The 
continental systemic ideology emphasizes the uniform and unitary order in the exercise of power 
and averts discretionary exercise of it.   
 
Theoretically speaking, prosecutors in Taiwan have no discretionary power in charging of 
felony cases.  However, when the prosecutor exercises her charging powers, she could abuse the 
charging power, even though they operate in a mandatory prosecution system.  For example, the 
prosecutor charges with insufficient evidence that does not meet the charging threshold, which is 
a violation of the mandatory requirement, yet nevertheless files the prosecution; in such a case 
there has been an abuse of the charging power.  Conceptually, this is not abuse of discretionary 
power; instead it is abusing the charging power.  Other than the type of abusing the charging 
powers, charging decisions may be erroneous decisions in judging mandatory requirements or in 
evaluating the threshold requirements.486 
 
                                                
486 Criminal law is one way of supervision of prosecution when the prosecutor intentional abuses their charging 
power.  However, criminal law is not direct supervision; rather an ex post supervision.  This supervision is not the 
procedural screening to the prosecution which directly affects the indictments’ validity. See Zhong Hua Min Gao 
Xing Fa[Criminal Code of Republic of China] art. 125 (2010)(Taiwan). 
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In 2002 and 2003, the Legislature in Taiwan separately enacted new provisions and 
revised criminal procedure to enforce the NJRC conclusions.  In order to have more party 
involvement in the process and protection of right to defense, as well as to reestablish the trust of 
citizens, reformers look to the adversarial style of the United States for insights.  One of the 
critical characteristics of the newly enacted system is to establish the role and obligation of the 
prosecutor at trial, including bearing the burden of proof by the prosecutor and ascertaining that 
the burden rests on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Additionally, the presumption of 
innocence was codified in law for the first time, as already announced many times by the 
Constitutional Court before the new legislation.  Both of these are basic principles of modern 
criminal procedure in many International Covenants and advanced countries. 
 
Because the law clarifies that the prosecutor bears the burden of proof, the judge 
discontinues the prosecutor’s investigation at trial.  The judge’s interest, role, and duty 
theoretically are no longer aligned with those of the prosecutor.  Judges play mostly a neutral 
role at trial, except in limited situations where the judges are required to conduct inquiry, as 
expressed in the conclusions of the Supreme Court’s criminal division’s meeting.487  In order to 
review prosecutors’ charging decisions and supervise the requirement of mandatory prosecution, 
Taiwan enacted screening mechanism for prosecutors’ charging decisions in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, Article 161,488which affords judges the power to prohibit cases that do not 
                                                
487See Zui Gao Fa Yuan[The Supreme Court], Zui Gao Fa Yuan Yi Bai Ling Yi Nian Du Di Er Ci Xing Shi Ting Hui 
Yi Ji Lu[The 2th the Supreme Court Criminal Divisions’Meeting Conclusion Transcript 2012](Taiwan), Jan. 17, 
2012, available at http://tps.judicial.gov.tw/faq/index.php?parent_id=589 (noting obligation of the prosecutor to bear 
the burden of proof ought to be disentangled with obligations of the judges’ fact-finding or judicial inquiry on the 
basis of the judges’ impartial role.  The judge’s inquiry therefore is circumscribed at the interest of the defendant to 
maintain a systematic interpretation). 
488Xing Shi Su Song Fa [The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 161(2013)(Taiwan) (stating that preceding to the first 
trial date, if the court finds that the method of proof indicated by the public prosecutor is obviously insufficient to 
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meet the requirement of mandatory prosecution from proceeding to trial and also to afford the 
accused another opportunity to challenge the prosecution.489  The following lay out detailed 
illustrations of the goal of the mechanism, and procedures of screening, evidentiary rule as well 
as any drawbacks of the design.          
 
1. Purpose of the Screening 
 
Under the demand of mandatory prosecution, once there is sufficient suspicion to believe 
the accused has committed the crime, the prosecutor is obligated to prosecute.  This also 
symbolizes the “obligation of the prosecutor’s proof.”490  As described, the prosecution is 
subjected to compulsory prosecution principle to restrain its charging discretion.  Theoretically 
speaking, there is no abuse of such decision as long as the prosecutor adheres to the mandatory 
requirement.  But, how could we be sure of the mandatory prosecution not being abused or 
misused?  If the prosecutor misjudges or violates the requirement of mandatory prosecution and 
charges the accused, i.e., there is no sufficient evidence to hold a suspicion to believe the accused 
has committed the crime, should the judge proceed to the trial?  If the prosecutor is negligent in 
carrying out her job, should the judge step into the role of the prosecutor at trial?  Would the 
judge lose her neutral character if she is obligated to gather evidence?  If there is no distinction 
between the obligation of evidence gathering and investigation by the prosecutor and judges’ 
official inquiry, then the judge has to officially inquire as to the truth, and replace the prosecutors’ 
                                                                                                                                                       
establish the possibility that the accused is guilty, the court shall rule the public prosecutor to supplement additional 
evidence within a specified time period; if additional evidence is not supplemented within the specified time, the 
court may dismiss the prosecution. Once the ruling to dismiss the prosecution becomes final, no prosecution can be 
reinitiated for the same case, unless specified conditions in the article 260 exist). 
489 LIN, supra note 233, at 112. 
490 LIN, supra note 3, at 164. 
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obligations.  Would this system undermine the society’s confidence and discredit the judge’s 
objective role? 
 
Considering the U.S. screening mechanisms, the goal of screening is not to decide 
whether the accused is guilty but rather to provide protections against unfounded prosecutions 
and to check whether “sufficient evidence” exists to proceed to trial.  Likewise, when the 
prosecutor submits insufficient evidence to justify a trial, the judge should supervise the 
prosecution to prevent the abusive prosecution and to check the prosecutor’s decision.  In a word, 
the first goal of a screening mechanism is to justify entering into a trial, to warrant a trial, and to 
prevent the abuse and erroneous use of prosecution.   
 
The second goal emphasizes that the prosecutor bears the burden of proof at trial.491  
Most considered that this revision resulted from fortifying the prosecutor’s burden of proof.492  
Thus, to further scrutinize prosecution by the use of a screening mechanism in order to 
strengthen the prosecutor’s burden of proof is one of the major objectives.493  Stated differently, 
a screening mechanism in Taiwan is to alter the traditional continental practice where both the 
judge and the prosecutor were used to play an active role in investigating the facts and gathering 
evidence, to one where the judge plays mostly a neutral role in evidence gathering. 
 
                                                
491Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 163 II (2013)(Taiwan). 
492 LIN, supra note 233, at 111;Kuo-Shu Peng, qi su jian du zhi du zhi yan jiu[The Research of The Prosecuting 
Supervision System In Criminal Procedure], 221(2003) (unpublished master thesis, National Taipei University (on 
file with author) (Taiwan); Guan-Ting Wu, Wo Guo Qi Su Shen Cha Zhi Du Zhi Jian Tao[Examination of Screening 
Mechanism in Taiwan], 50 XING SHI FA ZA ZHI[CRIM. L. J.] (No. 6), 42, 54-55 (2006) (Taiwan). 
493Ching-You Tsai, Xing Shi Su Song Fa Di Yi Liu Yi, Di Yi Liu San Tiao Xiu Zheng Hou Zhi Xin Si Wei, Xin Zuo 
Wei[New Concept and Exercise of the Revised Code of Criminal Procedure Article 161 and 163], 1067 SI Fa ZHOU 
KAN[JUDICIAL WEEKLY](Taiwan), 2-3 (2002). 
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This goal is misguided because the screening mechanism has nothing to do with the 
“burden of proof” of prosecutors.  Taiwan’s legislative intent seems to mistake the two as one. 
Critics noted that the revision rationale to ascertain and to strengthen the “burden of proof” is not 
justified to institute this screening mechanism.494  After all, the screening process is not meant to 
review whether the prosecutor’s proof justifies a conviction, but to ban abusive prosecutions or 
unfounded prosecutions at the pretrial stage.  The legislative rationale seems to blend the two 
separate notions into one idea and insert the burden of proof into the wrong phase of the criminal 
procedure.   
 
The third goal is to protect the innocent.  If the prosecutor fails to convince the courts that 
the evidence is sufficient to prove the accused committed the crime, the prosecutor should 
dismiss the case.  If she charges the accused anyway, it can result in many discriminatory and 
devastating effects to the accused.  The accused might suffer losses and costs of all sorts.  There 
should be a procedural phase installed between the investigation and the trial to check whether 
the prosecutor has provided sufficient evidence to justify advancing to trial.  Otherwise, the 
accused shall be protected from harassment by the prosecution and shall not be subjected to trial.  
Thus, the goal of protecting the innocent is actually the most critical one of all because wrongful 
prosecutions contribute to wrongful convictions and wrongful imprisonments.   
 
The last goal is also based on the idea of preserving limited resources.  The criminal 
procedure can be a long and complex process that involves limited resources and personnel that 
could be deployed elsewhere.  From investigation to conviction and enforcement, the prosecution 
                                                
494HWANG, supra note 224, at 373. 
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initiates the process to trial, and thus brings about all the associated costs.  When the government 
prosecutes meticulously, the trial court may convict the guilty.   
 
2. Ex-Post Screening   
 
Unlike the mechanisms in the United States and France, Taiwan’s screening mechanism 
occurs after the prosecution has been initiated.  In the United States and France, the screening 
mechanisms or supervising mechanisms are installed as a safety valve between investigation and 
trial.  In the United States, prosecution undergoes different layers of screening right before 
initiation of the charge.   
 
Increasing the difficulty of obtaining an indictment would enhance the quality of 
prosecution and reduce the number of prosecutions because the prosecutor would have to present 
the best evidence and better-prepared cases that could withstand multiple layers of examinations.  
It takes effort to convince external screening institutions that there is sufficient evidence to 
justify the charge, and the prosecutor has every incentive to present her best evidence to persuade 
the screener.  Additionally, an indictment would be more warranted under many layers of 
supervision, albeit at the cost of time-consuming procedures.  Accordingly, critics have claimed 
that the mechanism is supposed to occur before the prosecution begins in order to supervise and 
prevent erroneous charging decisions.495  Altering the screening stage might incentivize the 
prosecutor to strengthen and better prepare her case in order to obtain an indictment.      
 
                                                
495JAW-PERNG WANG, XING SHI SU SONG JIANG YI(ER)[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II], 95 (2003). 
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Currently, based on the Taiwan Code of Criminal Procedure Article 161, the screening 
point is established “prior to the first trial date.”  This means that the prosecutor has instituted an 
indictment before the screening takes place.  As stated in chapter 2, with regard to the 
prosecutorial bureaucratic structure, an indictment is internally reviewed by her superiors, i.e., 
head prosecutor and chief prosecutor, before filing with the court.  Formally, the superiors look 
over prosecutorial decisionmaking and give administrative directive over the case if they 
disagree with the decisions or demand more investigation, but the superiors too are subject to the 
constraints of mandatory prosecution and their directives cannot run contrary to those constraints.  
But in reality, how careful a hierarchical supervision is or whether it has been conducted is really 
an empirical issue that has not been researched.  The extent to which an internal screening takes 
place depends on many variables that may not be found in books.  Even assuming they do 
supervise correctly, the prerequisite of forming an indictment in Taiwan is that only one internal 
administrative screening has to be set before prosecution.   
 
The superiors review the dossier prepared by the prosecutor in order to decide whether 
the charging decision is grounded in facts and evidence and to carry out the will of the chief 
prosecutor if she has specific directives.  Once approved, the case is closed and transferred to the 
court without any additional external screening.  After the prosecutor indicts the accused, the 
case goes public, which could bring about many discriminatory and disadvantageous effects to 
the accused. 
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To be sure, the system is better off with the screening device than without it, because it 
could indirectly deter the abuse of prosecutorial power under current law.496  However, the 
screening mechanisms in countries like the United States and judicial supervision in France are 
set to review prosecution before it is made to the court to directly achieve the screening goals.  
By contrast, Taiwan’s design is set at the phase that could not perform the screening function 
before the case has made it to court.  Hence, when the judge dismisses a case before the trial, 
much of potential harms and devastating effects caused by the indictment are realized and 
irreversible.497  Comparatively, the mechanisms of the United States and France function directly 
in achieving the goal of protecting the innocent, or reviewing the case to avoid an abuse of 
charging power, as well as erroneous prosecutorial judgments.  Pre-indictment screening also 
sounds a notion of deterrence to the prosecutor to better prepare her prosecution.   
 
In addition, the screening procedure is readily mixed with the pretrial proceeding, i.e., 
preparation of trial, if set “prior to the first trial date.”498  “The preparation of trial” is a pretrial 
session (conference) that arranges and coordinates the trial affairs, including inquiring whether 
                                                
496Id. 
497There are a few cases that defendants committed suicides after being indicted, which caused irreversible regret.  
There is even suspect to commit suicide while being investigated due to all kinds of reason, one of which is being 
investigated and revealed by the media.  The wrongful charge itself does bring irreparable harm to the defendant. 
See e. g., Bai Wen Zheng Shen Wang Bei Xin Zui Shi Dao Huo Xian? Zi Sha Biao Qing Bai?[Wen-Cheng Bai 
Passed Away, The Offense of Breach of Trust Is theFuse? Committing of Suicide to Demonstrate Innocence?], Jin 
Ri Xing Wen Wang[Nownews](Taiwan), July. 4, 2008  http://www.nownews.com/2008/07/04/10844-2299386.htm, 
(last visit Jun. 22, 2012) (noting that Yuanta Securities ex-president Bai Wen Zheng committed suicide while being 
investigated with the suspected transaction of selling his stock shares in a high price to the Yuanta Securities 
involving with the offense of breach of trust).      
498Xing Shi Su Song Fa [The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 273(2013)(Taiwan)(providing that the preliminary 
preparation proceeding before the first trial date to arrange the following matters: 
1.The prosecution and its scope and any circumstance that might change the offense charged with as cited by the 
public prosecutor;2.Whether the accused pleads guilty to the crime charged and determines whether to apply 
summary trial procedure or summary procedure;3.Mainissues of the case and evidence;4.Opinions regarding the 
admissibility of the evidence;5.Informing the parties to motion for investigation of evidence;6.The scope, order and 
methods of investigation of evidence;7.The presentation of exhibits or evidential documents;8.Other trial related 
matters). 
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the defendant pleads guilty, if not, her defense, the opinion on the admissibility of evidence, the 
presentation of witness lists to be called at trial, exhibit lists, the investigation of admissibility of 
defendants’ confessions, and other main issues regarding admissibility of the evidence. 
 
As a result, the screening procedure might be mixed with the pretrial proceeding.  It is 
unknown whether the judge makes good use of the screening procedure in order to protect the 
innocent and weed out unfounded cases.  As described in the U.S. preliminary hearing or the 
grand jury, independent screening procedure is a distinctive procedure unless it is waived.  
Independent phase also mandates the judge to play the screening function effectively.  Since the 
goals of the screening procedure and pretrial proceeding are distinguished from each other, the 
screening ought to be carried out before the preparation proceeding in order to avoid 
unwarranted or abusive prosecution.  If the case has proceeded to the pretrial proceeding, it is not 
appropriate to dismiss the case.499 
 
3. Screener 
 
As noted, before prosecution, the prosecutors’ decisions to charge are under no external 
check or supervision, only internal superiors’ review within the prosecutors’ office.  Although 
internal hierarchical supervision may screen the decision, the extent and the effect of it is 
invisible to the public and, therefore, cannot win the public confidence.  As Professor Jaw-Perng 
Wang has noted, the public has distrusted prosecutorial internal supervision in the past, even if 
                                                
499LIN, supra note 233, at 112. 
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the internal screening was held to high standard.500  It is, therefore, concluded that to gain an 
indictment before trial in Taiwan is not difficult.  To impose external supervision is a much more 
convincing method of supervision and screening, from the public’s perspective.  
 
The screening is conducted by a three-judge panel who try the case in the subsequent trial.  
Neither the independent screening procedure nor the independent judge is set and exercised 
before prosecution.  Therefore, the trial judge who tries the case is authorized to review the 
dossier (the case file and the evidence).  Stated differently, no independent screening procedure 
and no additional panel of judges is set up for performing the screening function.  Unlike Taiwan, 
both the United States and France position different judges, like magistrates in the United States, 
or investigating judges in France, to perform screening mechanisms or add another layer of 
neutral investigation.  The grand jury screeners, composed of lay citizens, perform such a 
function democratically.  Normatively, the screening performed by a third party or a different 
institution in an unbiased view bears much confidence, like those reviewed by the magistrate.  
Hence, the design in Taiwan that does not separate the trial judge from the screening judge might 
draw some doubts. As to the transplant of the grand jury as a screener institution, it is a bigger 
legal construction that could be achieved especially when the citizens lack the confidence of the 
judgment of the judiciary and strongly demand civic participation in the decisionmaking as well 
as inserting the democratic element into the charging.  Since some doubts have been raised with 
regard to the grand jury independence and effectiveness, this dissertation does not advocate to 
transplanting the grand jury institution to Taiwan.    
 
                                                
500WANG, supra note 495, at 91 (noting that internal control is readily criticized that it is exercised under the black 
box even if the internal control holds high standard). 
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A second question is whether the trial judge who tries the case is also suitable to review 
the dossier, to decide whether to dismiss the case, and to try the merits of the case.  Some 
professors claim that installation of the screening judge is a necessity, in that the maintenance of 
the impartial role of a trial judge is doubtful when she had found that the charge is warranted and 
prior to trial.501  Stated differently, the trial panel might be predisposed to convict the defendant 
simply because the case is justified by the screening.  Therefore, some think to separate a group 
of judges as reviewers maintains the unbiased role.  One Taiwan district court judge has argued 
that the best means is to separate the screening judge and trial judge in case handling to maintain 
the unbiased role, but from a practical perspective, it could be considered that having trial judges 
taking turns to play screening judges might be a solution when facing the contemporary problem 
of a shortage of judges.502 
 
4. Screening Procedure 
 
The screening procedure adopts dossier review without any independent and public 
procedures.  According to the Code of Criminal Procedure article 161, if the court considers that 
“the method of proof indicated by the public prosecutor is obviously insufficient to establish the 
possibility that the accused is guilty,” the court shall require the prosecutor to present additional 
evidence to reach the “obvious sufficient” threshold within a specified time period.  If additional 
evidence is not presented within that period, the court may dismiss the prosecution by a ruling.   
 
                                                
501Yu-Xiong Lin, Lun Zhong Jian Cheng Xu-De Guo Qi Su Shen Cha Zhi De Mu Di, Yun Zuo Ji Li Fa Lun [The 
intermediate stage procedure: the Goal, Exercise and Legislative Perspective of Screening Mechanism in German], 
88 TAIWAN BEN TU FA XUE[The TAIWAN L. REV.], 69(2002). 
502See Wu, supra note 492, at62-63. 
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The operating procedure is that the panel merely reviews the dossier to evaluate evidence 
sufficiency.  As mentioned, current screening procedure is not an independent procedure; rather, 
it is a procedure affixed to the pretrial preparation.  It, therefore, has two distinctive 
characteristics.  One being that it does not afford the accused the right to participate.  The other is 
that the accused have no legal rights to a screening.  Hence, the accused are not entitled to 
challenge the indictment and to express their arguments with regard to the requirement of 
mandatory prosecution, evidence, and law application.  The following analyzes the two parts. 
 
First, from a comparative perspective, in the United States, the preliminary hearing 
accords the accused the right to call witnesses and question the witnesses until probable cause is 
found.  Both parties could perpetuate the testimony and prevent the unavailability of or 
tampering with the witnesses before the trial.  It could be deemed that the accused has a right to 
have the case screened.  Even if the defendant is denied preliminary hearing, because the 
prosecutor takes the case directly to the grand jury, the case is still screened.  Of course, in that 
case, it is done by lay jurors in secret rather than by a judge in a public proceeding.  The 
defendant has the right to, at least, grand jury review (unless waived), and therefore it can be said 
that there is a right to have the case screened.  As the analysis goes, given there is no 
independent screening procedure in Taiwan, there is no idea whether the judge does in fact wield 
her screening power to weed out unfounded charges.  Because the law affords no legal right for 
the accused to a judicial screening, the accused could not request the screening and challenge the 
indictment; instead passively waiting for the judiciary screening.  As a consequence, there is no 
way for the accused to know whether her charge was warranted, and there is no means to check 
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whether the judiciary has exercised its authority.  Critics have advocated the legal right to apply 
for screening by the accused.503 
 
Second, according to the Taiwan criminal procedure, the prosecutor has to indicate 
“method of proof,” i.e. different types of evidence to prove the elements of crime, in the 
indictment so that the judge can review whether the prosecutor has presented “sufficient 
evidence” to demonstrate the charging evidentiary basis.  Nonetheless, this is not an indication 
that the screening court proceeds by a public proceeding, but only an indication of the 
prosecutor’s burden to point out the proof in the indictment in order to satisfy the reviewing 
threshold.  Hence, the screening is without the participation of the accused. 
 
Comparatively, in the United States, preliminary hearing allows more input from the 
accused.  The accused can present the witnesses and crossexamine the prosecutor’s witnesses.  In 
France, as addressed in the next section, the defense is allowed to present her witnesses, have the 
investigating judge conduct specific investigations, and have more input during the instruction 
process.  In Taiwan, the accused is not entitled to take part in the screening or to challenge the 
indictment.  Moreover, there is no adversarial proceeding in the screening that allows the 
accused to challenge the indictment.  It is unknown whether the judge exercised the given 
authority because no check or independent hearing was set for the accused to express their 
challenges for indictment.  That Taiwan could reform the screening procedure to allow more 
participation by the accused in bringing challenges to the indictment is an intuitively viable 
blueprint in making the screening function effective.                   
                                                
503See id. at 61. 
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Third, when the court considers that the method of proof is obviously insufficient to 
establish the possibility that the accused is guilty, the court shall rule that the prosecutor must 
present additional evidence, i.e., to supplement additional evidence, to reach the “obvious 
sufficient” threshold.  A ruling to demand additional evidence is essential before the court 
dismisses a case for insufficiency of evidence.  Only when the prosecutor fails to comply with 
the court’s order could the court dismiss the prosecution’s case.  The order to present additional 
evidence is not allowed by interlocutory appeal.504  A dismissal ruling may be appealed 
according to the Code of Criminal Procedure article 161 section (5).  According to the legislative 
judicial committee hearing, some deemed that such ruling refers to the norm of prosecutorial 
authority to order the police officials to supplement additional evidence or continue their 
investigation.505  Likewise, the ruling to demand the police officials to present additional 
evidence is considered applicable to judiciary power to issue ruling to the prosecutor as well.506 
 
Critics have expressed that it is not appropriate for the trial court to rule what evidence 
should be supplied for the element of crime and what types of evidence are lacking. The 
screening mechanism aims to check whether the prosecution has abused or violated the 
requirement of mandatory prosecution.  Regardless of whether a court is situatedin an adversarial 
system or continental system country, it should play an impartial role in screening whether the 
                                                
504See Peng, supra note 492, at 299. 
505See generally Li Fa Yuan Di Si Jie Di Liu Qi Si Fa Wei Yuan Hui Xin Shi Su Song Fa Di Yi Bai Liu Shi Yi Tiao 
Ji Di Yi Bai Liu Shi San Tiao Xiu Zheng An Zeng Qiang Dang Shi Ren Jing Xing Zhu Yi Ji Cai Xing Xin Zheng 
Gong Kai Zhi Du Zhi Ke Xing Xing Gong Ting Hui Wei Yuan Hui Ji Lu[Legis. Yuan, 4th Term, 6th Sess., Judicial 
Comm. Public Hearing Minutes], 90Li Fa Yuan Gong Bao[LEGIS. YUAN GAZ.] (No. 56) (Taiwan), 169-170 (2001) 
(statement from Professor Tsai Tun-Ming of National Taiwan University expressed the analogical thought of the 
supplement rule from the prosecutor and police work relationship). 
506Id.   
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prosecution has abused its authority and whether sufficient evidence justifies opening the 
gateway to trial.  Since it is clear that the judge shall maintain an unbiased role in reviewing the 
prosecution’s case and shall firmly hold the presumption of innocence; the judge shall not direct 
the prosecutor toward the “insufficiency” part of the evidence.507  Furthermore, the judge shall 
not entangle herself with one party of the case nor indicate to the prosecutor which part of 
evidence in the dossier is insufficient.  This would result in the self-conflicting role of the judge 
and breach the checks and balances relationship between the judiciary and the prosecutor.  
Critics have mentioned that, from the outsider’s perspective, the judge and the prosecutor are 
allied in combating the crime.508 
 
To be sure, the judge is not superior to the prosecutor to make such an order to present 
additional evidence.509  This law creates the illusion that the prosecutor is subordinate to the 
judge. The image of the two siding with each other to combat the crime also seems inappropriate 
for the role of judiciary the law affords.  Professor Jau-Yih Hwang noted that to require the 
prosecutor to supplement additional evidence destroys the relationship between the judge and the 
prosecutor because the judge guides the prosecutor to present specific evidence and becomes 
hierarchically superior to the prosecutor.510 
 
 
 
                                                
507See id. (statement by Professor Ke Yaw-Cheng of National Chung-Cheng University expressed that the revision 
violates the principle of presumption of innocence, and asks the judge to prejudge the case in violation of the 
protection of human right).     
508LIN, supra note 233, at 115;Wu, supra note 492, at66-67. 
509LIN, supra note 233, at 115. 
510HWANG, supra note 224, at375. 
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5. Evidentiary Rules 
 
Evidentiary rules assist the criminal justice system in ferreting out the truth and set limits 
on what information an adjudicator can evaluate.  The goal of evidentiary rules is to ensure 
accurate results because of mistrust of juries to search for the right facts.511  According to the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, article 159, section II,512 hearsay evidence is admissible in the 
screening procedure.  Currently, the prevailing academia agrees that stringent evidentiary rules 
should not apply at the screening stage.  The law keeps silent with regard to whether 
exclusionary rule of the illegally obtained evidence applies to the screening procedure as well.  
Professor Jaw-Perng Wang claims that trial evidentiary rules should not apply to the screening 
stage on the basis of the following reasons: (1) the different goals at the trial and screening 
stages; the trial is to decide whether a defendant is guilty, and, by contrast, the screening 
procedure is to decide whether the prosecution has adhered to the standards of mandatory 
prosecution.  Therefore, screening process should not replicate trial.513(2) avoidance of unfair 
outcome—exclusion of all out of court statements is unfair to the prosecution and to 
society.514(3) the goals of the screening mechanism and exclusionary rule are different, in that 
the latter deters police misconduct, while the former is screening.  Therefore, the exclusion of 
                                                
511 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER& LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER THE RULES TEXT, CASES, AND 
PROBLEMS, 2 (2008). 
512 Xing Shi Su Song Fa [The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 159(2013)(Taiwan)( (states “Unless otherwise 
provided by law, oral or written statements made out of trial by a person other than the accused, shall not be 
admitted as evidence.  The provision of the preceding section shall not apply to the circumstances specified in 
section II of Article 161, nor to the case in a summary trial proceeding or where sentencing is ordered by a summary 
judgment; the same rule shall apply to the review of the application for detention, search, detention for expert 
examination, permission for expert examination, perpetuation of evidence and other compulsive measures.”). 
513 WANG, supra note 495, at110. 
514Id. at111. 
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evidence in the screening phase is inconsistent with the goal of this process.515Since the law is 
silent to the evidentiary rules, it is unclear whether in practice the exclusionary rule applies to the 
screening process. 
 
Comparatively, in the United States, the rules of evidence do not apply at the screening 
proceeding in federal jurisdictions and some state jurisdictions because it poses a great 
administrative burden and cost to administration of the criminal justice.  But, in some state 
jurisdictions, rules of evidence apply at their screening hearings.  This is actually a criminal 
justice policy choice concerning how much a system desires the screening function to achieve, 
and how much screening we want to institute in order to do away with unfounded cases.  If 
evidence that shall be excluded at trial is admissible while screening, then unfounded 
prosecutions can result in entering into trials, thus leading to the very thing the screening is 
trying to avoid.  It also depends on the purpose of the screening.  Adoption of stringent 
evidentiary rules that are identical to trial and are meant to screen prosecution in order to reach a 
more correct outcome and bring the prosecution closer to the conviction is probably the better 
way to protect the innocent.   
 
6. Threshold of the Prosecution and Threshold of Screening 
 
The threshold question for the prosecution is to determine whether a case should be 
brought into trial.  In Taiwan, sufficient evidence of suspicion that a suspect committed the 
offense in question triggers the prosecution.  For example, the accused was found leaving the 
                                                
515Id. 
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victim’s residence with blood stains on his clothing and his leaving was caught on video camera, 
while one neighbor heard loud quarrelling inside the house before the accused rushed to leave.  
Then the prosecutor may collect the above evidence, including the video, clothing with blood 
stains on them, and witness testimony of the neighbor.  Therefore, in this case, there is sufficient 
evidence to suspect that the accused committed the crime, and the prosecutor could prosecute the 
defendant for the crime of murder.   
 
What if the accused just went by the victim’s house to pay a short visit and found his 
friend dead, the accused turned out to be shocked and then ran away?  The accused tumbled over 
the body and got blood on his shirt, and the actual murderer had worn gloves to commit the 
murder, had just left before the friend came into the house, and had disposed of the murder 
weapon.  Supposedly, the police had found the blood stained clothing, the video tape, and the 
witness testimony, could the prosecutor charge the friend?  Should finding the murder weapon or 
a fingerprint on the murder weapon be necessary before prosecution?          
 
There are different arguments with regard to the high or low threshold of prosecution.  
Professor Wang has noted that the charging threshold is obtained evidence that is sufficient to 
consider that the accused is suspected to have committed the offense.516  In one empirical 
analysis he interviewed 11 judges, 6 prosecutors, and 21 defense attorneys, with the exception of 
6 interviewees, who considered that the quantification of the threshold is not possible, all other 
interviewees considered that the threshold is set where more than a 50% certainty the accused is 
                                                
516 Wang, supra note 495, at102. 
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guilty is needed.517  But there were interviewees who held that the threshold should be 100% 
certainty.518  Professor Lin explained, from the German law perspective, that the threshold to 
prosecute indicates sufficient suspicion that evidence obtained through investigation is very 
likely to convict the accused (Hinreichender Verdacht) and suggests that as a threshold for 
Taiwan.519  Hence, the threshold of charging is a grey area that is at the discretion of different 
prosecutors.  Currently, neither laws nor court precedents require prosecutors to prove a high 
degree of suspicion of commission of the offense.   
 
Aside from the charging threshold, the screening threshold articulates a different standard 
of proof indicated by the public prosecutor is “obviously insufficient” to establish the possibility 
that the accused is guilty.  The context obviously differs from the prosecution threshold in that 
the screening threshold is the “obviously insufficient possibility” to acknowledge that the 
accused is guilty.520  Professor Wang Jaw-Perng considered that this threshold is identical to 
prima facie of preliminary hearing in the United States.521  On top of that, he also noted that 
prima facie threshold is more predictable in context than “obviously insufficient” standard to 
establish the possibility that the accused is guilty.522 
 
The Judicial Yuan issued the guideline for the Code of Criminal Procedure Article 95 and 
                                                
517See Jaw-perng Wang & Chung-JauWu, Banqiao Di Fang Fa Yuan Shi Yan Dang Shi Ren Jin Xing Zhu Yi Zhi Shi 
Zheng Yan Jiu[Empirical Study of the Banqiao District Court’s Experimental Use of an Adversarial System], 30, 
GUO LI TAIWAN DA XUE FA XUE LUN YI[ NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. J.] 57, 78-79 (2001) ; WANG, supra note 495, at90-
91. 
518WANG, supra note 495, at102. 
519LIN, supra note 233, at 21; see also LIN, supra note 3, at 162-164 (noting from German’ perspective in the 
German Code of Criminal Procedure, article 170). 
520Wang, supra note 495, at102. 
521Id. at103. 
522Id. at104. 
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adopted an objective standard that the judge, by the objective, experienced, and logical rule, 
evaluate whether the evidence is obviously sufficient to establish possible guilt.523  This 
guideline is vague and uncertain.  Different cases, screened by different judges, can result in 
different fates.  Suppose, for example, the government prosecuted a sexual offense case on the 
basis of the victim’s testimony, pictures of the wounds, and the medical report regarding the 
wounds.  A district court dismisses the charge.524  It is unclear whether such prosecution would 
be obviously insufficient to establish the possibility that the accused is guilty in the views of 
different judges.  Certainly, a judge cannot draw any meaningful conclusions from the 
guidelines. 
 
In another example, the prosecutor prosecuted a defendant for taking drugs and presented 
evidence of confession without the defendant’s urine report.  Usually the judge will dismiss the 
charge since there is no corroborating evidence to prove the defendant was taking drugs outside 
of the confession.  Under this example, it is clear such prosecution is obviously insufficient to 
establish the possibility that the accused is guilty of taking drugs.  This conclusion, however, 
cannot be inferred from the guidelines. 
 
As noted before, the screening standard is directly related to the effectiveness of the 
screening and the kind of evidence the screener could appraise, which is also related to 
evidentiary rule application.  The threshold level that a system intends to adopt also depends on 
the goal the screening mechanism desires to achieve.  A higher screening threshold brings more 
                                                
523Fa Yuan Ban Li Xing Shi Su Song Ying Xing Zhu Yi Shi Xiang Di Jiu Shi Wu Dian [Guidelines to the Criminal 
Court in Handling Criminal Procedure], art 95 (Taiwan). 
524See Ping Dong Di Fang Fa Yuan [Ping Dong Dist. Ct.], Criminal Division,91Su Zi Di [No.] 251(2002) (Taiwan). 
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confidence that the system is weeding out both factually and legally innocent cases and ensures 
that a prosecution is more likely to warrant a conviction.  Thus, this dissertation, in next chapter, 
will reexamine the different thresholds between the prosecution and the screening and the 
disadvantages they may bring, and then it proposes a new screening threshold that might be more 
efficacious.   
 
There are two additional defects that are not addressed in current norm and have only 
been mentioned here.  One is the right to defense counsel in screening mechanism; the other is 
that the discovery rule could become a legal loophole in Taiwan law if the screening mechanism 
is reformed, because the current norm of discovery adopts full discovery once the prosecution 
has been presented to the court.  However, the legal loophole is required to be solved and 
adjusted accordingly once the law is reformed so that the screening procedure is an independent 
procedure and adopts an adversarial process.  These relevant issues together with the necessary 
reforms are all addressed in next chapter. 
 
III. Judicial Supervision of the Mechanism in France 
 
1. Nature and Purpose of the Instruction 
 
In the purely inquisitorial system, it is the state, rather than the adversary, that bears the 
responsibility of finding out the truth of the crime.  The judge is charged with that responsibility, 
together with some variations that reallocate the authority to the prosecutor or share the authority 
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with the prosecutor.525  An inquisitorial system considers the judicial control of the investigation 
to be the key to overall judicial supervision.526  The investigation and prosecution are to be made 
by the judges or reviewed by them.527  Under such ideology, the French system adopts judicial 
control of the pretrial investigation in the case of serious crimes, while Germany entirely 
abolished the pretrial investigating judge notion in 1975.528 
 
In France, the judicial function embraces a broader sense than that defined in common 
law countries.  The judiciary concept encompasses the investigative judiciary and adjudicative 
judiciary, also termed standing judiciary (parquet) and sitting judiciary (the juge d’instruction 
and the trial judge).529  As mentioned previously, the investigating judge, is authorized to 
undertake any lawful investigation, yet is not subjected to any kind of hierarchical control as is a 
prosecutor.  The opening of the judicial investigation, which is mandatory in the most serious 
offenses, i.e. crimes that carry imprisonment for five years or more; named information or 
instruction, occurs when the investigation is passed to the investigating judge.530  To initiate the 
procedure is not up to the investigating judge, but is up to the prosecutor to refer the cases for 
investigation.531  This features the uniqueness that investigations of the most serious offenses 
have to be conducted by a judge, not by the prosecutor.      
 
                                                
525Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 242.   
526Id.at 247. 
527Id. 
528Id. at 247-248;Richard S. Frase & Thomas Weigend, German Criminal Procedure as a Guide to American Law 
Reform: Similar Problems, Better Solutions?, 18 B. C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 317(1995).  
529HODGSON, supra note 67, at 67; Hodgson, supra note 239, at 1367. 
530HODGSON, supra note 67, at 209. See also Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 250 (noting that this procedure 
represents a small proportion of criminal cases.  For delit, offenses imprisoned from two months to five years, are 
tried in the Correctional court, the prosecutor has discretion to open a judicial examination).   
531HODGSON, supra note 67, at 210. 
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In terms of the judiciary, the investigating judge is independent of the hierarchical control 
from the Ministry of Justice.  The judge looks into the case to verify the evidence, confessions, 
and witness statements contained in the dossier, to check whether the accusation is clear, and 
many other issues with regard to evidence and procedure that have already been challenged and 
verified by her at the close of the instruction.532  The nature of the instruction is to review the 
prosecutor’s dossier as well as to conduct a wider investigation.  The nature of judicial 
examination generally represents judicial authorization of investigation beforehand.533  In short, 
it entertains the screening function to review the prosecutor’s case and may proceed to a wider 
and broader investigation to warrant a trial.   
 
French criminal procedure is historically characterized as an inquisitorial model, which 
centers on pretrial investigation in attaining the confessions and witness statements, and it 
formalizes the trial only by confirming the findings of the pretrial investigation.534  Therefore, 
during the instruction, the emphasis is imposed on “obtaining and evaluating all the relevant 
information during the pretrial, rather than the trial phase.”535  Ideally, the investigating judge is 
neutral, which justifies her dual investigative and judicial functions. Her position as a juge du 
siege (sitting judge) and her belief in her exercise of authority to define the public interest forms 
                                                
532Id, at 222. 
533Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 250.   
534 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 222. 
535See id. (noting one of the investigating judge said that: 
 “It is done in the public…what you need to understand by de’charge is that it is about 
checking aspects of the case that are favorable to the MEE.  Yes, we do that…That is what 
the lawyer does in England.  He tries to demonstrate to the court the aspects of the case that 
are favorable to the individual.  We are judges in an office.  It is in this way that we truly 
function as judges, because even in preparing the dossier, there is this idea of balance.  We 
try to include in our investigation that which is favorable and that which is 
unfavorable….What is important is that this should be done by a judge”). 
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her image.536  However, since the investigating judge and the prosecutor are both part of the 
judiciary, trained together, and even shaped by the identical ideology from the training institution 
as described above, the question arises whether the investigating judge can be a neutral evaluator 
or can just work with the police and prosecutor to fulfill their investigating goals?                
 
Actually, the role and function that the investigating judge plays has encountered lots of 
criticism which is addressed after we examine the full process of the felony judicial investigation.   
 
2. Instruction Procedure 
 
The French instruction procedure has been reformed, in 1993 and 2000 legislation, to 
enhance defense inputs to the investigation, to improve the imbalanced nature, and to nudge the 
investigating judge to listen to the voices of both sides.  As Professor Hodgson describes, French 
criminal procedure has acquired some adversarial features, and he has emphasized that all parties 
are afforded an equal right to participate in the criminal process, which also brings the due 
process aspects in line with the European Convention of Human Rights.537  The path the reform 
took put a heavy emphasis on enlarging the participation of the defense and affording the defense 
the opportunity to take the initiative in the criminal process that is in line with the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 538   European Convention of Human Rights article 6 (3) 
enumerates the minimum guarantees for anyone charged with a criminal offense to be entitled to 
                                                
536Id. at 223. 
537See HODGSON, supra note 67, at 42-44 (noting the reform adopted the idea of human rights, instead of the 
recommendation of adversary ideology); Stewart Field & Andrew West, A Tale of Two Reforms: French Defense 
Rights and Police Powers in Transition, 6 CRIM. L.F. 473, 480-481(1995).  
538Field & West, id. 
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protection.539  The protections apply to pretrial procedures because the failure to abide by the 
provisions of paragraph 3 may endanger the fairness of the trial.540 
 
In France, an investigation is normally commenced by the police under the supervision of 
the prosecutor.  However, in the cases involving serious crimes, the police must report to and 
prepare the dossier for the prosecutor, who then refers the case to a judge for judicial 
examination.541  But, it is the prosecutor who holds the authority to determine whether to initiate 
an instruction process.542  The prosecutor may not initiate a judicial examination because she 
ignores the aggravating factors and deems the offense to be of a lesser degree d’elit 
(misdemeanor); such prosecutorial decision is not without constraint.543  There are practical 
limitations restricting the decision making.  As Professor Goldstein and Marcus analyzed: 
If a defendant wishes to risk a higher sentence in the Court of Assize, because 
the acquittal rate there is higher or because there are more pretrial screens 
from which he may emerge uncharged, he may keep the Correctional Court 
from taking the case.  If the victim seeks a greater penalty than the 
Correctional Court can impose, he may press his own criminal complaint, 
                                                
539European Convention of Human Right (ECHR) art. 6 (3) (“Everyone charged with a criminal offense has the 
following minimum rights : a. to be informed promptly, in a language which has understands and in detail, of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him; b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defense; c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient 
means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; d. to examine or have 
examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witness on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him; e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or 
speak the language used in court”). 
540Marc Viering, “Right to a fair and public hearing” in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, 631-632 (Pieter Van Dijk, Fried Van Hoof, Arjen Van Rijn & Leo Zwaaked, 4ed., 2006).    
541Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 247.   
542 CODE DE PROCE’DURE PE’NALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 80 (stating the investigating judge can investigate the cases 
referred by the prosecutor). 
543See Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, at 251 (noting the procedure named as correctionalization). 
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thereby enforcing examination before a juge.  And the Correctional Court 
may itself decide that it would be inappropriate to try the case as d’elit 
because of the aggravating circumstances that the prosecutor has chosen to 
ignore provided, of course, that police and prosecutor have not omitted such 
circumstances from the dossier.  But the most important limits on the 
prosecutor’s discretion are those imposed by the nature of a particular case.  
Some crimes are not “correctionalized” because they are complicated or 
serious or controversial.  In some instances, judicial examination is regarded 
as appropriate because the case has been widely publicized or because 
political considerations are involved.  In others, it is genuinely necessary 
because police and prosecutors have only limited powers to arrest, search, 
summon witnesses, and interrogate the accused.544 
 
Once a serious offense is committed, and if it is one that could be tried before the Cour 
d’assises (criminal court which hears the most serious cases, hereinafter Court of Assize), it is of 
course brought to the attention of the procureur de la Re’publinque (hereinafter vice president in 
the court of appeals), who refers the case to an instruction judiciaire (hereinafter judicial 
investigation).545   The request then goes to a separate body of judges, the Chambre de 
l’instruction, who are responsible for the prosecution.546  The three-judge panel appoints one 
                                                
544Id. at 251-252. 
545Lerner, supra note 23, at 801.   
546Id.  
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judge, the investigating judge, to investigate the case, delve into both exculpatory and 
inculpatory evidence, and question the witnesses.547 
 
The formal instruction lies in the hands of the investigating judge.  She delegates much of 
her investigatory power to the police by the commission rogatoire, which affords the named 
police officer the right to specific inquiries for a limited time.548  She could direct the judicial 
police in gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses.  She is also entitled to order arrests, 
searches, extract testimony under oath, and interrogate the accused.549  The investigating judge 
personally conducts certain acts that cannot be delegated to the judicial police, such as 
questioning the mis en examen (MEE, hereinafter, the accused). 550   When witnesses are 
interviewed by the judicial police, the entire process is recorded verbatim, so that the witness can 
read the transcript for accuracy through elaborate procedures for verifying and correcting the 
record.551  The adversarial parties are entitled to ask the investigating judge to undertake certain 
investigations in the interest for searching for the truth, to interview the witnesses, to ask specific 
questions, and to gather particular physical evidence.552  The investigating judge could reject 
those requests with reasoned rulings, which is also subject to appeal.553 
 
                                                
547Id, at 802; see also Frase, supra note 189, at 539, 575 (noting that “a judicial investigation is required only when 
the prosecution wishes to charge a felony…An instruction is used only when further investigation is needed, when 
the case is politically sensitive, or when there is a need for an arrest warrant, pretrial detention, or pretrial 
supervision).     
548 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 212.  
549Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 247. 
550 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 212.  
551See Lerner, supra note 23, at 802, 803 (noting only the investigating judge or her depute is permitted to question 
the witness according to the CODE DE PROCE’DURE PE’NALE [C. PR. PEN.] art. 101, 102).   
552See id. at 803 (noting the authority is C. PR. PEN. art. 82, 82-1, 156); see also Hodgson, supra note 66, at 43 
(noting that the parties could ask the investigating judge conducts the searches, the interception of mails).    
553 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 43. 
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The accused may be examined several times during the first of which the investigating 
judge must inform the defendant of the legal and factual basis of the offense investigated.554  If 
the defense attorney is present, the investigating judge could proceed with questioning.  If the 
defendant is without an attorney, the investigating judge informs the defendant of her right to 
choose an attorney or have one provided by the legal aid institution.555  Then, the defendant is 
informed of her right not be questioned without her consent.  The defendant is entitled to the 
right to remain silent, and she is strongly encouraged to do so by defense counsel.556  Defense 
counsel is entitled to access the dossier four working days before the judicial inquiry, and the 
accused is allowed to have a copy of the contents of the dossier.557  Although the law affords 
defense counsel more participation during the instruction than it does during the police 
investigating stage, it should be noted that the rights of the accused are not understood in the 
context of “adversarial” term and is part of the principle of “contradictorie.”  The new idea 
comes from ECHR accentuating that both sides are equal in the right and opportunity to take part 
in the criminal process, giving equal right to request the investigating judge to call and confront a 
witness based on the contradictorie  theory.558 
 
After the investigating judge wraps up the investigation, she must decide whether there is 
sufficient evidence to justify prosecution for a serious crime.559  She then transfers the dossier to 
the office of the vice president in the court of appeals, who then refers the dossier to the 
procureur g’en’eral who represents the government before the Courts of Appeals (Cour d’appel), 
                                                
554Lerner, supra note 23, at 803(noting the authority is C. PR. PEN. art. 116).    
555 Id.    
556Id. at 803-804. 
557See id. at 803 (noting the authority is C. PR. PEN.  art. 114); HODGSON, supra note 67, at 117-120. 
558HODGSON, supra note 67, at 42-43.   
559Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 247. 
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and handles prosecution in the Court of Assize.560  The procureur g’en’eral then files the dossier 
with a recommendation for further prosecution, to the Chambre de l’instruction, which consists 
of three high-ranking judges to decide whether there is sufficient evidence to charge.561  If the 
answer is positive, the Chambre de l’instruction issues the formal charge (mise en accusation) 
and transfers the case to the trial court of general jurisdiction of that geographical division.562 
 
In a nutshell, before a case is prosecuted in the Court of Assize, there are several checks 
in the pretrial proceedings by different groups of judges—among which the investigating judge 
is the most involved and who supervises the police and the prosecutor’s investigation in felony 
cases and remains in a neutral role, maintaining her independence from control of the executive 
branch.   
 
Though not a screening mechanism in the screening of the sufficiency of evidence, 
through the investigating judge, the law sets up an ideal check on supervision and investigation 
for the most serious crimes to warrant sufficient evidence to charge.  However, there are 
criticisms whether the authority and function the investigating judge performs achieves such 
design when the practice contradicts the law on the books because of the French criminal justice 
judicial culture and legal practice factors in when determining the effectiveness of judicial 
supervision in evaluating whether or not the investigating judge could play a neutral and 
effective role in leading the investigation. The following analyzes the judicial culture, ideology, 
                                                
560See Lerner, supra note 23, at 805 (noting the authority is C. PR. PEN.  art. 181).    
561See id. at 806 (noting the authority is C. PR. PEN.  art. 806).     
562 Id.     
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and relies on the study conducted by Professor Hodgson to illustrate the contemporary criticisms 
against the investigating judge and possible abolition of the investigating judge.   
 
3. Judicial Supervision in Practice in France 
 
Law in books sometimes varies significantly from the law in action.  This dissertation is 
concerned that the legal transplant construction includes the legal procedural traditions, the role 
and functions of participant personnel, and that the role played by the participants be dictated by 
existing legal cultures.563  Therefore, this section looks beyond how the French criminal 
procedure operates on paper, and intends to delve into what they actually do in action. 
 
To begin with, the French investigating judge could conduct pretrial investigation and 
supervision comprehensively in most serious crimes, but, as Professors Goldstein and Marcus 
claimed, “judges in inquisitorial systems do not control or supervise the investigation, 
prosecution or trial of most criminal cases much more closely than do judges in our own 
adversarial systems.”564  In reality, it is the prosecutor who determines and controls the initiation 
of the instruction.  If she keeps the investigation out of the hands of the investigating judge, there 
exists no possibility for the investigating judge to intervene.  Especially when the prosecutor 
could investigate the most serious cases as “correctionalized”—as a misdemeanor offense in 
order not to burden the system with judicial investigation, even if those offenses are chargeable 
                                                
563 Ed Cape, Jacqueline Hodgson, Ties Prakken & Taru Spronken, Procedural Rights at the Investigative stage: 
Towards a Real Commitment to Minimum Standards, 1,available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1440229.  
564Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87, YALE L. J. 1570, 
1571 (1978).   
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as serious offenses565  Although such “correctionalized” discretion alleviates the mandatory 
requirement of judicial supervision of the most serious crimes, it basically eliminates the 
opportunity of the judicial supervision for most serious cases and evades the law.  Therefore, 
there are some concerns that judicial investigation and supervision might not be prevailing in the 
most serious types of cases.  According to Professor Hodgson, only about 4% of cases are passed 
to the investigating judge for a wider investigation.566 
 
Second, the police investigations usually proceed without supervision by the prosecutor 
or the investigating judge, as well as without the judicial review by the ensuing trial judge.567  In 
some instances, the investigating judge could not work independently and individually of the 
police and the prosecutor.  She delegates much of her investigation to the police through 
instruction to extend police powers in investigation, which turns the instruction into police-
dominated investigation.568  For example, the investigating judge normally does not question 
witnesses herself.  In this sense, it increases the chances that the investigating judge work closely 
with the police in reviewing and verifying the evidence that is offered by the police, and it makes 
the investigating judge less likely to view things from a perspective different from that of the 
police.569 
 
In other instances, if the prosecutor has decided to develop the case for a serious offense, 
she normally holds the case as long as possible before requesting the instruction in order to 
                                                
565Id. at 1572. 
566Hodgson, supra note 239, at 1368. 
567Id. at 1573. 
568HODGSON, supra note 67, at 213.  
569Id. at 242. 
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maintain control of the investigation.570  Also, the prosecutor often intends to procrastinate 
opening the instruction procedure in order to prolong the denial of defense rights and the 
safeguard of the instruction procedure.571 
 
If the investigating judge relies so much on the police and the prosecutor, the relationship 
may transform into the symbiotic entity wherein she may not review and investigate the dossier 
prepared by the police and the prosecutor objectively.  As Professors Goldstein and Marcus 
claimed, the police complete most of the investigation before the intervention by the prosecutor 
and investigating judge and the police are well trained for those investigating technicalities.572  
The investigating judge generally receives the police dossier, evaluates it, and may delegate 
more power to the police for further investigation.  In such a case, how could a system anticipate 
an investigating judge to prepare the dossier and supervise the investigative conduct neutrally?     
 
Third, the ideal notion is that the investigating judge entails dual investigative and 
judicial functions.  That a judge can play both roles was simply based on assumption.  Is she able 
to perform both functions?  As mentioned, French judiciary includes the investigative judiciary 
and adjudicative judiciary, also termed as standing judiciary and sitting judiciary.573  They are 
trained and formed as a unit, and the prosecutor and investigating judge are simply job difference, 
and is a matter of personal selection.  The common recruiting process, centralized institutional 
training, and ease of transferring from the initial selection of being a prosecutor to being an 
                                                
570Id. at 213. 
571Id. at 213. 
572Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 33, 249. 
573HODGSON, supra note 67, at 65-67; Hodgson, supra note 239, at 1367. 
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investigating judge, form a unique judiciary group and ideology.574  This unique judiciary group 
distinguishes itself from the defense attorneys as well.   
 
Such legal culture formed by various legal members of one big judicial corps can 
generate the inner trust and confidence that in turn lessen the independence and checks on the 
investigation and prosecution.  Originally, the investigation and prosecution are designed to be 
separated from the adjudication in order to have a system of checks and balances.  The 
investigating judge is supposed to check the investigation and decide on the prosecution’s case 
objectively.  However, the shared common status and close ideology that group them as a 
complete judiciary might obstruct the function of separation of powers.  This kind of judicial 
ideology, therefore, undermines the judicial independence and judicial supervising power.  
Moreover, the close ideology and friendly relationships could result in a detrimental effect on the 
independence of the investigating judge as well as the defense’s ability to have an equal voice.575  
For example, a French high-profile case, Outreau’s investigative report alleges that the 
prosecutor dominated the investigation and the investigating judge stood by the prosecutorial 
view by discovering incriminating evidence.576  This constitutes a judicial corps that cooperates 
in fighting against the defense and undermines the impartial role in any necessary reviewing and 
checking power.  
 
                                                
574See HODGSON, supra note 67, at 69-70 (noting an interview conducted by author demonstrates that the unity of a 
single judicial corps that characterizes the image); Hodgson, supra note 239, at 1365. 
575Hodgson, supra note 239, at 1371-1372.  
576See id. at 1373-1374 (quoting the National Assembly Report that the investigating judge lacks a culture of control, 
and copied the prosecutor’s conclusion to highlight the malfunction of the investigating judge).   
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Simultaneously, the investigating judge prevents the defense from having input into the 
inquiry, even places the defense outside of the procedure, and deprives the defense of any 
opportunity to question the witness’s character.577  The overlapping function that combines the 
investigating function with judicial neutral function, integrates two conflicting characters into 
one investigating judge.578  Judging from the adjudicating role of a judge, she should maintain a 
neutral standing in appraising the guilt or innocence of the accused.  An investigation, on the 
other hand, involves a one-sided advocate that may not be impartial and objective in its nature.  
An investigating judge has to conduct a “neutral” investigation, to appraise the evidence 
presented, to collect evidence in the dossier, and to decide whether the charge is justified.579  The 
role is confused by the fact that she is both a player of the game as well as the judge of it.   
 
The last point is attributed to her role of making the decision whether to authorize a 
coercive investigative action, which may include wiretapping, authorizing bail, or custody of the 
suspect under investigation before the criminal reform of 2000.  The detention power during the 
instruction in particular conflicts with itself as an investigator.580  This is the most disputed 
power she exercises in the pretrial detention, which led to the installation of the independent juge 
des liberties et de la detention (judge of detention and liberty) in reducing the number of suspects 
held in custody during the instruction.581 
                                                
577Id. at 1375. 
578 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 70. 
579Id. 
580Id, at 242. 
581Hodgson, supra note 239, at 1369. 
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The major criticism is aimed at the judges’ dual roles and, thus, calls into question their 
neutrality.582  The main concern is that of demanding an investigator to make a neutral decision 
with regard to detention while conducting the investigation, if she is pre-judgmental that the 
accused is the actual culprit after reviewing the police dossier.  In carrying out her investigation, 
the investigating might be more inclined to detain the suspect to search for the truth in the 
interest of the public. Would this not be a bias per se?  As Professor Hodgson put it “the concern 
is that the independence of the judicial function is undermined by having the investigator in the 
same professional grouping as the trial judge.”583 
 
All of these blur the line and demand reform.584  As the criminal justice reform was going 
on in France, the new voice that urges to abolish the investigating judge arose recently.  The 
Le’gar commission, in consonance with French President Sarkozy’s plan, proposes the 
abolishment of the investigating judge and supplants it by placing the public prosecutor in charge 
of all criminal investigations.585  The proposal of the Le’gar envisions more than simply 
replacing the investigating judge with the prosecutor, but proposes that the juge du sie’ge or the 
juge de l’enqueteet des libertes (hereinafter judge of pretrial investigation and detention) 
judicially supervise the investigation by the prosecutor.586  It is unknown whether the reform 
could lead to a more independent review of the prosecutor and police investigation by the new 
judge of pretrial investigation and detention, or if the reform pays attention to the issue of the 
                                                
582Id. 
583Id. at 71. 
584HODGSON, supra note 67, at 71. 
585Hodgson, supra note 239, at 1379. 
586See id. at 1384 (noting that the new judge will oversee the prosecutor’s decision and will authorize intrusive 
investigative action while extending the prosecutorial power). 
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judicial legal culture as described before. The reform would change the investigation and 
supervision practice. 
 
In sum, ideally the dual role of the investigating judge in carrying out investigation of 
most serious cases as well as in supervising the police and the prosecutor would function as 
designed, yet in practice, the analyses clearly identify the uneasiness of its neutral and impartial 
judicial supervision.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
French criminal procedure has undergone several major reforms since 1993, with the goal 
of bringing the criminal process in conformity with the principles of European Convention of 
Human Rights.587  The reform of judicial investigation procedure drives toward the guarantee of 
the rights of the accused and sets up the principle of equal participation between the prosecutor 
and the defense.  It not only broadens the application of right to counsel to judicial investigation, 
but also strengthens the substance of right to participation, such as discovery during the 
investigation, requests to call witnesses, etc.  Notwithstanding the fact that judicial investigation 
is limited to a small number of cases, namely, felony offenses, the trend of its reform actually 
symbolizes the need of more adversarial voice and underlies the importance of the adversary 
system even during the judicial investigating stage. 
 
                                                
587See generally, HODGSON, supra note 67, at 40-60 (noting the reform was not based on the adversarial 
requirement). 
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This chapter’s mission is to look into the various screening mechanisms of the 
prosecution, the procedure it employs, the interplay, and inner-system relationships among the 
legal participants, and the legal culture or ideology that influences or frustrates the screening 
practice.  The goal is to identify the advanced parts of the U.S. and French criminal screening or 
reviewing functions and to examine ineffectiveness and malfunctions of Taiwan’s screening 
mechanism.  The next chapter addresses legal borrowing and reconstruction engineering in better 
constructing and achieving the screening mechanism and function in Taiwan.   
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CHAPTER 4 NEW SCREENING MECHANISM 
 
I. Introduction 
 
As mentioned previously, criminal charging in Taiwan adopts mandatory prosecution 
system in felony offenses.  In theory, the prosecutor has no discretion with regard to charging of 
felony cases and must file criminal charges whenever there is sufficient evidence that indicates 
that the suspect is suspected in the breach of criminal law.  But even while operating under a 
mandatory prosecution system, she retains the authority of whether not to charge.  For example, 
when the evidence obtained is insufficient to prove the accused is suspected of having committed 
an offense, the prosecutor may still prosecute.  In this case, she either has misjudged the 
mandatory requirement to charge, or she acknowledged the insufficiency issue that she should 
not otherwise prosecute but chose to prosecute anyway.  In other words, the prosecutor presents 
insufficient evidence to support her charging decision, which is a violation of the mandatory 
requirement, resulting in the abuse of the charging power.   
 
Consider a recent call for chastisement of the prosecutor because a defendant was 
charged with the rape and burglary of a victim at knifepoint. The prosecutor charged the 
defendant without the DNA test report, but merely on the basis of his confession and victim’s 
identification.  The defendant was in custody until trial, and at trial, the DNA (extracted from the 
victim) examination proved the offense was committed by another person.  The court eventually 
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found the defendant not guilty.588  The community and the family of the accused condemned the 
prosecution for abuse of power.  The prosecutor, then, prosecuted the case in a swift manner as a 
signal of deterrence to the society.  After the defendant was acquitted, the prosecutor faced even 
greater consequences in the face of criticisms and chastisement, in addition to the remedy paid to 
the wrongfully prosecuted defendant.589 
 
The criminal justice system should not focus only on criminal control; the core ideology 
of the criminal process should also emphasize the degree to which a system should prevent 
wrongful conviction, incarceration, and harassment of innocent people.590  As Justice Harlan puts 
the fundamental value determination of U.S. society, “it is far worse to convict an innocent man 
than to let a guilty man go free.”591  It is actually the prosecutor who holds the key to the door of 
both initiation of the criminal trial and the potential error of convicting an innocent.  
Correspondingly, the prosecution and screening are of equal significance in any criminal justice 
system.   
 
Conceptually, the above example constitutes an abuse of charging power rather than an 
abuse of discretionary power.  A prosecutor’s decisions may also be erroneous decisions in 
                                                
588Fa Wu Bu Xin Wen Gao[Ministry of Justice Press Release], Zhen Dui Shi Si Ri Mei Ti Bao Zai Shei Jian Cha 
Jian Cha Guan Yi Wen Fa Wu Bu Shuo Ming Ru Xia[Ministry of Justice Response to Media on the topic of who 
check prosecutor](Taiwan), Aug. 15, 2011, available at 
http://www.moj.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=239773&ctNode=27518&mp=001( last visited Aug. 20, 2012). 
589Yang Yi, Zhua Cuo Dong Hai Zhi Lang Jian Yuan Jiu Zheng Tai Zhong Jian Jing[Wrongful Arrest of the Rapist, 
Control Yuan Correct the Taichung Prosecutor and Police Agency], China Times (Taiwan), Jan. 12, 2012, available 
at http://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E6%8A%93%E9%8C%AF-
%E6%9D%B1%E6%B5%B7%E4%B9%8B%E7%8B%BC-
%E7%9B%A3%E9%99%A2%E7%B3%BE%E6%AD%A3%E5%8F%B0%E4%B8%AD%E6%AA%A2%E8%AD
%A6-213000416.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2012). 
590Notes, supra note 299, at 784.   
591See In Re Winship, 397, U.S. 371-372(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting disutility of convicting an innocent 
is not equal to acquitting a guilty).   
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judging mandatory requirements or in evaluating the prosecutorial threshold requirements.  
Whether the decision is an abuse or an erroneous judgment, these should be the main types of 
charging through which a screening mechanism intends to filter.  The question is whether the 
current screening system functions in such capacity? 
 
One of the critical characteristics of the modified adversarial system is to ascertain the 
role and obligation of the prosecutor at trial, including bearing the burden of proof and the proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The trial is no longer a continuation of the prosecutor’s investigation 
as are the traditional Taiwanese judge inquiry system and the traditional trial model.  The 
obligation of the prosecutor to bear the burden of proof ought to be disentangled from the 
obligation of the judges’ fact-finding or judicial inquiry.  Under this notion, in order to review 
whether the prosecutors’ charging decisions are grounded and whether the prosecutor abuses the 
power or makes mistakes using the power, the screening mechanism shall afford the judge power 
over cases to review whether the charging is congruous with the mandatory prosecution and 
allows the accused an opportunity to challenge the prosecution as analyzed and extracted from 
the U.S. screening mechanism and French investigating judge mechanism. 
 
This chapter connects the defects of Taiwan’s current mechanism, including deficient 
procedures, devices, screening threshold, and evidentiary rules from the comparative perspective, 
and proposes a new screening device as a potential vehicle for future reform.    
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II. Identify Ineffective Procedural Device and Solutions 
 
1. Screening Timing 
 
To begin with, in the United States and France, the screening mechanism or supervision 
of investigation are both installed as a safety valve before the opening of the trial.  Since the 
purpose of the screening in Taiwan intends to achieve the protection of the innocent, to provide 
protections against unfounded prosecutions, to check whether “sufficient evidence” exists to 
proceed to trial, and to preserve limited judicial resources, a screening mechanism devised to 
contribute to a timely reviewing function before the prosecution is of significant importance.  
Once the prosecution has been presented in court, the prosecution is disclosed and become 
known to the public, the end that the screening mechanism serves to protect, such as the 
reputation of the innocent and other associated disadvantages that come along with the 
prosecution, seems to be unattainable.   
 
To establish the ex ante screening before trial increases the difficulty of obtaining an 
indictment, which might enhance the quality of prosecution and lessen the quantity of 
prosecution because the prosecutor would present only the best evidence and prepare the best 
case that withstands multiple layers of examination.  It takes effort from the prosecutor to 
convince the external screening institution that sufficient evidence exists, and she has every 
incentive to present the best evidence available to convince the screener.  In order to gain an 
indictment, she is incentivized to present her case in the best way strategically in exchange for an 
198 
 
indictment.  Additionally, an indictment would be more justified or warranted under many layers 
of supervision even at the cost of time-consuming efforts and procedures.   
 
A screening mechanism is supposed to be set before prosecution to directly supervise 
those who charge.592  However, Taiwanese mechanism is ex post screening after the prosecution 
has been initiated.  Normally, an indictment undergoes an internal review process conducted by 
the prosecutor’s superior, i.e., head prosecutor and chief prosecutor, before being filed with the 
court.  The superior reviews the dossier to decide whether the outcome is grounded in facts and 
evidence, and whether the charging decision complies with the guidelines issued by the higher-
ranking hierarchical official, or is congruous with the conclusion of the chief prosecutor if she 
has specific directives or considerations, even though prosecutors and superiors are both 
subjected to the demand of mandatory prosecution as well. 
 
Once approved, the investigation is closed and the case’s dossier is transferred to the 
court without any external screening.  Other than internal hierarchical review, the prosecution 
has undergone no review at all, and the ease with which the prosecutor is able to institute an 
indictment renders self-evident that the prosecutor may present a case that does not meet the 
threshold of suspicion that a crime has been committed by a suspect.  Critics have noted the 
public distrust of prosecutorial internal monitoring, even when the internal control was held to a 
high standard.593  Despite the fact that the prosecution has been reviewed by the superiors, 
                                                
592Wang, supra note 495, at 95. 
593See id. at 91 (noting that internal control is readily criticized that it is exercised under the black box even if the 
internal control holds high standard). 
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because the process is both invisible and the extent of internal review is unknown to the society, 
it is usually trusted less by the society.   
 
Moreover, the internal monitoring may not be working because the highly ranked 
government official may not screen if that official is also corrupt, and thus has an incentive to not 
screen effectively.  Economists also noted an agency cost problem, which is that prosecutors’ 
self-interests may not align with those of the society.  The prosecutor may not prosecute the case 
in the best interest of the public.  Placing restraints on prosecutorial power from internal review 
by superiors’ supervisory power is an alternative to lower agency cost; however, the superiors 
are prosecutors as well.  The higher officials may fail to screen the exercise of the charging 
power by the subordinates.594  Given that the superiors might mal-screen the subordinates’ cases 
and take a free ride with the fame and reputation through the prosecutions, the internal reviewing, 
in this sense, might not work as well.  In this case, after the prosecutor indicts the accused, the 
case goes public, which could result in many negative effects to the accused.  At this stage, even 
if the judge dismisses a case, the harm caused by the indictment has materialized and is 
irreversible.  It is certainly justifiable that one be assured that there is institution of effective ex 
ante screening before the prosecution is filed. 
 
Last, by comparison, the screening mechanisms of the United States and France function 
directly to protect the innocent or to review cases in the avoidance of abuse of charging powers 
as well as erroneous prosecutorial judgments.  Additionally, ex ante screening also preserves 
limited judicial resources for once the gate is open, the cost of all is materialized.   
                                                
594Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure As a Market System, XII J. of LEGAL STUD, 300 (1983). 
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In sum, as one professor noted for current situation, it is better for the accused to have the 
screening device than not to have it, in that it could “indirectly” deter the abuse of prosecution.595  
This dissertation, of course, wants a genuinely effective screening mechanism to directly grapple 
with the problems and achieve the aforementioned goals.   
 
2. Screening Process 
 
2.1. Independent Procedure 
 
As learned, a preliminary hearing in the United States allows more input from the 
accused, and hearing of more testimony by magistrates to decide the sufficiency of the charges.  
It accords the prosecution the power to call and question witnesses until probable cause is found.  
The burden rests with the prosecution.  The accused is permitted to present witnesses and to 
crossexamine prosecutor’s witnesses.  The magistrate supervises the procedures that make the 
final decision whether probable cause is found.596  Basically, the preliminary hearing adopts an 
adversarial process that allows the participation of the accused and emphasizes the equal footing 
for both sides.   
 
In France, the instruction procedure also allows more input from both parties, especially 
from the defense, to demand that the investigating judge proceeds with certain investigation, 
                                                
595WANG, supra note 495, at 95. 
596WRIGHT& LEIPOLD, supra note 266, §92. 
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including calling the witness, confronting the witness, and conducting specific medical reports, 
in order to incorporate ECHR’s spirit.       
 
In this vein, an independent screening procedure should be separated fromthe pretrial 
proceeding.  By contrast, in Taiwan, there is no way to check and review whether the judge 
screens for the benefit of the accused and achieves other goals.  There is no independent 
procedure that allows the judge to screen the case and permits the accused to challenge the case.  
The result is often a mixture of the screening and pretrial proceeding, i.e., preparation of trial.  
Once the preparation for trial is finished, usually the trial date and case issues are both set, and 
the judge does not dismiss the case.  The functions of the screening are invisible and forgettable 
under current law.   
 
Since the goals carried out by the screening mechanism are so critical to the criminal 
justice system and to avoiding wrongful convictions of the innocent, to install a single mandatory 
screening procedure requires that the judge perform the screening function instead of being a 
“paper tiger” or an adornment, especially when the goal and function of screening and pretrial 
proceeding vary.  If the prosecution cannot justify the case, it should be dismissed before 
prosecution, and the judge should not arrange the pretrial preparation proceeding.   
 
2.2. Adversarial Procedure 
 
The screening procedure in Taiwan provides for dossier review by a three-judge panel, 
which try the case at trial without any opening procedure.  A document review merely examines 
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the dossier prepared by the prosecutor.  In other words, there is no procedure at all, and outsiders 
find no way to check whether judges exercise their power.   
 
Here, we should shift gears from screening back to investigation in Taiwan in order to 
better understand it.  The accused has less input during the investigation.  The only thing she 
contributes to the investigation is her statement or, in some cases, confession.  Because the 
defendant plays no role in the investigation, the defense counsel is also unable to rely on the 
procedural and evidentiary rules that provides cross examination and a suppression hearing.  The 
investigation is completely controlled by the prosecution and becomes entirely a one-sided story.  
As Professor Lewis’s research puts it, the defense in Taiwan lacks real investigative power 
during the investigation.597 
 
Opponents may argue that the current law in Taiwan allows the accused to request the 
prosecutor to call witnesses, and allows the prosecutor to have the witnesses cross examined by 
the suspect at her discretion.  The prosecutor could reject such request without any reason.  This 
proceeding is conducted in the investigating court before the prosecutor, instead of one before an 
unbiased trial judge.  The investigating procedure differs from the trial procedure significantly 
and the accused’s involvement is very limited in the investigating procedure.  If the accused is 
not entitled to take part in the investigation and there is no adversarial screening provided that 
allows the accused a right to challenge the indictment, then from the investigation to charging, 
the accused could be completely or partially excluded from presenting her version of events.   
 
                                                
597See Lewis, supra note 103, at 691(noting that answer was replied from a public defender in Taiwan). 
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Additionally, it is unknown whether the screening judge did review the prosecution under 
the current mechanism.  To adopt an adversarial screening process and to allow more 
participation by the accused in bringing challenges to the indictment is an intuitively viable plan 
in making the screening function more effective.  It has been argued that the screening procedure 
should proceed in closed court by dossier-review simply because the screening is to check 
whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the threshold.598  Yet, as suggested, independent and 
adversarial procedure allows more input by defense and provides an opportunity to examine 
witnesses and perpetuates the testimony.  Otherwise, it is doubtful that current screening would 
function effectively.  By contrast, the adversarial screening relies mostly on the defense 
participation to present or to cross examine prosecution’s witnesses.   
 
Accordingly, this dissertation advocates an adversarial screening, one that allows for 
more involved defense participation.  The nature of the adversarial process is that it is held in 
open court, which results in a case going public.  A prosecution that goes through screening may 
be dismissed by the screening court, and the prosecutor might then choose to reinvestigate the 
case.  In this case, the principle of secrecy (discussed later) is binding to all parties during the 
investigation in order to protect the reputation of the possibly innocent defendant and to prevent 
from witness tampering, etc.599  Then, the first-time adversarial screening might jeopardize the 
innocent if the screening proceeds in an open court.  In this sense, should the adversarial 
screening process be held in an open court?  
 
                                                
598Wu, supra note 492, at 65. 
599Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art.245, Section 1 (Taiwan)(An investigation shall not be 
held in a public proceeding). 
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2.3. Public Hearing 
 
The first question is whether the screening process should be held in an open court.  
According to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, an adversarial process, i.e., a trial, 
shall be held in open court as a fundamental right of the accused.  Should it apply to an 
adversarial preliminary hearing?  How does a system reconcile the adversarial process with the 
“secrecy principle”?  Due to screening being set between the investigation and the trial, would a 
public hearing conflict with the “secrecy” principle demanded by the law?   
 
The secrecy principle aims to protect the efficiency of the flow of investigation, which 
aims to preserve the physical evidence from being destroyed by the accused, to prevent the 
suspect from tampering with witnesses, and to protect the accused’s reputation, especially when 
the accused is under investigation, but has not yet been convicted.600  It refers to the fact that the 
investigation is closed to all during the investigation stage, while the trial is supposed to be open 
and fully informed procedure where both parties are well prepared and have equal footing in 
their preparation of trial.  The prosecutor’s dossier is supposed to be fully open for the defense at 
trial.  Nonetheless, during the screening process, which the prosecution has not filed yet, could 
we adopt an adversarial proceeding that is held in closed court in order to maintain the goals of 
the secrecy rule? If so, how could we reconcile the adversarial screening and the secrecy 
principle? 
 
                                                
600HWANG, supra note 224, at 132-134. 
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One of the major goals of the screening mechanism is to protect the innocent from false 
charges.  In fact, the criminal justice system should avoid any wrongful convictions.  The 
procedure that carries out this major criminal justice goal of protecting the innocent far 
outweighs other value or goal that are achieved by other procedural essentials.  Besides, while 
Taiwan’s judicial authority also brandishes the flag to promote substantive equality for the 
adversary, it is proposed that the adversarial procedure afford the accused more procedural 
participation, more rights of defense, more rights to question, and, generally, to have input that 
equalizes the power of the parties.601 
 
Given that the investigation stage is finished by the prosecutor without much 
participation from the defense, and that, even though the accused is represented, the defense 
attorney often does nothing more than be present in the interrogation room to monitor whether 
the prosecutor’s interrogation violates the law, advise the suspect whether to exercise her 
Miranda right to remain silent, and requests the prosecutor to investigate specific evidence(such 
as questioning specific witnesses and the acquisition of other requested physical evidence, etc.).  
But the prosecutor is not legally obligated to conduct the investigation the defense requests, and, 
unlike in the French system, the defense is not afforded a right to appeal if the request is rejected 
by the prosecutor.602  The defense is also allowed to state the opinion with regard to the 
investigated crime.  It is still far from being on equal footing with the prosecution during the 
investigation when both the accused and defense attorney are not permitted to mandate the 
prosecutor to investigate evidence that may be in their favor.   
                                                
601See e. g., Judicial Yuan, Gai Liang Shi Dang Shi Ren Jin Xing Zhu Yi [Modified Adversarial Criminal Procedure] 
(Taiwan), Apr. 2, 2004, available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/work/work02/work02-01.asp (last visit July, 10, 
2012)(describing the emphasis of substantial equal status between parties in the new law). 
602 HODGSON, supra note 67, at 43. 
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Under the proposed screening process, the prosecution has not been screened, and it has 
not officially initiated the trial.  In other words, the secrecy principle might still dominate the 
screening process.  In order to reconcile the adversarial process while maintaining secrecy 
principle that aims to protect the reputation of the accused and other goals, the adversarial 
procedure could be held in a closed court proceeding while the screening procedure itself is 
closed to everyone except the parties.  Through a closed adversarial device, not only could it hear 
the voice of the defense to achieve a greater value that adversarial process could bring, but also it 
could protect the basic goal the secrecy principle. 
 
Comparatively, in the United States, a preliminary hearing is occasionally held in 
chambers in sensitive cases, such as sexually related offenses that involve underage victims.603  
Besides, in New York, Criminal Procedure §180.60 provides “A hearing upon a felony 
complaint must be conducted as follows: . . . 9.The court may, upon application of the defendant, 
exclude the public from the hearing and direct that no disclosure be made of the proceedings.”604  
Such a device balances both interests and achieves dual goals.  Of course, after the case passes 
the screening judge’s scrutiny to proceed to trial, the accused remains entitled to her 
constitutional right to an open trial and is no longer protected by the secrecy principle.    
 
Other than the adversarial screening process, there are rights and devices that facilitate 
equality of the adversary and participation in the screening procedure.  The following explores 
the right to counsel in the reformed screening procedure, the right to cross examination in the 
                                                
603JONATHAN D. SCHIFFMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS, §3:2 (1986). 
604N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 180.60(Consol. 2013). 
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screening procedure, and the limited discovery device, which arms the defense with materials 
necessary to the basis of the prosecution in order to check the prosecution.  
 
3. Accompanied Devices and Rights 
 
3.1. Right to Counsel 
 
The right to counsel in Taiwan is a much developed field ever since the borrowing of the 
Miranda warning as an essential part of criminal procedure.605  Any suspect is entitled to retain 
her choice of counsel at any stage of the criminal procedure.606  At trial, there is mandatory right 
to the assistance of counsel under the following six circumstances: (1) where the minimum 
punishment is no less than three years imprisonment; (2) where a high court has jurisdiction of 
the first instance;(3) where the indigenous defendant is indicted; (4) where the defendant is 
indigent;(5) where the accused is unable to make a complete statement due to unsound mind; and 
(6) where the presiding judge considers such appointment of counsel is necessary.607  During the 
investigation, the mandatory right to counsel is where a suspect is unable to make a complete 
statement due to unsound mind or the suspect is indigenous, the public prosecutor shall appoint a 
public defender or an attorney to defend the suspect if no defense attorney has been retained 
during the investigation.  Therefore, because the current screening process is not listed as a 
mandatory stage that requires an attorney, this creates a loophole.   
                                                
605 In Taiwan, Miranda Warning is required to inform suspect when the investigation by polices and prosecutors and 
to inform the defendant once charged and subjected to the trial proceedings by the trial judges.         
606A defendant may retain defense attorney of his or her choice at any phase of the criminal procedure.  A suspect 
interrogated by judicial police officers is entitled to the right to counsel as well. See Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code 
of Criminal Procedure] art. 27(2013)(Taiwan). 
607Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 31 (2013)(Taiwan). 
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Because the proposed adversarial preliminary hearing is devised to proceed as adversarial 
style, and the proposed procedure is a highly technical, professional process, the accused surely 
is not able to proceed without the assistance of counsel or proceed by self-representation unless 
the accused waives the right to counsel.  As mentioned, the Supreme Court in the United States 
mentioned that preliminary hearing is a “critical stage” that requires counsel, and the counsel’s 
goals are exposing fatal weaknesses in the government’s case that may cause the magistrate to 
refuse to charge, cross examining of the witness, preserving of testimony that is unavailable, and  
effectively discovering the case against the accused.608 
 
Because the screening has to be accomplished through a highly trained and professional 
expert that makes adversarial screening effective, such equal force and power in striking the 
government’s case is essential to examine the government’s case.  Furthermore, to check 
whether the judgment and requirement of mandatory prosecution is satisfied, a counsel is 
required when the accused retains no counsel or the indigent accused could not afford counsel 
during the screening.  As mentioned, the defendant has a mandatory right to counsel at trial 
under certain circumstances.  Similarly, at the screening, the accused should be entitled to retain 
an attorney and be entitled to a mandatory right to counsel under identical circumstances.  As 
this dissertation proposes in this chapter, the new screening is supposed to apply only to felony 
cases due to the allocation of the comprehensive criminal justice resources (see last section of 
this chapter).  The mandatory right to counsel should also be applied in all felony case screenings 
where the minimum imprisonment is no less than five years imprisonment.         
                                                
608Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U. S. 9(1970). 
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3.2. Right to Cross Examination 
 
Under the new proposed mechanism, another main feature is to extend the right to 
confront the witness against the accused.  Generally, this right afforded during screening is not as 
extensive as it is at trial; instead, there is a restriction of this right by two rationales: (1) such 
cross-examination should not be used as a discovery method and (2) the exercise of this right 
should not touch on the credibility of the witnesses, which is an issue to be solved at trial.609 
 
Comparatively, the magistrate is entitled to supervise and terminate the cross examination 
that aims to elicit more information from prosecution than is needed for probable cause in the 
United Sates.  For example, when the defense cross examined a witness on whether other 
persons were present at the time the crime occurred or whether the witness had recovered her 
possession taken during a robbery, the court expressed that preliminary hearing is not pretrial 
discovery and sustained the magistrates’ ruling.610  In practice, many magistrates allow the 
discovery type of questioning provided the crossexamination is brief.611  Because the proposed 
new screening mechanism advocates limited discovery, the defense should garner the 
information she needs concerning her challenge of the prosecution from the examination 
procedure, and it should be strictly limited to cross examining the witnesses on questions the 
prosecutor has posed so as not to cross the line of discovery, to protect other values that the 
discovery restrictions intend to protect.   
 
                                                
609KAMISAR ET AL, supra note 273, at 1030. 
610See id. at 1031 (citing People ex rel. Pierce v. Thomas, 334 N.Y. 2d 666(Sup. Ct. 1972) ).  
611Id.                 
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Another example is if crossexamination accentuates the “general trustworthiness” of the 
witness, it goes beyond the need to establish probable cause.612  Currently, in most U.S. 
jurisdictions, mere conflict in testimony is not judged by the magistrate unless the evidence is 
overwhelming.613 One state court ruled that the magistrate is empowered only to judge the 
“plausibility of the story.”614  In any event, even though there are variances amongst the states, 
there is a sense that the magistrate is not an adjudicator, and that the preliminary hearing is not a 
trial.  Therefore, the magistrate is limited with regard to looking into the witness credibility issue 
even if the defense has tried to dispute the credibility under cross examination.  Credibility issues 
are just not suitable for the screener to judge.  Judgment on this issue would supersede the core 
of the trial and trial judge, and it would make a trial a hollow process.    
 
In Taiwan, the trial judge hears the evidence presented, examines physical evidence, and 
weighs the evidence comprehensively before making the decision.  The credibility of witnesses 
often was credited or discredited by the testimony they gave, yet this issue is weighed after a 
thorough cross examination.  Sometimes, the credibility is evaluated comprehensively after the 
witness is questioned by both parties.  Such comprehensive evaluation of the testimony and its 
creditability cannot be achieved until after both parties rest their case.  We cannot deny that the 
screening function has its limitations and is not intended to replicate a trial.  The screening judge 
is not qualified to judge the credibility issue because the nature of screening accentuates the 
reviewing of whether the prosecution is founded.  In addition, if the screening judge appraises 
the credibility during the screening, it also blurs the line between the determination of guilt and 
innocence, and the determination of whether the prosecution is justified or not.  Therefore, under 
                                                
612See id. at 1030 (citing Wilson v. State, 208 N. W. 2d 134(Wis. 1973) ). 
613Id. at 1026. 
614Id. 
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the proposed screening, it is not appropriate for the defense to raise the issue of credibility or 
even cross examine the witness in order to strike at the credibility.   
 
 
3.3. Discovery or Review of the Dossier  
 
The adversarial process bears an ancillary discovery effect that allows the adversary to 
acquire the prosecutor’s evidence and prepare to challenge it.  In Taiwan, the dossier cannot be 
discovered until the case has made it to the trial court.  If the adversarial screening procedure is 
adopted, should the discovery procedure apply to the screening procedure and, if yes, to what 
extent?   
 
Taiwan adopts “full discovery” at trial once an accused is charged, and the defense is 
allowed to access the full dossier prepared by the prosecutor.  Is full discovery applied as well 
during the screening process while a case is charged, yet not screened?  Theoretically, in the 
United States, the preliminary hearing is not deemed as a discovery device, but  discovery is an 
ancillary effect and is inevitable given the fact that the defense could look into some evidence of 
the prosecution’s case for the first time and cross examine prosecutor’s witnesses to “lock in” the 
testimony.615  The California Supreme Court ruled that the defendant could inspect writings and 
physical evidence in prosecutor’s possession, yet the court did not mention the right of doing 
so.616  In Los Angeles, the District Attorney allows access to the evidence in her file at the 
preliminary hearing, but such practice extends no further than extracting information from the 
                                                
615Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 (1970).  
616 People v. Cooper, 349 P. 2d. 964, 972-973(Cal. 1960). 
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investigator.617  In short, a wider discovery is a feasible alternative for the defense to find out 
what the prosecution has in possession.  As Professors Graham and Letwin stated, “the efficacy 
of the preliminary hearing as a defense discovery device depends not only on the attitudes of the 
defense counsel and of the magistrate, but also on prosecutorial strategy.”618 
 
Strategically, the prosecutor could present as little evidence as she needs to prove 
probable cause or prima facie case, although multiple witnesses may testify at trial.619  In short, 
the prosecution does not disclose her witnesses completely in the preliminary hearing as the 
prosecuting strategy.  In Taiwan, there is no discovery issue because of a clear-cut delineation 
that once a case is prosecuted and is at trial, the defense is entitled to full discovery except in 
very few exceptions (namely, when the discovery may jeopardize the witnesses’ safety and 
national security).  By contrast, no discovery is allowed during the investigation.   
 
The screening process must reconcile two interests.  One is to keep discovery from the 
accused in order to prevent potential witness tampering and concealment or destruction of 
physical evidence.  The other is to allow the defense to challenge the allegations against him or 
her on the basis of evenhanded information and to have both parties participate in the screening 
procedure.  On the one hand, a screened case is not charged yet, and if the case is dismissed and 
the prosecutor intends to investigate further, the case’s dossier probably cannot be disclosed to 
the defense during this phase.  On the other hand, as with the U.S. preliminary hearing, limited 
                                                
617See Kenneth Graham & Leon Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal-
Policy Observations, 18 UCLA L. REV. 916, 917-919 (1971) (noting the file includes defendant’s prior convictions, 
complaint, the police arrest report, the property report, witness testimony). 
618Id. at 923. 
619SCHIFFMAN, supra note 603, at§3:7. 
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discovery is an ancillary effect to the adversarial type of screening where the defense learns 
limited information and evidence from this proceeding.  Additionally, in France, the defense 
counsel is allowed to have at least four working days to access the dossier before any judicial 
investigation begins, and the attorney can have a copy of the contents of the dossier.620  This 
legislation strengthens the rights of the accused under the notion of equality of arms and the 
increasing influence of ECHR.621 
 
Since the proposed screening adopts adversarial procedures and emphasizes more 
evenhanded participation, the defense needs to acquire some information in the prosecutor’s 
dossier.  If the concern that secrecy principle remains in application when the screening judge 
dismisses the case, and the prosecutor reinvestigates the case, we might need to maintain the 
secrecy principle.  In order to harmonize such concerns, a limited discovery would be a viable 
means that caters to the necessity to provide the defense with more participation in the procedure 
and the material on which the prosecution was based.  Besides, how could a system acquire more 
input from the defense if the defense is not afforded access to the prosecutor’s case?   
 
Given that the proposed screening is limited to the finding of the prima facie case of the 
prosecution, a system could adopt “limited discovery” that extends limited information to the 
defense for that purpose only.  A limited discovery is strictly circumscribed within the need to 
establish the prima facie case by the prosecution that the accused has committed the alleged 
offense.  The extent of the discovery is under strict constraint decided by the prosecution to 
establish the prima facie case.  The defense could acquire limited information from the 
                                                
620HODGSON, supra note 67, at 120. 
621Id. 
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prosecutor in order to check the prosecution’s case.  If the prosecution presents illegally obtained 
evidence, the defense is entitled to argue to exclude it.   For example, if, in a drug smuggling 
case, a small amount of cocaine is obtained by warrantless search of luggage at a bus station 
without probable cause, it might violate the Fourth Amendment and be excluded based on illegal 
search.  The defense should have it excluded and then challenge the indictment for unfounded 
prosecution if the drug (physical evidence) is excluded.  Without the limited discovery by the 
prosecution, the defense could neither learn of such information in advance nor challenge the 
illegally obtained evidence.  Likewise, it would apply to the hearsay evidence listed in the 
indictment, unless the prosecution presents and questions the first-hand-knowledge witness at the 
screening hearing.  Otherwise, the defense could demand to exclude it. 
 
In sum, this dissertation advocates adversarial screening procedure to allow defense 
participation, especially the defense voice and limited discovery to allow the defense to acquire 
some of the prosecution’s evidence to challenge the indictment in the hopes of effectuating the 
screening mechanism in Taiwan.   
 
4. Screener 
 
Currently in Taiwan, without independent screening procedures and a different group of 
judges to perform unbiased screening, the trial panel who tries the case is in charge of reviewing 
the dossier.  Critics are concerned that without the division of another group of judges from trial, 
it may lead to an issue of “biased” opinion that the trial judges who try the case also hold the 
authority to review the indictment and to decide whether to dismiss the case.  As Professor Lin 
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claimed, it is necessary to have the screening judge and trial judge in that it is doubtful whether a 
trial judge can remain impartial when also holds the screening authority.622  If a judge is both the 
screening and the trial judge, we worry that she may be predisposed to convict the accused, 
because she found the case to be warranted and that the prosecution has already proven the 
charges beyond a reasonable doubt.    
 
Unlike Taiwan, both the United States and France position a different group of judges, 
like the magistrate in the United States or the investigating judge in France, to perform screening 
functions or supervise the investigation.  In the United States, in addition to the magistrate, the 
grand jury which is a group of independent lay citizens, supposedly not under the control of any 
institution, also carry out the screening function.  Judging from a normative perspective, the 
screening performed by a third party or a neutral institution would maintain the separation of 
powers and checks and balances, thus bringing about more confidence in the ultimate charge.   
 
One judge has acknowledged that it is better to separate the screening judge and the trial 
judge in case handling, given that some judges would dismiss cases to lighten their caseloads.623  
However, as analyzed in the empirical findings in chapter 1, the extremely low dismissal rate 
actually suggests that judges do not dismiss cases for such benefit.  In fact, the dismissal rate has 
gradually decreased since the enactment of screening mechanism in 2002.  The argument based 
on this possibility has been ruled out.       
 
                                                
622Lin, supra note 501, at 69. 
623Wu, supra note 492, at 54, 55. 
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If the screening is carried out by a different group of judges, the advantage is that a 
special group of judges would provide impartial screening instead of the trial judge who might 
mix both the screening and preparation of trial function into one proceeding.  By this design, 
there is no longer the concern of the disappearance of the screening function, but there may exist 
the potential concern of judicial legal culture or judicial corps like that experienced in France, 
where even the judge does not effectively supervise the prosecutor’s cases and investigates the 
case neutrally given the fact that they both are members of the same judiciary organization.  
Because prosecutors and judges are members of the judiciary, recruited by centralized judicial 
examination and trained together, the cultivation and education form close underlying ideology.  
Similar to the judiciary in France, Taiwan’s judiciary also has a continental heritage; therefore, 
Taiwan’s judges and prosecutors may also render so-called “judicial coporatism” phenomenon 
that forms the unique underlying legal culture.624 
 
As seen in the French experience, the investigating judge charged with supervision and 
investigation was criticized and doubted in wielding her authority with regard to impartial 
investigation.  The research also points out that underlying ideology and judicial culture form a 
judicial corps that influences the separation of power and mitigates the checks and balances.  The 
investigating judge receives the prosecutor’s dossier and might readily accept her theory of the 
case.  Likewise, it is inevitable that similar problems would arise in Taiwan, a country adopts 
continental legal system as well, and might lead to the possibility that the judge is reluctant to 
                                                
624See generally Heng-Wen Liu, Zhan Hou Taiwan Si Fa Ren Zhi Yan Jiu-Yi Si Fa Guan Xun Lian Wen Hua Wei 
Zhu De Guan Cha[A Study of the Judges and Prosecutors in Postwar Taiwan: An Observation Focus On Their 
Training Culture], 40 Si Yu Yan: Ren Wen Yu She Hui Ke Xue Za Zhi[Thought and Words: Journal of the 
Humanities and Social Science] (NO.1) (Taiwan), 125, 125-182(2002); Heng-Wen Liu, Si Fa Guan Liao Fa Xue Bai 
Nian Lai Taiwan Fa Xue Jiao Yu Zhi Bian Qian[A Study of the Judiciary Bureaucracy in Taiwan: Legal Education 
Evolvement in Taiwan for the Past Century] (Taiwan), Sep. 8, 2007, available at  
http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/RTE/myform_detail.asp?id=2174(last visited Sep. 20, 2012). 
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screen the prosecution because the underlying ideology, legal culture and mutual familiarity.  As 
a result, the legal culture might actually undermine the checks and balances achieved by the 
screening mechanism, which is devised for checking the prosecution by the independent 
screening judge.   
 
The only solution relies on the division of training of the judges and prosecutors.  
Currently, a division of the two groups of judges may improve the screening judges to exercise 
their authority independently because screening and trial functions would be clearly severed.  
The screening outcome might influence judges’ reputation and might demand the accountability 
for the screened cases screened even if screening judges have close bonds with the prosecutors. 
 
In short, a set of screening judges who are separate from the trial judges is better policy 
when seeking to achieve the goal of independent and unbiased performance of one’s duties and 
functions, thus creating a workable systematic design. Moreover, if the recruitment and training 
of judges and the prosecutors could be separated, and the underlying ideology as one judicial 
corps could be eradicated, this would be a collaborative reform that would help to achieve the 
screening goal.      
 
5. Evidentiary Rules 
 
Evidentiary rules not only matter with regard to the information that a system allows an 
adjudicator to access to discover the truth at trial, but also with regard to the information that the 
preliminary hearing magistrates may review when appraising the sufficiency of evidence to 
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justify a trial.  The preliminary hearing is a safety valve that allows a case with sufficient 
evidence to justify further proceedings and diverts a case without sufficient evidentiary support 
from the criminal justice.  Those cases with sufficient evidence and which satisfy evidentiary 
rules bring with them a high possibility of a conviction.  That indicates that in the avoidance of 
wrongful prosecution, by imposing trial-style evidentiary rules upon preliminary hearings, this 
design could elicit more correct charging and achieve a higher probability of conviction, in that 
evidentiary rules applied and evidence qualified as competent at trial are more reliable than most 
inadmissible evidence.625 
 
Neither screening mechanisms in the United States apply the evidentiary rules in federal 
proceedings.  It is believed that imposing the evidentiary requirement upon the preliminary 
hearing would increase the administrative pressure to avoid preliminary examination and that 
relaxed evidentiary requirements for preliminary hearing would advance the flow of the case, as 
discussed in chapter 3.  However, in federal jurisdiction, the law does not preclude the magistrate 
from demanding that the prosecution present evidence that would be available and admissible at 
the time of trial.626  In some state jurisdictions, rules of evidence would apply at the preliminary 
hearing.  Also, in France, in order to incorporate human rights and to allow the defense to take 
the initiative in the criminal proceedings, the defense is entitled to seek the exclusion of 
unlawfully obtained evidence.627 
 
                                                
625Notes, supra note 299, at 779-780.  
626WRIGHT& LEIPOLD, supra note 266, §92. 
627Field & West, supra note 537, at 479. 
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Again, the extent to which trial evidentiary rules are applied depends on the interest a 
nation wants to protect and the criminal justice it desires to achieve.  As Taiwan’s society is 
calling for more detailed prosecution, that evaluates the performance of individual prosecutors 
more closely and strictly controls the quality of the charging decision.628  It also demands more 
than just weeding out of unfounded cases.  The society has high expectations of the prosecutor 
not to abuse the charging power by indicting the innocent.  Otherwise it creates a situation where 
the prosecution forces the innocent to become involved in a criminal process in which he or she 
should not be involved.629 
 
The strict evidentiary rules may bring more improvement and confidence on screening 
the prosecutorial charging decision.  If inadmissible evidence could be admissible while 
screening, then there would not be much screening, and an unwarranted prosecution could 
proceed to trial.  This is true in cases involving hearsay evidence, which can turn on the 
reliability issue and should not be credited as trustful.  Illegally obtained evidence violates 
fundamental and constitutionally protected human rights and undermines the values that a 
society most wants to preserve, and the exclusion of such illegally obtained evidence limits the 
overreaching of government power as a procedural safeguard.  Thus, an indictment shall not be 
based on unreliable hearsay evidence and illegally obtained evidence.  One may consider that a 
                                                
628Judicial Reform Foundation, Jian Zuo Ni Lei Le Ma? Zhui Qi E Jian Xi Lie Ji Zhe Hui Zhi Yi Zhi Zhi Si[The 
Prosecutor, Are You Tired? In the Pursuit of Evil Prosecutor Conference [The Prosecutor, Are You Tired? In the 
Pursuit of Evil Prosecutor Conference I to IV] (Taiwan), Nov. 29, 2011, Dec. 8, 2011, Mar. 29, 2012, Jun.11, 2012, 
available at http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/RTE/myform_detail.asp?offset=20&id=3629  (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). 
629 Judicial Reform Foundation, Jian Zuo Ni Lei Le Ma? Zhui Qi E Jian Xi Lie Ji Zhe Hui Zhi San[The Prosecutor, 
Are You Tired? In the Pursuit of Evil Prosecutor Conference[The Prosecutor, Are You Tired? In the Pursuit of Evil 
Prosecutor Conference III] (Taiwan), Mar. 29, 2012, available at 
http://www.jrf.org.tw/newjrf/RTE/myform_detail.asp?id=3557  (last visited Aug. 12, 2012). 
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screening mechanism is not a suppression hearing; therefore, the evidence shall not be 
suppressed at the screening procedure.   
 
Basically, it is not until the screening stage that the defense has the opportunity to check 
the prosecution’s evidence for the first time since the start of the investigation under the 
proposed mechanism.  In order to protect the defense’s right of participation in the screening 
procedure and to review the prosecution’s evidence and witnesses the prosecutor desires to call 
at the preliminary hearing, the defense should be allowed to have, in advance, a copy of the 
prosecution’s evidentiary list for the preliminary screening that is sent to the screening judge and 
accompanied dossier concerning the evidentiary list.  This should be done for the purpose of 
participation in the screening mechanism, but not for the purpose of a suppression hearing or 
preparation for the trial.        
 
Under the proposed screening procedure, the prosecutor has her main witnesses present 
before the screening judge, questioned and crossexamined under oath.  Through direct 
questioning and cross examining of witnesses with first-hand knowledge, the testimony is no 
longer hearsay evidence after the witness has taken the stand before the screening judge, and the 
testimony is also preserved on the record.  By hearing the first hand knowledge of key witness at 
the preliminary hearing, not only could the defense and the screening judge appraise whether 
there is a warranted prosecution and whether the threshold has been met, but also the defense and 
the prosecution could preserve the testimony for subsequent use in the future.        
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As to the illegally obtained evidence or other incompetent evidence, the defense is 
entitled to check whether the proffered evidence list provided for the screening process—
including confession and other physical evidence—is acquired through legal means.  For 
example, if the defense is dubious as to the admissibility or legality of the confession, she is able 
to file a challenge during the screening on the basis of information provided by the prosecution 
after limited discovery is served.  She could ask for the exclusion of such evidence beforehand or 
during the screening in order to argue that the indictment does not meet the charging threshold at 
the screening hearing stage.   
 
But, again, the screening hearing is neither a suppression hearing nor a complete 
proceeding that supersedes the trial.  In the U.S. federal jurisdictions, the screening judge’s 
ruling on probable cause determination challenges has no binding effect in subsequent trial.  But 
in some state jurisdictions, such as New York, the screening judge is entitled to look into both 
probable cause and the admissibility of the evidence because the law requires “legally sufficient” 
competent evidence that establishes each element of crime charged.  In other words, the 
screening judge does review the competency of evidence.  Thus, if the prosecution is partially 
based upon incompetent or inadmissible evidence, and such evidence is an “essential” part of the 
prosecution’s case, the screening judge should stand in the way and impede the case from 
passing through the screening; otherwise, during the suppression hearing, the trial judge could 
hold the evidence inadmissible on the motion to suppress the evidence and rule directly for a 
dismissal.   
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In light of the above, why bother to allow the case to enter the trial in the first instance?  
A screening hearing should accomplish more than merely to evaluate the “factually innocent” 
case and have the potential “legal innocent” go through the stigmatization of trial.  As Professor 
Packer noted “by opening up a procedural situation that permits the successful assertion of 
defenses having nothing to do with factual guilt, it vindicates the proposition that the factually 
guilty may nonetheless be legally innocent and should therefore be given a chance to qualify for 
that kind of treatment.”630 
 
Current norms and the prevailing academic view in Taiwan hold that stringent 
evidentiary rules do not apply to the screening stage as stated in chapter 3.  However, the 
argument is derived basically from emphasis on the formality of differences between trial and 
screening, including the goal and function.  It might ignore that one of the most critical goals in 
any criminal justice system is to protect the innocent from wrongful convictions.  It also leaves 
out that one of the most important goals a screening mechanism intends to reach is to protect the 
innocent.  The argument does not address the problem of how to achieve this goal without 
investing in stringent evidentiary rules to insure that the evidence supporting the charge are be 
fully admissible.   
 
Why are so many procedural safeguards and rights set forth in criminal procedure?  Why 
does a system impose a heavy burden on the prosecution to prove a case beyond a reasonable 
doubt?  And why does a system remedy the wrongfully convicted if it is later found and proven 
that the conviction was erroneous because of various causes, such as DNA evidence or wrongful 
                                                
630HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION,167 (1968). 
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identification?  It all relies on the prosecution to bear the burden of proof and burden of 
persuasion, because no system designer desires to imprison and penalize the innocent unless it is 
corrupted and broken.  It is necessary to burden the prosecution and install many impediments 
for prosecution in order to ensure that not only that factually innocent are free from harassment 
by the government, but also that legally innocent persons walk free when the government relies 
on its misconduct when trying to prove the case or intrudes upon the values a society or a nation 
cherish the most.  
 
There are two advantages to adopting the evidentiary rule in Taiwan’s screening 
mechanism.  First, the perpetuation of testimony for future use: if hearsay evidence is 
inadmissible at preliminary hearing, the prosecution has to call key witnesses during screening to 
justify her warranted prosecution.  This rule enables the prosecutor to call the witnesses to testify 
and preserve and perpetuate their testimony, and to have it on the record for both parties.  Under 
some circumstances, the defense could call her witnesses to testify and have testimonies on the 
record.   
 
In the United States, the witness’ prior statements, testified to at preliminary hearing, 
would be admissible under the condition the witness is unavailable to testify at trial, and only if 
the defendant has the opportunity to crossexamine the witness during the preliminary hearing.631  
Taiwan faces the same issue which allows a variety of ways to introduce and admit prior 
statements.  However, it may cause many troubles for legal practitioners when different judges 
apply the law differently.  Taiwan recognizes that the prosecutor is entitled to question a witness 
                                                
631Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.36, 158(2004). 
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during the investigation.632  The law admits the witness’s “out of court” testimony, stated to the 
prosecutor under oath during the investigation, as hearsay exception, unless there are 
circumstances that demonstrate its unreliability.633  There are different opinions concerning the 
admissibility of pretrial “out of court” statements.  Some judge recognizes that the prosecutor is 
entitled to call witnesses and to extract testimony under oath.  They believe that the prosecutor 
obeys the law and are unlikely to conduct coerced extraction; therefore the “out of court” 
testimony made before the prosecutor during investigation is admissible unless explicit 
unreliable circumstances exist. 634   Taiwan’s Supreme Court acknowledges that “explicit 
unreliable circumstances” include the interrogative circumstance and witness state of mind, 
including coercive, fraud circumstances,635 but does not address whether the witness can be cross 
examined by the accused.636  More recently, other judges have acknowledged that such hearsay 
evidence is admissible if the witness has testified under oath and has been crossexamined at trial, 
                                                
632Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 248(2013)(Taiwan)(stating an accused is present 
while a witness is examined during the investigation and she may examine the witness. If the question is an 
inappropriate one, the public prosecutor may prohibit the question. If it is foreseen that a witness cannot be 
examined at trial, the accused shall be ordered to be present unless such witness cannot testify freely in his presence). 
633Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 159-1(2013)(Taiwan) (stating witness prior 
statements made out of court by a witness to the judge shall be admitted as evidence. Statements made during the 
investigation stage by a witness other than the accused to the public prosecutor, shall be admitted as evidence unless 
it is evidently unreliable); art. 159- 2 (2013)(Taiwan)( (stating if witness prior statements made during the 
investigation by a witness other than the accused to the assistant of public prosecutor, judicial police officer, or 
judicial policeman are inconsistent with that made at trial, the prior statements may be admitted as evidence, 
provided that specified conditions exist indicating that the prior statements are more reliable, and necessary in 
proving the facts of the criminal offense); 
art.  159- 3(2013)(Taiwan)( stating that witness prior statements made during the investigation by a witness other 
than the accused to the assistant of public prosecutor, judicial police officer, or judicial policeman may be admitted 
as evidence, if one of the specified conditions exist at trial and after proving the existence of a condition indicating 
its reliability and its necessity in proving the facts of criminal offense: 
1. The witness died; 
2. The witness has lost memory or been unable to make a statement given physical or emotional impairment; 
3. The witness is unavailable due to the fact that he is in a foreign jurisdiction or whereabouts is unknown; 
4. The witness has refused to testify at trial without justification). 
634Zui Gao Fa Yuan [Sup. Ct.], Criminal Division, 95 Tai-Shang ZiNo.1044(2006) (Taiwan). 
635Zui Gao Fa Yuan [Sup. Ct.], Criminal Division, 95 Tai-Shang ZiNo.934(2006) (Taiwan). 
636Zui Gao Fa Yuan [Sup. Ct.], Criminal Division, 94 Tai-Shang Zi No.7132(2005) (Taiwan);  
Zui Gao Fa Yuan [Sup. Ct.], Criminal Division, 95 Tai-Shang Zi No.1585(2006) (Taiwan) 
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given the constitutional demand for right to cross examination or right of confrontation for the 
defendant in Taiwan.637 
 
Therefore, there are some differences in admissibility of “out of court” hearsay evidence 
within Taiwan’s criminal justice system, which results in confusion.  Whether the application of 
the hearsay law and the practice is repugnant to U.S. law and how does the confrontation clause 
apply in Taiwan is one question. If the prosecutor could present her first-hand witnesses under 
oath during the screening hearing and have the witnesses crossexamined by the defense, the 
hearing could not only screen the case to check whether the prosecution is founded, but also help 
determine whether such testimony is admissible.     
 
Second, both sides could take advantage of the recorded testimony for impeachment 
purposes when any witness alters her position against any side, or makes any inconsistent 
testimony.  Since the testimony is perpetuated, the witness’s unavailability or change of position 
is less likely to influence the outcome.  In other words, it disincentiveizes perjury or other 
attempts to tamper with a witness after her first statements are made. 
 
6. Supplementary Evidence Ruling 
 
Currently, when the court considers whether the proof presented is “obviously 
insufficient” to establish the possibility that the accused is guilty (the screening threshold), the 
court may order the prosecutor to present additional or supplementary evidence before the court 
                                                
637Zui Gao Fa yuan [Sup. Ct.], Criminal Division, 101 Tai-Shang Zi No. 2615(2012) (Taiwan); Zui Gao Fa Yuan 
[Sup. Ct.], Criminal Division, 99 Tai-Shang ZiNo.2629(2010) (Taiwan). 
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dismisses the case.  In so doing, it positions the court system in a biased role in screening, and it 
leaves the judge in a conflicting role that makes the judge stand by the prosecutor or direct the 
prosecutor to supply one-sided evidence instead of checking the prosecution impartially.   
 
Such a ruling also incentivizes the prosecutor to ignore or to be reckless in performing 
her duty.  The imbalance tips the government and implies the judiciary and the prosecutor still 
stand side by side to achieve crime control for society.  As a matter of law, this is in contrast to 
the adversarial ideology that seeks to equalize both parties in the views of the law and 
adjudicator.  Binding the judiciary with the prosecutor as a whole raises the concern that 
inquisitorial judiciary, one that groups the adjudication and prosecution together in one hand, 
might secretly return.  The current law might actually tip the balance of the relationship among 
both parties and destroy the unbiased judiciary role.       
 
The legislation that replicates the law of the prosecutorial directive to the police official is 
just a mistaken transplant from Taiwan’s internal criminal justice system in that both the 
prosecutor and the police officials are in charge of investigation and the prosecutor is in charge 
of the prosecution exclusively.  They both share the same role as combatants against criminals 
and work as a team constantly and hierarchically during the investigation.  Structurally, the 
prosecutor is entitled to supervise, direct, and order the police officials with regard to the 
investigation.  She is also entitled to order the police officials to reinvestigate and supplement the 
dossier with the evidence as a hierarchically higher ranking official.  Thereafter, the prosecutor is 
in charge of prosecution and has the final say concerning the evidence and the dossier.   
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In contrast to the hierarchical relationship between the prosecutor and her agents in 
Taiwan, the judiciary and the prosecutor are not hierarchically ranked in the same branch of the 
government or are not supposed to be ascribed as “partners” who work together.  Rather, the 
relationship is one of checks and balances among the government powers in different branches of 
government.  In this sense, the judiciary mission is to check the prosecutorial power instead of 
providing judicial directives to one of the party. 
 
Comparatively, in the United States, there is special emphasis on the balance of power of 
both parties in the preliminary hearing so the judge shall not ally with the prosecutor.  In addition, 
the magistrate checks the executive power, which is consistent with the idea that the prosecution 
is subject to the review of the judiciary.  The judiciary checks the government’s power, but it 
does not play a role of a superior to the executive nor does it act as the government attorney, nor 
does it use inquisitorial power to demand the prosecutor to further her investigation.  
 
In short, the supplementary ruling runs against the contemporary institutional design that 
achieves the check and balance between the separation of governmental powers as well as the 
adversarial style of even-handed screening procedure.  Therefore, this device should be abolished 
in that it tips the balance of the adversarial-style procedure and relations of separation of powers.  
Without it, the imbalance in favor of the prosecution is avoided.    
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7. Charging Threshold and Screening Threshold 
 
The threshold of prosecution determines the degree to which a case should be prepared 
by the prosecutor before sending it to the court.  In the United States, the screening magistrate 
screens the cases on the basis of probable cause standard, which binds the case over to the grand 
jury stage.  In federal jurisdiction, the court states that “probable cause signifies evidence 
sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to conscientiously entertain a 
reasonable belief of the accused’s guilt.”638 
 
In the United States, state jurisdictions approach the probable cause determination in 
different ways.  Some states follow the federal approach, and others employ a stricter, prima 
facie, standard, which requires a state to demonstrate sufficient probable cause to believe that the 
charged has committed the offense and all reasonable inferences from evidence could support a 
guilty verdict.639  The prima facie standard requires no credibility weighing of the testimony and 
is not equated to the standard for a conviction.640  This standard, when applied in the preliminary 
hearing, where adversarial procedure is adopted, brings closer to the ruling on motion for 
directed verdict after the completion of presentation of evidence by both parties.641 
 
By adopting the prima facie standard, a few criticisms may arise.  One concerns timing: 
this standard may cause an arrested suspect to be held for a longer period of time while the case 
                                                
638Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 175,176 (1949);Coleman v. Burnett, 
C.A.D.C. 477 F. 2d 1187, 1202 (1973). 
639Com. v. Williams, 911 A. 2d. 550, 553 (Pa. Super. 2006). 
640Id. at 548(citing Commonwealth v. Kohile, 502 Pa. 359, 466 A. 2d 991, 997 (1983) and stating that credibility is 
not an issue at pretrial proceedings).  
641LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 311, at221. 
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is being prepared and screened.  The other criticism is that more states use the probable cause 
standard instead of this higher standard.642  As to the former criticism, it is inevitable that 
adopting the higher standard may take longer to complete the investigation.  However, one may 
perceive the potential debate from a different perspective.  Although the suspect may be detained 
for a longer time due to the prosecution preparing a case, a suspect may be cleared at the end of 
the investigation and released.  In other words, the higher standard demands more elaborate 
investigation, which might lead to the benefits of obviating the erroneous prosecution and 
achieving justice. While a higher social cost is embedded within by adopting a higher screening 
standard, these benefits outweigh the cost.  This might be what a proposed screening mechanism 
expects to achieve.  As to the latter criticism, the rigidity of threshold is just a matter of choice as 
opposed to the value of “right” or “wrong.”  A stringent screening assessment would be much 
more effective in the latter phase in criminal justice.  This dissertation advocates that both 
factually innocent and legally innocent shall not go through the harsh trial and be diverted earlier 
from the criminal justice system.  Higher screening standard is one natural way for a system to 
reduce wrongful charging.   
 
In Taiwan, normally, the charging threshold is whether the evidence is sufficient to 
consider that the accused is suspected to have committed the offense.643  The screening threshold 
is “obviously insufficient” to consider the possibility that the accused is guilty.  In other words, 
the threshold looks at the possibility of a guilty conviction unless the evidence is clearly 
insufficient.  By comparing it with the prima facie standard, both are compared to the standard 
for a conviction.  The difference lies between “obviously insufficient” and “prima facie” degree 
                                                
642KAMISAR ET AL, supra note 273, at 1025. 
643WANG, supra note 495, at102. 
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of proof.  Although there is a proclamation that this threshold is identical to the “prima facie,”644 
considering that the context “obviously insufficient” evidence to prove guilty, it is a threshold 
that demands much lower degree of proof than the prima facie standard because the context 
“obvious” is an important qualification. 
 
While the degree of “obviously insufficient” is uncertain and vague in comparison to the 
current charging standard, the screening standard is set so low that there is hardly any 
comparison to the standard for conviction.  Besides, the prosecution standard and screening 
standard have different thresholds that confuse the prosecutor as to which one should be 
followed.  The standard is difficult for the defense to challenge and the screening judge to 
exercise.  It would be better if the two thresholds are lined together in order to remove the gap 
between charging and screening.  In addition, the two standards shall be raised up higher than the 
probable cause or suspicion that the offense was committed standards.           
 
From normative perspective, the prima facie standard provides a clear-cut standard in 
application and case selection.  As we previously noted, the prima facie standard is more 
predictable in context than “obviously insufficient” standard.  Moreover, a higher threshold 
could sound a cautionary note to the prosecutor to conduct the screening more rigorously.  
Besides, the threshold incentivizes the prosecutor to consider whether the evidence supports her 
version of the facts and would support the conviction of the accused.  Comparatively, Germany’s 
threshold to prosecute demands sufficient suspicion that evidence obtained through investigation 
                                                
644Id. at103. 
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is “very likely” to lead to a conviction of the accused.645  In other words, the prosecutor is 
required to prove to a degree close to conviction of the accused.     
 
Set forth earlier in this chapter was an example of the prosecutor who indicted the 
accused for rape on the basis of a confession and victim’s identification without a DNA 
examination or other evidence.  As a matter of law, a mere confession could not prove a 
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without corroborating evidence.646  Eventually, the 
DNA test report cleared the defendant.  If a screening mechanism would entail prima facie 
standard, the case would be easily ruled out because prosecution evidence would not warrant a 
conviction due to the absence of the corroborating evidence required to verify the confession and 
victim identification.  DNA evidence is currently required nowadays in almost every type of rape 
cases.  The prosecutor should have concluded that the case bore insufficient evidence and failed 
to satisfy the requirement of the mandatory prosecution.  The prosecutor should have also chosen 
not to charge until the DNA report was released.  Obviously, a different and more correct 
outcome ensues when a higher standard is applied.  
 
8. Pretrial Detention        
 
Pretrial detention in Taiwan is divided into two parts.  One is the detention made during 
the investigation by the judge through the filing of the application by the prosecutor.  The other 
is decided by the trial judge simultaneously, together with the case filing at the trial court, if the 
                                                
645LIN, supra note 233, at 21. 
646Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 156 (2013)(Taiwan) (The confession of a defendant, 
or an accomplice, shall not be taken as the only proof of a conviction; other collaborative evidence shall still be 
investigated and collected to check whether the confession is consistent with fact). 
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accused was held in custody during the investigation.  Normally, the trial judge receives the case 
with the dossier and decides by a custodial hearing whether the accused should remain in 
custody or not once the prosecution is presented at court.  For the former one, i.e., the detention 
made during the investigation, it was decided earlier in the criminal process and is irrelevant to 
the screening.  For the latter one, i.e., the detention made after the case is filed at the trial court, it 
is related to the new proposed screening procedure and needs to be addressed.    
 
Currently, the screening takes place after the case is filed, and the trial judges in charge of 
the case decides whether the continued detention is necessary if the accused is being held in 
custody during the investigation.  Under the reformed screening perspective, the prosecution is 
screened by an independent screening judge.  Should the screening procedure include the 
determination of the trial detention when the prosecution is filed or should both be separated?  
This question is irrelevant to the screening process, and it is a question that might mix with the 
screening procedure and attract the attention of judiciary community and society to resolve it.  In 
addition, there is a tension that exists when the screening and detention decisions conflict with 
each other, especially if it is decided that the detention should continue during the trial and the 
case is then dismissed by the screening judge.  Apparently, both decisions should be grouped 
together in case this type of situation occurs.  If both decisions are evaluated and decided 
individually and separately, the inconsistency of the decisions might result in troublesome 
situations.  Moreover, if the detention decision is made by trial judges, we are also concerned 
that these judges may be predisposed to convict the defendant.  Would it be better that both 
decisions are determined by screening judges to avoid the inconsistency when the prosecution’s 
case is filed? 
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In light of this characteristic, the trial detention should be decided simultaneously by the 
screening judge.  While the screening judge conducts an adversarial screening procedure, she has 
control over the dossier including witnesses and other physical evidence.  She is also exposed to 
the witness testimony and cross examination.  Thus, the decision whether the accused shall be 
detained further at the trial and whether the detention requirement is satisfied partially depends 
on the screening result that demonstrates that the accused is highly suspected of committing the 
offense.  In the reformed screening mechanism, there may be two distinctive thresholds that a 
screening judge is required to consider.  First, the screening threshold is set so that the state is 
required to demonstrate sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict.  Second, the detention 
threshold is set at a level that the judiciary holds a great suspicion of the commission of the crime 
and the likelihood of the accused to flee or destroy evidence, etc. (other detention 
requirements).647  It could be distinguished that the prima facie screening threshold entails a 
higher threshold than that of a detention.  If a case meets the screening threshold, it seems that 
                                                
647Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 101 (2013)(Taiwan) (providing that an accused may 
be detained after a detention hearing by a judge and is greatly suspected of having committed an offense, given the 
existence of one of the following circumstances to indicate that there are potential difficulties in prosecution, trial, or 
execution of sentence unless the accused is detained: 
1.She has absconded, or facts sufficient to justify an apprehension that he may abscond; 
2.There are facts sufficient to consider that she may destroy, forge, or amend evidence, or tampering with a co-
offender or a witness; 
3. She has committed an offense punishable for a death penalty, life imprisonment, or a minimum imprisonment 
with no less than five years. 
During the detention hearing, the public prosecutor may be present and present the reason for applying detention 
order and necessary evidence.); art. 101-1(Taiwan) (providing that an accused may be detained, if necessary, after 
detention hearing and is greatly suspected of committing one of the following offenses, and if there are facts 
sufficient to indicate that he may commit more of the same offense: 
1. arson and the offense of constructive arson; 
2. forced sexual intercourse, act of molestation, aggravated molestation. For the case chargeable upon a complaint, if 
a complaint is not filed or has been withdrawn, or if the charging period of filing the compliant has lapsed, then this 
section shall not apply; 
3. obstruction of freedom in movement ; 
4. forcing others to conduct certain acts, intervening others to exercise their rights and threatening to personal 
security; 5. larceny ; 
6.robbery; 8. extortion). 
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the charge would satisfy the “great suspicion” requirement of the detention threshold.  However, 
this merely shows the degree to which the screening judge believes that the charge is likely to 
support a conviction.  For the detention, a judge is still required to consider other factors required 
by law, such as the likelihood that the accused will flee or destroy the evidence, etc.  Eventually, 
the screening judge could decide whether to detain the accused further on the basis of the 
information derived from the screening procedure and the dossier.   
 
9. Reprosecution After Dismissal   
 
Currently, when screening judges dismiss the prosecution’s case, the prosecution may 
directly appeal to the higher court and ask for a review of the dismissal decision.  What causes 
the dispute is the restriction on the refiling of the case by the prosecution whether on the basis of 
the same evidence or not.  According to the law, once the rule to dismiss the prosecution’s case 
becomes final, no prosecution can be filed for the same case, unless one of the circumstances 
specified in article 260 exists.648 
 
The restriction to reprosecute is restricted in order to protect of the accused from being 
harassed by the state.  A prosecution may be reinitiated, however, based on new facts or 
evidence discovered after the first prosecution or upon the following conditions: (1) the evidence 
on which the dismissal is based have been proven fabricated or modified;(2) the material 
                                                
648Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 161(2013)(Taiwan); art. 260(2013)(Taiwan) (stating 
if a ruling not to prosecute or if a deferred prosecution has been maintained by the superior prosecutor and become 
finalized, no re-initiation of prosecution of the identical case shall be allowed except under one of the following 
conditions:1. New facts or evidence is discovered; 
2. Circumstances for retrial exist as specified in one of the condition 1, 2, 4, or 5 of section I of article 420). 
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testimony, or expert opinion on which the dismissal is based has been proven false;(3) the 
decision by any court on which the dismissal is based has been altered in a final decision;(4)the 
prosecutor who investigates or prosecutes the case commits crimes in her position and those 
offenses have been proved; or (5) the prosecutor neglected her duties in handling the case and 
had been administratively chastised, and the misconduct is sufficient to affect the original 
judgment.649 
 
In the United States, the prosecutor is not barred from refiling the case even on the basis 
of the same evidence.  The basic notion is that the preliminary dismissal does not implicate 
double jeopardy clause in federal jurisdiction, and state law puts very few restrictions on refiling 
the charge.650  For the minority of states that bar the refiling on the same evidence, they allow the 
prosecutor to refile the case if new evidence occurs.651  Due to the difference of double jeopardy 
notion between United States and Taiwan, the prosecutor dismissal decision restricts itself from 
the second prosecution except on the condition of the newly discovered evidence and facts or 
those exceptions listed above.  Likewise, under the new proposal, the screening dismissal applies 
an identical concept that such dismissal bars reprosecution unless those exceptions exist.   
 
Theoretically, the prosecutorial dismissal of the case is not a judicial decision and has no 
binding effect; therefore, it is irrelevant to the double jeopardy consideration.  However, 
concerning the prosecutor’s decision is deemed as a judicial decision with binding effect in 
Taiwan, to bar a second prosecution without existence of the aforementioned exceptions is 
                                                
649Xing Shi Su Song Fa[The Code of Criminal Procedure] art. 420 (2013)(Taiwan). 
650KAMISAR ET AL, supra note 273, at 1027. 
651Id. 
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rooted in our judicial culture.  This dissertation does not argue any defective procedure 
concerning the refiling procedure, because it inherently is less related to the defect of the 
screening process.        
 
III. Any Objections 
 
Currently in Taiwan, the screening mechanism is equally applied to all offenses, ranging 
from minor offenses to felony, despite the fact that it is rarely used.  As this dissertation 
advocates an adversarial screening, most objections arise from two rationales.  One is the cost of 
the procedure.  Second is the redundancy of the adversarial style of the screening hearing.  Both 
involve several factors that boost expenses carried out by the proposed adversarial screening.  
The possible increased expenses include procedural costs, such as increases in hearing times and 
complexity of the process for the screening judge, and the administrative costs accompanied with 
the procedure, including personnel, defense attorney fees, and the cost to the witnesses.652 
 
Seemingly increased expenditure accompanied with the reformed screening is inevitable, 
but it is affordable.  Any reform inevitably brings additional expenses, and increased costs of all 
kinds.  The proposed screening could at least bring in the following saved costs that make the 
system better off than that of a system without it.  First, the accused may gain an earlier insight 
into the government’s case and weigh it, which might result in an earlier guilty plea or a plea 
bargain.  .  If the accused is informed that the prosecutor has a solid case earlier in the criminal 
                                                
652See Notes, supra note 299, at 790 (noting the factors result in the expenses in forward-looking preliminary 
hearing are hiring more qualified magistrates, both party manpower to prepare for the hearings, administrative fee 
for the judicial proceedings). 
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process, she might adjust her litigating strategy in exchange for a more favorable sentencing.653  
Even if the accused decides not to plea or plea bargain, the hearing could facilitate the trial 
process.  Either way, it reduces a great amount of time and expense at trial for both parties and 
trial judges.  In addition, a higher prosecution standard may well inform the prosecution of the 
strength of its case concerning whether the accused could be convicted, and alternatively, save 
time and resources of that charge for a better one.654 
 
Second, administrative and procedural cost saving is an essential benefit.  Given that the 
screening hearing entails questioning and cross examination of the prosecution witnesses, it 
perpetuates of witness testimony and its preservation for the subsequent use at trial if the witness 
becomes unavailable.  So, the hearing not only reduces the time and expense at trial, but also 
ascertains the admissibility of “out of trial court testimony” lest “out of trial court testimony” 
leads to another debate at the suppression hearing.   
 
Third, as Judge Posner stated, “how accuracy in fact finding relates to deterrence, notice 
that the expected cost of punishment is actually the difference between the expected cost of 
punishment if one commits a crime and the expected cost of punishment if one does not commit 
a crime.”655  He also noted that    
“The more accurate the process of determining guilt is, the less random 
punishment will be, and so the greater will be the law’s deterrent effect . . . . 
So, inaccuracy can increase as well as reduce deterrence.  But probably the 
                                                
653Anti-Corruption Act, art. 8 (Taiwan).  
654Notes, supra note 299, at 795. 
655Richard A, Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1483(1999). 
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latter effect will predominate in most cases . . . it will impose greater social 
costs the bigger the case.”656 
 
Similarly, Professor Miceli stated that “err in the determination of guilt mitigates the deterrent 
effect of criminal punishment by reducing the expected cost of committing crime, or, 
equivalently, by reducing the benefit of being innocent.”657  Therefore, wrongful convictions 
lead to reduced deterrence and impose greater social cost on the person being wrongly convicted.  
   
A wrongful conviction still conveys the deterrent effect to the rest of the society in spite 
of no specific deterrence to the wrongly convicted.658  For the society as a whole, the aggregate 
deterrence effect is not as great as that of a correct conviction to the whole society as well as to a 
specific convicted defendant.  Therefore, the total deterrent effect is still reduced in this sense.  
For the wrongfully convicted person, society will have to pay for the loss for the wrongfully 
convicted person.  For the nonconvicted culprit, either the actual wrongdoers will be arrested and 
tried in the future, or she will never be found.  In the former case, society will pay the trial cost 
twice for the same offense.  In the latter one, the expected cost of committing the crime is not 
realized; hence, the deterrent effect is reduced. 
 
Wrongful prosecution opens the door to the wrongful conviction, and leads to reduced 
deterrence and a waste of social cost to prosecute, to litigate, to convict, and to imprison the 
wrong person.  First, not identifying, investigating, and prosecuting the factually guilty person 
                                                
656Id. at 1484-1487. 
6573 Thomas J. Miceli, Criminal Procedure, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 125, 141 (Nuno Garoupa eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
658 This specific idea comes from Professor Leipold’s Memorandum after his review of my dissertation proposal. 
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has already allocated great amount of resources in the wrong direction and led to ineffective 
deterrence.  Second, the actual culprit might not be deterred and even commit more offenses.  So 
any wrongful prosecution reduces deterrence as well.  A new occurrence of crime is another cost 
that comes from the wrongful targeting and charging.  As a result, a wrongful prosecution 
generates much social costs and less deterrence to the criminal justice system.  The proposed 
adversarial screening procedure, would aim targeting at the guilty, avoid wrongful charging, 
lessen burdens to the criminal justice system, and better obviate wrongful conviction from a 
system. 
 
IV. One Size Fits All? 
 
While acknowledging above-outlined objections, the new reform mechanism should 
address the costs and benefits and propose to apply the new reformed mechanism only in felony 
adversarial screenings.  This dissertation does not consider that the new reformed mechanism 
does fit all.  Rather, in order to balance the costs and benefits of the proposed system, the optimal 
design may be to select specific group of offenses, usually felonies, for the potential candidate 
under which to apply the adversarial screening on the basis of the following reasons.    
 
First, as analyzed empirically, but not conclusively, in chapter 1, the conviction rate of 
felony cases, especially for corruption offenses, has been quite low for years.  Considering that 
this kind of offense sometimes involves high-ranking government officials and political figures, 
these cases attract more attention and publicity and usually involve more suspects or a ring of 
suspects.  These cases are also the ones that the government is especially interested in 
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prosecuting in order to gain personal reputation or personal fame.  This may incentivize the 
prosecutor to charge not in the best interest of society and engage in less self-screening in the 
decision making.  Moreover, concerning the internal screening, the internal hierarchical high-
ranking officials, might not screen effectively because of their interests being aligned with the 
indicting prosecutor in order to take a free ride in gaining the fame as well.  Thus, the nature of 
the offense inherently makes the charging decision a disputed issue and often brings doubts in 
society among different political parties.  One example can be seen in the investigation and 
charging in 2008 of the former president of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, for corruption and money 
laundering at the conclusion of his presidency.  The prosecution was questioned by his party and 
its supporters, alleging that the prosecution was politically motivated and lacked evidence.  Not 
only did the supporters criticize it as political persecution, but also the former chairman of the 
American Institute in Taiwan, Nat Bellocchi, wrote in an open letter to the Ministry of Justice 
that “the prosecutors’ offices should avoid the appearance of targeting only one particular 
political group.”659  The nature of corruption case results in demanding more stringent and 
refined screening before the charge can be considered justified and warranted.   
 
Second, it seems that the conviction rates of more ordinary offenses are significantly 
higher in comparison to corruption.  From May 2008 to May 2012, the average conviction rate in 
                                                
659 Nat Bellocchi, Eroding justice: Open letter No.2,Taipei Times (Taiwan), Dec. 2, 2008, available at 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/12/02/2003430120 (last visited Jan.11, 2012); see also 
Jerome A. Cohen, rebuilding trust, Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 27, 2008,  available at http: 
//www.cfr.org/publication/17870/rebuilding_trust.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F14%2Fjerome_a_cohen   
(last visited Jan.11, 2009)(professor Jerome A. Cohen of New York University College of law wrote to an Asia 
newspaper expressing his suggestion that “Taiwan's president, Ma Ying-jeou, appoint an ad hoc independent 
commission of experts to examine claims that corruption prosecutions of present and former officials during the 
Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou administrations may have been politically inspired or selective”).  
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corruption offenses is 63.1% while the average overall offense conviction rate is 95.7%.660  
Given that the overall dismissal rate is much lower than 1%—noting that the corruption offenses 
have a disproportionately low conviction rate when compared with the overall conviction rate—
the central problem seems to fall on the corruption offenses.  Even the Ministry of Justice 
noticed this question and committed to raise the conviction rate.661 
 
Moreover, misdemeanors and mid-level felonies are less complex in nature, and the 
evidence is easier to obtain in support of the prosecution’s case.  Furthermore, offenses that are 
punishable by less than three year imprisonment are at the discretion of the prosecutor.  The need 
for the refined screening for these kinds of offenses i.e., misdemeanor, and mid level felonies is 
at great expense to the criminal justice system.     
 
Due to the limited resources and personnel, the adversarial type of screening should be 
allocated to felony cases only in order to prevent innocent persons being forced to stand trial and 
to protect their reputation.  An adversarial screening is not intended to protect those who are 
actually guilty of committing the charged offense.  With regard to the ordinary cases, the accused 
should still be entitled to a screening that adopts current screening procedures after balancing the 
costs to the pretrial system.                                                 
  
                                                
660Ministry of Justice, Statistic of Justice, available at http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/273111445976.pdf  
(last visited Aug. 21, 2012) 
661Fa Wu Bu Xin Wen Xiao Xi, Fa Wu Bu Dui Yu Bao Zai Jian Fang Lan Su Tan Du Ding Zui Lu Jin Wu Cheng 
Wu Zhi Yi Jian[Ministry of Justice Opinions of Media Reporting Corruption Offense Conviction Rate Mere 
55%](Taiwan), available at http://www.moj.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=141046&ctNode=27518&mp=001(last visited 
Sep. 26, 2012). 
242 
 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION 
  
Taiwanese prosecutors have been accused of abuse and errors in judgment in 
prosecutorial charging decisions where there has not been sufficient evidence to indict or where 
there were unjustified motivations behind the charges.  Theoretically, in a hierarchical model of 
prosecutorial government, the prosecutorial decisionmaking accentuates organizational 
consistency and centralization of authority.  Moreover, a mandatory prosecution system, like that 
of Taiwan, mandates the prosecutor to charge once there is sufficient evidence in felony cases.  
The prosecution should be subjected to no pressure or external influence.  In reality, prosecutors 
retain their charging decision power that could either be abused or misjudged to breach the 
requirements of mandatory prosecution.  Thus, abuse of mandatory prosecution or errors of 
judgment by prosecutors regarding the decision to prosecute still exist.   
 
Accordingly, an effective screening of prosecutorial charging should be a critical stage in 
criminal procedure to prevent a potential wrongful prosecution and conviction, which inflicts 
discriminative effects upon defendants and burdens the criminal justice system with inflated 
caseloads, and breeds mistrust of the system by the citizens.  It also diminishes the general and 
specific deterrent effects and increases social costs.  In light of these characteristics, it is 
especially important that the mechanism for screening prosecutors’ charging decisions functions 
effectively.  Although, Taiwan did enact the screening mechanism in the criminal procedure, the 
criticisms continue and no existing research examines the effectiveness of the newly 
promulgated screening mechanism.   
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The empirical data presented in chapter 1, suggests that the system is seldom being 
employed to screen charging decisions, given that both the overall offense and the corruption 
offense dismissal rates are much lower than 1% (See table 1 and 2).  Judging from the overall 
dismissal rates in Taiwan ranging from 0.0025% to 0.03%, one might deem that either the 
prosecutions are of extraordinary high quality or the screening mechanism is not used properly.  
If we suggest the prosecution quality is quite high, the conviction rate should be accordingly 
high.  When this dissertation examines the overall conviction rate throughout these years, this 
dissertation finds that the conviction rate is quite high.  However, if we break down the overall 
conviction rates into distinct felonies, like corruption, for example, the conviction rates for 
corruption offenses, including facilitation of payment and favoritism, from May 2001 to 2012 are 
around 49% to 67% (See table 3), while dismissal rates for the corruption offense are almost zero 
(See table 2).  Since the conviction rates are low, then, why do judges not screen out such cases 
in the first place?  One may argue the reasons that contribute to the low-conviction phenomenon 
are quite varied. 
 
Although these statistics are not conclusive, they are still suggestive that the new 
screening mechanism is underemployed.  Furthermore, one empirical project funded by the 
Ministry of Justice in Taiwan examined reasons for low conviction rates in corruption offenses 
and sought improvement of the technicalities of investigating corruption cases, and found that 
94.6% of judges considered the main reason for the low conviction rate to be insufficient 
evidence.  In addition, the acknowledgement of the abuse of prosecutorial power in corruption 
cases is 78.7%.  
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The empirical information strongly suggests that the alleged problem of corruption 
prosecutions without sufficient evidence is a genuine problem.  This empirical project especially 
demonstrates the severity of the abuse of prosecution in the corruption cases, and the corruption 
cases entail the problem of insufficient evidence, yet the dismissal rate is still so low, which 
suggests how urgent the new screening mechanism is in need of reform.  The current screening 
mechanism might not function effectively as a shield to protect the accused and scrutinize 
unwarranted charging decisions, and this dissertation examines current deficiencies of the 
mechanism and offers potential alternatives and prospective solutions.   
 
To begin with, this dissertation examines some major criminal justice systems and 
underlying ideologies for the prospective analysis of prosecutorial organizations, functions, and 
authorities of the United States, France, and Taiwan.  Through analysis of various legal systems, 
this dissertation finds that legal participants, legal cultures, the prosecutorial organizational 
structures, and the roles the prosecutor plays, all affect her behavior in performing her charging 
authority.  Regardless of whether the prosecutor operates in a continental system or the U.S. 
system, the charging authority entails the possibility of being abused or misjudged.  The 
screening mechanism aims to prevent such abuses of prosecutorial charging discretion.         
 
Preliminary hearings in the United States, whether in federal or state jurisdictions, adopt 
adversarial process that allows for equal footing for both parties.  It entails the right to defense 
counsel, public hearings, and cross examination of prosecution witnesses, which are all aimed to 
determine whether the charge is appropriate.  The burden rests on the prosecution to call 
witnesses and elicit testimony to meet the screening threshold, probable cause or prima facie 
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standard, is found.  The magistrate supervises these procedures and terminates the questioning 
once probable cause is found.662  While the preliminary hearing adopts adversarial procedures, 
the grand jury mechanism’s traditional form remains intact and is somewhat similar to an 
inquisition procedure.  Thus, various calls for reform of the grand jury also emphasize the 
adversarial inputs and strengthening defense rights of the target to redress current defects that 
puts heavy dependence on prosecutors and tilts the process of screening.663 
 
On the other side of the Atlantic ocean, in France, the instruction procedure, i.e., judicial 
supervision led by the investigating judge allows more input, especially from the defense, to 
demand the investigating judge to proceed with certain investigation, including calling witnesses, 
confronting the witness, searching, and conducting phone surveillance in order to help establish 
the equality of arms.  This pretrial process aims to incorporate fundamental safeguards of human 
rights as outlined in the ECHR.664 
  
Therefore, adversarial participation and evenhanded involvement are essential 
components in discovering more balanced evidence and in protecting the innocent from 
squandering her overall cost to defend against unfounded accusations.  The combination of these 
two components is a more trusted screening process than inquisitorial or one-party dominant 
systems could afford.  While there is such a trend toward adversarial screening in the United 
                                                
662WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 273, §92. 
663See Leipold, supra note 264, at 311(noting that “unless there is a clash of adversaries, grand juries composed of 
nonlawyers will be left to make a foregone legal conclusion, and thus will be a shield in name only”). 
664See HODGSON, supra note 67, at 42-44 (noting the reform adopted the idea of human rights, instead of the 
recommendation of adversarial ideology).  
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States, and there are demands for more party-participated judicial investigation in France, 
Taiwan’s screening mechanism bears opaque and ineffective features that are in need of reform. 
 
By “opaque” this dissertation means that the screening procedure proceeds without 
holding an adversarial hearing and without an independent procedure that really mandates the 
screening.  The screening is mixed with the pretrial preparation without distinct process that 
advances the goals of the screening mechanism.  It seems like an almost invisible mechanism or 
procedure that is seldom being mentioned or employed.  The “ineffectiveness” was analyzed 
from several perspectives, including the screening procedure, screener neutrality, evidentiary 
rules, the right to counsel, threshold for screening, and discovery.  This dissertation then 
illustrates the current law and practice of screening mechanism in Taiwan and identifies major 
defects that are urgently in need of reform to create a better informed, more party-participatory 
procedure, and independent stage to conduct an independent screening of the charging decision.   
 
In short, the appraisal that the current Taiwan screening procedure is ineffective depends 
on several factors.  The screening procedure is set after the prosecution has initiated and gone 
public without actually extending the protection to the accused.  Other than the screening 
procedure being invisible, the screener neutrality is at stake due to the directive to the prosecutor 
to supplement additional evidence before the judge could dismiss a case.  This design endangers 
the impartiality of the screening judge and undermines the checks and balances relationship 
between the judiciary and prosecutors.   
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Moreover, the lack of evidentiary rules and the assistance of counsel inherently create 
ineffective screening that could not prevent the biased procedure and biased presentation of 
prosecution’s version of the criminal behavior.  Besides, the proof threshold requirement poses 
another two questions: (1) whether the low and uncertain degree of the threshold both pose 
threats to the uniformity of screening threshold, and (2) whether the innocent are truly protected 
if such uncertainty maintains a low possibility of a conviction.                       
 
To effectuate reform of the current institution, the overhaul of the screening mechanism 
should adopt adversarial-styled procedures that emphasize an evenhanded process among both 
parties and more participation from the defense.  Independent screening procedures should allow 
the screening judge to hold a hearing in order to screen effectively as opposed to an invisible 
procedure.  Both structural reform of the screening procedure and incorporating adversarial 
components to improve the screening would lead to a comprehensive solution for Taiwan.   
 
This dissertation, therefore, advocates the following reform path: 
 
1. Screening should occur in an independent, ex ante screening procedure that differentiates 
itself from other procedures to inform the judge and allow her to exercise the screening 
power.  Both parties should understand that the procedure should serve as a shield 
between the government and the citizens.  At any rate, a procedure to screen the potential 
charge that is set before the initiation of the prosecution could provide a safeguard for the 
innocent, in case the prosecution goes public once charged, and also incentivize the 
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prosecutor to better prepare her case in the face of the possible challenges from the 
accused. 
 
2. The screening procedure should be adversarial allowing the accused the chance to 
examine the prosecution’s case and to counterbalance the prosecutor’s investigation.  In 
order to implement this more adversarial process, the screening procedure should convert 
to a process of equal party participation that allows the defense an opportunity to present 
her side of the case. 
 
3. The proposed screening procedure should adopt fair procedures that emphasize that some 
procedural safeguards be equally applied to the screening process.  Hence, some identical 
rules of evidence, such as the hearsay evidence, should be equally applied to the 
screening process to play the critical screening function to ensure the accurate outcome.  
In addition, to ban the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence as the government’s 
proof of its case, i.e., exclusionary rule, assists the screening judge in evaluating the 
foundation of the government’s case.  Both of these, when applied in the screening 
mechanism, assure the cases screened are more closely matched to the outcome of the 
trial.  
 
4. When the screening threshold and the prosecution threshold adopt different thresholds, 
unpredictability and unfair outcomes can result.  On top of that, a stringent screening 
threshold brings much more confidence that the accused is not the wrongfully accused 
and functions more effectively in sifting out the unfounded cases.  As a consequence, the 
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proposed screening threshold should be the prima facie standard that could support a 
guilty verdict, but is still lower than the standard that would definitely sustain a 
conviction.         
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APPENDIX A TABLES 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total defendants 
prosecuted during 
the year 
Total defendants 
whose charges 
were dismissed 
during the year 
Dismissal  
rate 
          2002 158,187 49 0.0309% 
          2003 158,907 55 0.0346% 
          2004  134,956 33 0.0244% 
          2005  145,139 43 0.0296% 
          2006 173,720 147 0.0846% 
          2007 203,150 59 0.0290% 
          2008  219,456 50 0.0227% 
2009 205,272 39 0.0189% 
2010 198,159 13 0.0065% 
2011 194,986 5 0.0025% 
 
 
*Data available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/index1.htm  (last visited Dec.10, 2012). 
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Table 2 
 
 
 
Total defendants 
prosecuted during 
the year 
(Corruption 
offense) 
Total defendants 
whose charges 
were dismissed 
during the year 
Dismissal  
rate 
          2002 969 0 0 
          2003 1311 1 0.0762% 
          2004  701 1 0.1426 % 
          2005  547 1 0.1828% 
          2006 840 105 12.5% 
          2007 832 0 0 
          2008  845 0 0 
2009 886 0 0 
2010 721 0 0 
2011 777 0 0 
 
 
*Data available at http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/index1.htm  (last visited Dec.10, 2012). 
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Table 3 
 
Year 
# of Defendants 
Indicted for 
corruption offense 
Conviction Rate 
2001 115 50% 
2002 307 49% 
2003 876 66.3% 
2004 866 49.9% 
2005 562 52.9% 
2006 766 60.6% 
2007 981 62% 
2008 1390 67.6% 
2009 Not listed  67.3% 
2010 Not listed 62.9% 
2011 Not listed 59.3% 
2012(Jan. To Jun.) Not listed 66% 
 
*2001-2008 Data available at 
http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/9221455414.pdf (last visited Dec.10, 2012). 
2009-2012 Jun. Data available at 
http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/226125357.pdf (last visited Dec.10, 2012) 
(However, Ministry of Justice does not give the total number of defendants indicted since 
2009) 
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Table 4 
 
Year 
Overall 
Conviction Rate 
2008(May to Dec.) 95.7% 
2009 95.4% 
2010 95.6% 
2011 96.1% 
2012(Jan. To Jun.) 96.1% 
 
 
Data available at http://www.moj.gov.tw/public/Attachment/273111445976.pdf (last visited Oct. 
25, 2012) 
 
(Ministry of Justice does not give the total conviction rate before 2008 individually) 
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Table 5 
 
 
 
Source 
 
FA WU BU, DIAO CHA JI GOU: JUE CE DIAO CHA GU FEN YOU XIAN GONG SI[Ministry of 
Justice, Research Institute: Decision Making Research], Taiwan DI QU GONG WU YUAN FAN 
TAN DU ZUI DING ZUI LU ZHI WEN JUAN DIAO CHA [Taiwan conviction rate of government 
officials corruption questionnaire and research] (2008)(Taiwan). 
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Table 6 
 
 
 
FA WU BU, DIAO CHA JI GOU: JUE CE DIAO CHA GU FEN YOU XIAN GONG SI[Ministry of 
Justice, Research Institute: Decision Making Research], Taiwan DI QU GONG WU YUAN FAN 
TAN DU ZUI DING ZUI LU ZHI WEN JUAN DIAO CHA [Taiwan conviction rate of government 
officials corruption questionnaire and research] (2008)(Taiwan). 
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Table 7 
 
 
 
FA WU BU, DIAO CHA JI GOU: JUE CE DIAO CHA GU FEN YOU XIAN GONG SI[Ministry of 
Justice, Research Institute: Decision Making Research], Taiwan DI QU GONG WU YUAN FAN 
TAN DU ZUI DING ZUI LU ZHI WEN JUAN DIAO CHA [Taiwan conviction rate of government 
officials corruption questionnaire and research] (2008)(Taiwan). 
 
 
